In Law’s Empire, Ronald Dworkin combines his role as a legal theorist with his role as a political theorist. He sets forth a view of jurisprudence and law as modes or fields of interpretation, and he likewise propounds the notion that our current law can best be interpreted as a system pointing to the ideal of equality-of-resources. Nowhere does Dworkin’s combination of views emerge more piquantly than within his chapter entitled “The Common Law.” There Dworkin grants that much of English and American common law has had the effect of simulating markets—in other words, the effect of allocating productive forces in ways that would have come about via costless bargains among all relevant people. But he disputes the added thesis that the judicial simulation should be interpreted as the maximizing of wealth. Pitting himself against the economic approach to legal matters, Dworkin holds that we can best understand market-simulation as the achievement or pursuit of equality.