1. See Ron Cowen, “Andromeda on collision course with the Milky Way” (31 May 2012), online: Nature doi.org/10.1038/nature.2012.10765.

2. See McDonald v McDonald, [2016] UKSC 28.

3. See Bull v Hall, [2013] UKSC 73; Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd v Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 US ___ (2018).

4. See Bărbulescu v Romania [GC], No 61496/08, (5 September 2017) [Bărbulescu].

5. See New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964); Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130 [Hill]; Palomo Sánchez and others v Spain [GC], No 28955/06, (2 September 2011).

6. See Lorraine E Weinrib, “The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism” in Sujit Choudhry, ed, The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 84; Kai Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2012).

7. See Elinor Mason, “Value Pluralism” in Edward N Zalta & Uri Nodelman, eds, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2023), online: plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/value-pluralism/.

8. Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty” in Isaiah Berlin, Liberty, ed by Henry Hardy (Oxford University Press, 2002) 166 at 216.

9. Isaiah Berlin, “The Pursuit of the Ideal” in Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, 2nd ed, ed by Henry Hardy (Oxford University Press, 2013) 1 at 18.

10. See Alison L Young, “Mapping Horizontal Effect” in David Hoffman, ed, The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 16. See also Aharon Barak, “Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law” in Daniel Friedmann & Daphne Barak-Erez, eds, Human Rights in Private Law (Hart, 2001) 13; Dawn Oliver & Jörg Fedtke, eds, Human Rights and the Private Sphere: A Comparative Study (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007).

11. See Jud Mathews, Extending Rights’ Reach: Constitutions, Private Law, and Judicial Power (Oxford University Press, 2018); Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton University Press, 2007) at ch 7.

12. See Hugh Collins, “Private Law, Fundamental Rights, and the Rule of Law” (2018) 121:1 W Va L Rev 1 at 23-25.

13. A brief clarification about how the literature figures in the article is in order. While much has been written about the topic, few attempts have been made to tackle its philosophical aspects and even fewer to engage it as a problem of moral pluralism (an exception in this regard—from which I benefitted greatly and to which I attempt to respond, albeit indirectly—is Jean Thomas, Public Rights, Private Relations (Oxford University Press, 2015)). Given this paucity, this article focuses on ideal-typical models that reflect judicial principles without getting into theoretical complications that are too distant from the line of argument. In general, important points of divergence between the claims made here and competing theoretical claims are addressed in the main text while reference to other theories and to their claims is made in the footnotes.

14. See Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, “Deontological Ethics” in Edward N Zalta, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020), online: plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/ethics-deontological/.

15. See Erwin Chemerinsky, “Rethinking State Action” (1985) 80:3 Nw UL Rev 503.

16. See Mathews, supra note 11 at ch 5.

17. See Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905) [Lochner]. See also Tushnet, supra note 11 at 173.

18. For a survey of central critiques (and responses), see Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, “The State Action Principle and Its Critics” (2010) 96:8 Va L Rev 1767.

19. Samuel Scheffler, “Individual Responsibility in a Global Age” in Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought (Oxford University Press, 2002) 32 at 36–38.

20. Hart famously distinguished in this regard between ‘general’ and ‘special’ rights: see HLA Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?” (1955) 64:2 Philosophical Rev 175 at 183-88.

21. See Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2013) at 285-89, 300-03.

22. See DeShaney v Winnebago County, 489 US 189 (1989) [DeShaney].

23. See Susan Bandes, “The Negative Constitution: A Critique” (1990) 88:8 Mich L Rev 2271 at 2313-26.

24. See Thomas Nagel, “Libertarianism Without Foundations” (1975) 85:1 Yale LJ 136 at 139-40. See also Samuel Scheffler, “Morality and Reasonable Partiality” in Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory (Oxford University Press, 2012) 41 at 69-72.

25. See Barbara H Fried, “What ‘Does’ Matter? The Case for Killing the Trolley Problem (or Letting it Die)” (2012) 62:248 Philosophy Q 505 at 509-17.

26. See Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “Moral Status and the Impermissibility of Minimizing Violations” (1996) 25:4 Philosophy Public Affairs 333; David Enoch, “Intending, Foreseeing, and the State” (2007) 13:2 Leg Theory 69.

27. See Marion Smiley, “Collective Responsibility” in Edward N Zalta, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017), online: plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/collective-responsibility/; Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford University Press, 2011) at 107-12.

28. FA Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty: A new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy (Routledge, 1982) vol 2 at 33.

29. See Tom Kohavi, “Loosely Relational Constitutional Rights” (2021) 41:2 Oxford J Leg Stud 348.

30. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised ed (Harvard University Press, 1999) at 73-78; John Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition, 2nd ed (Columbia University Press, 2005) at 266, 269-71, 282 [Rawls, Political Liberalism]; John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed by Erin Kelly (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001) at 55-57 [Rawls, Justice as Fairness].

31. See Katharina Pistor, The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality (Princeton University Press, 2019).

32. See David Bilchitz, Fundamental Rights and the Legal Obligations of Business (Cambridge University Press, 2021) at 143-147; Colin D Campbell, “The Nature of Power as Public in English Judicial Review” (2009) 68:1 Cambridge LJ 90.

33. See Ian Haney-López, “Intentional Blindness” (2012) 87 NYUL Rev 1779.

34. See Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US 715 (1961); Moose Lodge No 107 v Irvis, 407 US 163 (1972).

35. See Lawrence G Sager & Nelson Tebbe, “Discriminatory Permissions and Structural Injustice” (2021) 106 Minn L Rev 803.

36. See Mathews, supra note 11 at 129-32.

37. See John CP Goldberg & Benjamin C Zipursky, “Tort Theory, Private Attorneys General, and State Action: From Mass Torts to Texas S.B. 8” (2021) 14:2 J Tort L 469.

38. See Stephen Gardbaum, “The Myth and Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism” (2008) 107:3 Mich L Rev 391 at 431-44.

39. On utilitarianism and consequentialism, see generally Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Consequentialism” in Edward N Zalta, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021), online: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/consequentialism/.

40. See Bilchitz, supra note 32 at 62-63, 67-68, 78, 179; Sonu Bedi, “The Absence of Horizontal Effect in Human Rights Law: Domestic Violence and the Intimate Sphere” in Tom Campbell & Kylie Bourne, eds, Political and Legal Approaches to Human Rights (Routledge, 2017) 189 at 195-99.

41. On this constitutional burden, see Bilchitz, supra note 32 at 181, 232.

42. See Aoife Nolan, “Holding non-state actors to account for constitutional economic and social rights violations: Experiences and lessons from South Africa and Ireland” (2014) 12:1 Intl J Const L 61.

43. See Meskell v CIE, [1973] IR 121.

44. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, ss 8(1), 8(2).

45. Khumalo v Holomisa, [2002] 5 SA 401 (CC) at paras 21, 33, 41-43. See also Bilchitz, supra note 32 at 199-203.

46. Bilchitz, supra note 32 at 195-96.

47. See ibid at 227.

48. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 30 at 268.

49. See Bernard Williams, “Consequentialism and Integrity” in Samuel Scheffler, ed, Consequentialism and Its Critics (Oxford University Press, 1988) 20 at 35, 49.

50. Ronald Dworkin, “The Common Law” in Law’s Empire (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986) 276 at 294.

51. See Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (Hart, 1999) at 10, 93.

52. See Emad H Atiq, “Why Motives Matter: Reframing the Crowding Out Effect of Legal Incentives” (2014) 123:4 Yale LJ 1070.

53. See Bilchitz, supra note 32 at 273-79. It should be noted that Bilchitz focuses on private relations in which power is distributed asymmetrically.

54. See R Jay Wallace, The Moral Nexus (Princeton University Press, 2019) at 69.

55. Thomas Nagel, “War and Massacre” (1972) 1:2 Philosophy & Public Affairs 123 at 137, 138.

56. On the forms of blame involved here, see Bennet W Helm, “Personal Relationships and Blame: Scanlon and the Reactive Attitudes” in Katrina Hutchinson, Catriona Mackenzie & Marina Oshana, eds, Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2018) 275.

57. See Wallace, supra note 54 at 49-61, 76-86, 98-100; Stephen Darwall, “Bipolar Obligation” in Morality, Authority, & Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I (Oxford University Press, 2013) 20; Jesse Wall, “Public Wrongs and Private Wrongs” (2018) 31:1 Can JL & Jur 177.

58. See David Bilchitz & Laura Ausserladscheider Jonas, “Proportionality, Fundamental Rights, and the Duties of Directors” (2016) 36:4 Oxford J Leg Stud 828 at 844-45, 849.

59. See Carlo Vittorio Giabardo, “Private Law in the Age of the ‘Vanishing Trial’” in Kit Barker, Karen Fairweather & Ross Grantham, eds, Private Law in the 21st Century (Hart, 2017) 547.

60. See e.g. Marco Bastos & Dan Mercea, “The public accountability of social platforms: lessons from a study on bots and trolls in the Brexit campaign” (2018) 376:2128 Philosophical Transactions Royal Society A, online: https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2018.0003.

61. See Avihay Dorfman & Alon Harel, “Against Privatisation as Such” (2016) 36:2 Oxford J Leg Stud 400.

62. See e.g. Sophia Moreau, Faces of Inequality: A Theory of Wrongful Discrimination (Oxford University Press, 2020) at ch 7; Avihay Dorfman & Alon Harel, eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Privatization (Cambridge University Press, 2021).

63. See John Oberdiek, “It’s Something Personal: On the Relationality of Duty and Civil Wrongs” in Paul B Miller & John Oberdiek, eds, Civil Wrongs and Justice in Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2020) 301.

64. See Sibo Banda, “Taking Indirect Horizontality Seriously in Ireland: A Time to Magnify the Nuance” (2009) 31 Dublin U LJ 263; Nick Friedman, “The South African Common Law and the Constitution: Revisiting Horizontality” (2014) 30:1 SAJHR 63. See also Oliver & Fedtke, supra note 10 at 479-84.

65. Then, it might be justified to “empower citizens in their interpersonal relations to ask that others alter their conduct or take seriously considerations that might have been neglected.” Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog” (2010) 123:5 Harv L Rev 1214 at 1227.

66. See Bilchitz, supra note 32 at 74-75. This also seems to be the central case in Thomas, supra note 13.

67. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 30 at 259-65.

68. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 30 at 164, 166.

69. See David O Brink, “Utilitarian Morality and the Personal Point of View” (1986) 83:8 J Philosophy 417; Paul Hurley, Beyond Consequentialism (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 36-46. See also Henry Shue, “Mediating Duties” (1988) 98:4 Ethics 687 at 696-97.

70. This reduces the problem of arbitrary “rule-worship” that plagues moral indirect consequentialism. JJC Smart, “Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism” (1956) 6:25 Philosophical Q 344 at 349.

71. For the claim that private agents must be able to reason from rights to their duties to others (which rules out indirect models of horizontality), see Thomas, supra note 13 at 147, 161-64, 169-71.

72. See Gonçalo de Almeida Ribeiro, “The Effects of Fundamental Rights in Private Disputes” in Hugh Collins, ed, European Contract Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, vol 2 (Intersentia, 2018) 219 at 242-46.

73. 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958) [Lüth].

74. See Stefan Somers, The European Convention on Human Rights as an Instrument of Tort Law (Intersentia, 2018); Eleni Frantziou, The Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights in the European Union: A Constitutional Analysis (Oxford University Press, 2019); Ernest J Weinrib, Reciprocal Freedom: Private Law and Public Right (Oxford University Press, 2022) at 141-48.

75. Evans v UK [GC], No 6339/05, ECHR 2007 [Evans].

76. See Virgílio Afonso da Silva, “Comparing the Incommensurable: Constitutional Principles, Balancing and Rational Decision” (2011) 31:2 Oxford J Leg Stud 273 at 280-83.

77. On this concern, see Mattias Kumm, “Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law” (2006) 7:4 German LJ 341 at 359.

78. See Rowan Cruft, Human Rights, Ownership, and the Individual (Oxford University Press, 2019) at 143-49.

79. See Kurt Gray & Chelsea Schein, “Two Minds Vs Two Philosophies: Mind Perception Defines Morality and Dissolves the Debate Between Deontology and Utilitarianism” (2012) 3:3 Rev Philosophy & Psychology 405. See also FM Kamm, “Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology, and the Harming-Versus-Not-Aiding Distinction” (1998) 108:3 Ethics 463.

80. Paul Edward Hurley, “Exiting the Consequentialist Circle: Two Senses of Bringing it About” (2019) 60:2 Analytic Philosophy 130 at 131.

81. See Paul Hurley, “Consequentializing and Deontologizing: Clogging the Consequentialist Vacuum” in Mark Timmons, ed, Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics: Volume 3 (Oxford University Press, 2013) 123; Daniel Muñoz, “The Rejection of Consequentializing” (2021) 118:2 J Philosophy 79.

82. See Peter Schaber, “Are There Insolvable Moral Conflicts?” in Peter Baumann & Monica Betzler, eds, Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 279 at 285-89; S Andrew Schroeder, “Consequentializing and its Consequences” (2017) 174:6 Philosophical Studies 1475.

83. See Benjamin C Zipursky, “Pragmatic Conceptualism” (2000) 6:4 Leg Theory 457 at 460-467,

84. See Stephen Darwall, “Demystifying Promises” in Hanoch Sheinman, ed, Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays (Oxford University Press, 2011) 255.

85. See TM Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Belknap Press, 1998).

86. See Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Harvard University Press, 2006) at 11-12.

87. On transparency and opacity in this regard, see Meir Dan-Cohen, “Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law” (1984) 97:3 Harv L Rev 625.

88. See Weinrib, supra note 74 at 204-06.

89. See Jeremy Waldron, “Vagueness and the Guidance of Action” in Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) 58 at 65.

90. See Shiffrin, supra note 65 at 1227; Dan Priel, “Jurisprudence and Psychology” in Maksymilian Del Mar, ed, New Waves in Philosophy of Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 77 at 88.

91. See John Gardner, From Personal Life to Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2018) at 8-9; Andrew S Gold, “The Relevance of Wrongs” in Miller & Oberdiek, supra note 63, 41 at 45-47.

92. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “The Divergence of Contract and Promise” (2007) 120:3 Harv L Rev 708 at 740-43.

93. See John CP Goldberg & Benjamin C Zipursky, “The Moral of MacPherson” (1998) 146:6 U Pa L Rev 1733 at 1742-43.

94. See Michael Selmi, “Indirect Discrimination and the Anti-discrimination Mandate” in Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 250.

95. See Jeremy Waldron, “Indirect Discrimination” in Stephen Guest & Alan Milne, eds, Equality and Discrimination: Essays in Freedom and Justice (F Steiner, 1985) 83; Samuel R Bagenstos, “The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law” (2006) 94:1 Cal L Rev 1 at 40-47.

96. See Bilchitz, supra note 32 at 105, 116, 128.

97. See Thomas, supra note 13 at 25-28, 33-34.

98. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford University Press, 1986) at 177. See also Thomas Nagel, “Pluralism and Coherence” in Mark Lilla et al, eds, The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin (New York Review Books, 2001) 105 at 106-07.

99. See Mathews, supra note 11 at ch 7; Gavin Phillipson & Alexander Williams, “Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint” (2011) 74:6 Mod L Rev 878.

100. This idea is implicit in the four-stage sequence in which Rawls unpacks his theory of justice—see Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 30 at 397-99; Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 30 at 11, 48.

101. On these ideas in private law theory, see Charles Fried, “The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know” (1981) 60:1 Tex L Rev 35 at 57; Benjamin C Zipursky, “Coming down to Earth: Why Rights-Based Theories of Tort Can and Must Address Cost-Based Proposals for Damages Reform” (2006) 55:2 DePaul L Rev 469; Ernest J Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 3, 11, 18; Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs (Harvard University Press, 2016) at 292-94.

102. Weinrib claims, in this regard, that constitutional rights with distributive aspects that entail positive duties (most notably social and economic rights), are outside the scope of horizontality because they are incompatible with the bipolar normative structure of private law (which, at most, can recognize negative duties not to impair the exercise of such rights that it is the state’s positive duty to guarantee). See Weinrib, supra note 74 at 150-60. Responding to these claims about the nature of private law goes beyond the scope of this article. A brief reply is that private law can, and already does, translate collective duties (say, to protect public safety or promote equality) to private law duties, including positive ones.

103. Lüth, supra note 73. See also Mathews, supra note 11 at 51ff.

104. See Anton Fagan, “Determining the Stakes: Binding and Non-binding Bills of Rights” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez, supra note 10, 73.

105. See Weinrib, supra note 74 at 131-41.

106. See Human Rights Act 1998 (UK); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 at 223 (entered into force 3 September 1953); Phillipson & Williams, supra note 99.

107. See Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 et al v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 573.

108. Ibid at 600.

109. Hill, supra note 5 at 1170-1171.

110. See Rent Act 1977 (UK); Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30.

111. See Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 SCR 1016.

112. See Campbell v Mirror Group Newspaper Ltd, [2004] UKHL 22. See also Collins, supra note 12 at 16-17.

113. See Hill, supra note 5 at 1183, 1187-88, 1193.

114. See Weinrib, supra note 74 at 177. See also George Crowder, “Pluralism, Relativism, and Liberalism” in Joshua L Cherniss & Steven B Smith, eds, The Cambridge Companion to Isaiah Berlin (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 229 at 237-40.

115. See Cass R Sunstein, “Incompletely Theorized Agreements” (1995) 108:7 Harv L Rev 1733. See also Vladislava Stoyanova, “Common Law Tort of Negligence as a Tool for Deconstructing Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights” (2020) 24:5 Intl JHR 632 at 638-41.

116. On this solution from the private law side, see Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, “Justice in Private: Beyond the Rawlsian Framework” (2018) 37:2 Law & Phil 171 at 173, 176.

117. See Bilchitz, supra note 32 at 219-33.

118. Mathews, supra note 11 at 186, 191.

119. See Hayek, supra note 28 at 24-25. See also Weinrib, supra note 74 at 140-41.

120. See Stoyanova, supra note 115 at 645-48.

121. See Young, supra note 27 at 113-22.

122. For example, if we come across an online sale of a product that we really want and it ends in an hour, and we are exhausted, we might have good second-order reasons to avoid the purchase. How attractive the deal is, how tired we are, and the possible cost will all shape our decision. See Ruth Chang, “Putting Together Morality and Well-Being” in Baumann & Betzler, supra note 82, 118 at 140-47.

123. See Phillipson & Williams, supra note 99.

124. See McKinney v University of Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 229 [McKinney].

125. See Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Ass’n v Douglas College, [1990] 3 SCR 570.

126. See Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 461.

127. See Philip Pettit, “Consequentialism and Moral Psychology” (1994) 2:1 Intl J Philosophical Studies 1 at 3-6, 10-12; Philip Pettit, “The Inescapability of Consequentialism” in Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang, eds, Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams (Oxford University Press, 2012) 41.

128. See Bărbulescu, supra note 4 at paras 139-41.

129. See López Ribalda and Others v Spain [GC], No 1874/13, (17 October 2019).

130. See James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 68-69, 80.

131. See Amartya Sen, “Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason” (2000) 97:9 J Philosophy 477 at 487-94. See also Christian Seidel, “New Wave Consequentialism: An Introduction” in Christian Seidel, ed, Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems (Oxford University Press, 2019) 1.

132. See Hurley, supra note 81 at 127-31.

133. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 30 at 11, 257-58; Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 30 at 10-12, 50, 73. See also Samuel Freeman, Rawls (Routledge, 2007) at 243, 294-95, 336.

134. Ronald Dworkin, “In Praise of Theory” (1997) 29:2 Ariz St LJ 353 at 357.

135. See also Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, “Structure and Value in the Common Law” (2015) 163:5 U Pa L Rev 1241; Hanoch Dagan, “Doctrinal Categories, Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law” (2015) 163:7 U Pa L Rev 1889 at 1891-1908.

136. Pettit, “The Inescapability of Consequentialism”, supra note 127 at 45.

137. Joseph Raz, From Normativity to Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2011) at 176. See also NP Adams, “In Defense of Exclusionary Reasons” (2021) 178:1 Philosophical Studies 235.

138. See Alison L Young, “The Human Rights Act 1998, Horizontality and the Constitutionalisation of Private Law” in Katja S Ziegler & Peter M Huber, eds, Current Problems in the Protection of Human Rights: Perspectives from Germany and the UK (Hart, 2013) 69 at 83.

139. Campbell, supra note 112 at para 53.

140. [2009] 3 SCR 640.

141. See Martha C Nussbaum, “The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis” (2000) 29:2 J Leg Stud 1005; Martha C Nussbaum, “Comment” in Judith Jarvis Thomson, Goodness and Advice, ed by Amy Gutmann (Princeton University Press, 2001) 97 at 102-04.

142. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Democratic Law, ed by Hannah Ginsborg (Oxford University Press, 2021) at 86.

143. See Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford University Press, 1991) at 109-10.