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Representation by Population: A Comparative Study

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2014

Terence H. Qualter
Terence H. Qualter*
Affiliation:
University of Waterloo
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Extract

On March 9, 1964, the Hon. J. W. Pickersgill moved in the House of Commons the second reading of the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Bill, a step of major constitutional importance which not only made provision for the first redistribution of Canadian federal constituencies since 1952, but provided that, for the first time, this task of redistribution would be taken out of the hands of parliamentary committees and entrusted to independent representation commissions. All this was long overdue and there was broad, if not unanimous, agreement that the creation of impartial representation commissions was a desirable reform. As Mr. Pickersgill said in the House next day:

The first and by far the most important of these [principles] was that we should not follow the pattern that had been followed in the first ninety years since Confederation, of having the readjustment of representation in this place done in this place by its members directly, but that it should be done by some body which would be as impartial as we in our collective ingenuity could provide and who would be as competent as we could find means to provide through legislation and subsequent appointment.

Lorsque la Loi sur la révision des limites des circonscriptions électorales fut introduite dans la Chambre des Communes canadienne en 1964, on était d'accord que les inégalités énormes existant dans les districts électoraux devaient être rectifiées, mais en même temps on reconnaissait le fait qu'une égalité absolue était pratiquement irréalisable. Par conséquent, le sujet central du débat qui suivait fut, jusqu'à quel point, et pour quelles raisons, on pourrait tolérer ou même insister sur une mesure d'inégalité. Bref, les arguments se divisaient en deux catégories: la suggestion que les limites de tolérance soient rétrécies afin d'assurer une forme plus stricte de représentation par population, et la suggestion contraire que les limites soient étendues afin d'accommoder d'autres considérations telles que la communauté d'intérêts, les moyens de communication, la tradition, et les avantages d'un alignement des limites des circonscriptions électorales avec les limites des comtés. L'étude des débats révèle que la plupart des défenseurs d'une grande tolérance ont cherché à préserver les circonscriptions rurales ayant des populations moyennes de beaucoup au-dessous des quotités électorales provinciales, tandis que ceux qui représentaient les intérêts urbains favorisaient des limites plus rétrécies pour atteindre une mesure d'égalité plus grande. Un compromis de 25 pour cent au-dessous ou au-dessus de la quotité provinciale fut enfin accepté.

Après cet examen des débats canadiens, l'article traite ensuite de la situation dans trois autres pays: d'abord, la Grande Bretagne, où des circonstances spéciales sont censées exiger une position même plus souple que celle demandée au Canada; ensuite, la Nouvelle-Zélande où, faisant partie d'une ligne de conduite par laquelle la trop grande représentation des districts ruraux est en train d'être rectifiée, les limites de tolérance furent restreintes à 5 pour cent; et enfin, l’Australie où, bien que les problèmes canadiens de distance et d'énormes régions existent dans des formes même plus extrêmes, presque toutes les circonscriptions électorales ont des populations jusqu'à 10 pour cent de quotité (la moitié des limites légales de 20 pour cent).

La dernière partie de l'article examine quelques décisions récentes de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis, en commençant par Baker vs. Carr en 1962. Le thème développé à travers ces décisions est que les inégalités énormes dans la population des districts électoraux constituent une infraction du Quatorzième Amendement qui garantit la protection égale des lois, et que trop représenter les intérêts ruraux au prix des intérêts urbains constitue une discrimination électorale aussi indéfendable que celles bassées sur la race, le sexe, la propriété, ou la religion.

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique , Volume 33 , Issue 2 , May 1967 , pp. 246 - 268
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1967

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References

1 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1964, p. 739.Google Scholar (Cited hereafter as Debates.)

2 Bill C-143, 1st Session, 27th Parliament.

3 Bill S-22, 1st Session, 27th Parliament.

4 One change was later made in the time limits set down in the original Act. On February 18, 1966, die House approved a Bill amending Clause 20 of the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act extending from fifteen to forty-five days the period within which the House might consider an objection filed with the Speaker. This Bill (C-126) incidentally, passed through all stages from first to third reading in approximately four minutes. See Debates, 1966, p. 1486.

5 The figures are from 26th General Election 1963, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, Table 5, pp. xii-xviii.

6 Debates, 1963, p. 5115.Google Scholar

7 On a motion of Mr. Eldon Woolliams (PC), carried by a vote of 60-11. Debates, 1964, p. 10,057.Google Scholar

8 Debates, 1963, p. 5129.Google Scholar

9 Debates, 1872, p. 926.Google Scholar

10 Debates, 1899, p. 3482.Google Scholar

11 Dawson, R. M., The Government of Canada, 4th ed. revised by Ward, Norman (Toronto, 1963), 341.Google Scholar

12 Debates, 1872, p. 926.Google Scholar

13 Debates, 1899, p. 3442.Google Scholar

14 For the circumstances which led to this debate, and for its outcome, see Ward, Norman, The Canadian House of Commons: Representation (Toronto, 1950), 37-8.Google Scholar

15 Debates, 1899, p. 3471.Google Scholar

16 Debates, 1899, p. 3463.Google Scholar

17 Debates, 1964, p. 10,112.Google Scholar

18 Filed with Mr.Speaker, , 02 14, 1966 and debated April 28, Debates, 1966, pp. 4454–85.Google Scholar

19 The quotations in this paragraph are from “Annex to Objections Relating to Readjustment of Electoral Boundaries in Ontario,” filed with Mr. Speaker, February 14, 1966. Similar objections were raised by other Ontario members. In Objection no. 15, filed February 16, Mr. R. J. McCleave (PC, Halifax) and nine other Conservatives, protested boundaries in the Halifax area which did not conform with “recognized Municipal divisions.”

20 Debates, 1964, pp. 836–7.Google Scholar

21 Objection no. 5, filed with Mr. Speaker, February 10, 1966, signed by the four P.E.I, members and six others. Objections to the proposed new divisions of Beauharnois, Chambly, Laprairie, Longueuil and St. Jean maintained that drastic changes were insufficiently justified. This was brought out in Objection no. 26, filed February 18, and signed by eleven Quebec Liberals, one Ontario Liberal and one Quebec Conservative.

22 Debates, 1966, p. 4455.Google Scholar This does seem an unfair attack on the commissions, for to read the debates of 1964 together with the Reports of the commissions leaves the impression that the commissions in each province attempted faithfully to interpret the legislation in the spirit of those debates.

23 Debates, 1966, p. 4538.Google Scholar

24 Debates, 1964, p. 10,032.Google Scholar

25 Debates, 1964, p. 2211.Google Scholar

26 Debates, 1964, p. 2266.Google Scholar This is an echo of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's opposition in 1892 to increased representation for Montreal. ( Debates, 1892, p. 3119.Google Scholar)

27 Debates, 1964, p. 833.Google Scholar

28 The only non-signing member was H. A. Olson, Social Credit member for Medicine Hat. The Objection was filed on January 28, 1966, and was introduced for discussion in the House on April 28.

29 Debates, 1966, p. 4435.Google Scholar The reader should read also the objections raised by Mr. Gerard Laprise (RCr, Chapleau) to the practical difficulties of campaigning in the proposed new riding of Abitibi which created an “impossible situation.” ( Debates, 1966, p. 4397.Google Scholar) In the 1964 debates Mr. Gilles Gregoire discussed other campaign difficulties in the rural ridings. ( Debates, 1964, p. 833.Google Scholar)

30 Debates, 1964, p. 766.Google Scholar

31 Debates, 1964, p. 830.Google Scholar

32 Debates, 1964, p. 772.Google Scholar

33 “The member for Trois-Rivieres could absorb 3,000 more electors. First, as far as I am concerned, there would be no problem of distance. Those people live one, two, or three miles away from the office of the member for Trois-Rivieres and of those who will come after me. Therefore it is quite natural to leave them as they are.” (Debates, 1966, p. 4511.)Google Scholar

34 Debates, 1966, p. 4425.Google Scholar

35 Debates, 1966, pp. 4407–8.Google Scholar

36 Debates, 1966, p. 4542.Google Scholar

37 Filed with Mr. Speaker, February 15, 1966, and discussed in the House, April 29. See Debates, 1966, pp. 4535 ff.Google Scholar

38 Debates, 1964, p. 849.Google Scholar

39 Debates, 1964, p. 829.Google Scholar

40 Debates, 1964, p. 803.Google Scholar

41 Debates, 1964, p. 854.Google Scholar

42 Butler, D. E., The Electoral System in Great Britain since 1918, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1963), 214.Google Scholar Paraphrasing Rules 4 and 5 of the House of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Act, 1949.

43 For a fuller history of redistribution in England see Butler, D. E., “The Redistribution of Seats,’ Public Administration (London), 32 ( 1955), 125–47.Google Scholar

44 New Zealand, The Electoral Act, 1956, Sec. 16 (d).

45 Ibid., Sec. 17. For electoral purposes in New Zealand a European is anyone who is not a Maori. The Maoris are separately represented in four Maori constituencies in which the population is considerably less than the European average.

46 Sec. 19 of the Australian Act reads: “In making any proposed distribution of a state into divisions, the Distribution Commissioners shall give due consideration to

(a) Community or diversity of interest,

(b) Means of communication,

(c) Physical features,

(d) Existing boundaries of Divisions and Subdivisions,

(e) State Electoral boundaries;

and subject thereto the quota of electors shall be the basis for the distribution, and the Distribution Commissioners may adopt a margin of allowance, to be used whenever necessary, but in no case shall the quota be departed from to a greater extent than one fifth more or one fifth less.”

The comparable Sec. 13(c) of the Canadian Act reads:

(c) the commission may depart from the strict application of rules (a) and (b) in any case where

(i) special geographic considerations, including in particular the sparsity, density or relative rate of growth of population of various regions of the province, the accessibility of such regions or the size or shape thereof, appear to the commission to render such a departure necessary or desirable, or

(ii) any special community or diversity of interests of the inhabitants of various regions of the province appears to the commission to render such a departure necessary or desirable, but in no case, except as may be necessary in order to give effect to rule (b), shall the population of any electoral district in the province as a result thereof depart from the electoral quota for that province to a greater extent than twenty-five per cent more or twenty-five per cent less.

47 Report of the Joint Committee on Constitutional Review, 1959, of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. No. 108 (Grp. H) F 8051/59. Para. 350. The figures in the above section are all taken from paras. 348-350 of this report.

48 Ibid. paras. 345-352.

49 Rural inhabitants were all those who lived in a community of less than 2000 population and who were more than five miles distant from the central post office of one of the four main cities. All others were urban inhabitants.

50 When introduced in 1881 the Country Quota was set at 25 per cent. It was reduced to 18 per cent in 1887, but increased to 28 per cent in 1889. It remained at that figure until abolished altogether in 1945.

51 See Lipson, L., Politics of Equality (Chicago, 1948), 182–3.Google Scholar

52 364 US 339 (1960).

53 Gomillton v. Lightfoot has been aptly described as “the dragon in the political thicket,” a reference to Colegrove v. Green (328 US 549 (1946)) in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter had written “Courts ought not to enter this political thicket (of legislative reapportionment).” For eighteen years Colegrove stood as the precedent for judicial non-intervention in questions of malapportionment.

54 369 US 186 (1962).

55 For a fuller account of Baker v. Carr and of reaction to it, see Baker, G. E., The Reapportionment Revolution (New York, 1966), 4 ff Google Scholar, and also Congressional Quarterly Background, Representation and Apportionment (Washington, DC, 1966).Google Scholar

56 376 US 1 (1964).

57 377 US 533 (1964).

58 377 US 713 (1964).

59 For details see Hanson, R., The Political Thicket (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1966), 91–101 Google Scholar, or Congressional Quarterly Background, Representation and Apportionment, 27-32.

60 The fiftieth state was Oregon, which had reapportioned on a population basis in 1961.

61 Five states, Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, Vermont, and Wyoming, have only one representative, and two states, Hawaii and New Mexico, elect two representatives at large. None of these nine is therefore subject to reapportionment. Two of the three seats outside the 15 per cent limits were from Georgia and one from Ohio.

62 These figures, and many more or a similar nature, can be found in Congressional Quarterly Background, Representation and Reapportionment.

63 Ward, Norman, The Canadian House of Commons: Representation, 42.Google Scholar