Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-fwgfc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-12T21:10:05.585Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Would We Even Know Moral Bioenhancement If We Saw It?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 May 2017

HARRIS WISEMAN
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract:

The term “moral bioenhancement” conceals a diverse plurality encompassing much potential, some elements of which are desirable, some of which are disturbing, and some of which are simply bland. This article invites readers to take a better differentiated approach to discriminating between elements of the debate rather than talking of moral bioenhancement “per se,” or coming to any global value judgments about the idea as an abstract whole (no such whole exists). Readers are then invited to consider the benefits and distortions that come from the usual dichotomies framing the various debates, concluding with an additional distinction for further clarifying this discourse qua explicit/implicit moral bioenhancement.

Keywords

moral enhancementreductionismmedical ethicsmental healthpaternalismaddiction
Type
Special Section: Enhancement and Goodness
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , July 2017 , pp. 398 - 410
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

I thank Vojin Rakić for his general kindness, generosity, and forbearance in inviting me to his conference, and throughout this process. If I did not know better I would think that his kindness had been expertly bioenhanced. It turns out that he is just a very nice person. I also thank MIT Press, and note that the general points used here are elaborations of ideas articulated in my book, published by them, The Myth of the Moral Brain.

References

Notes

1. Douglas, T. Moral enhancement via direct emotion modulation: A reply to John Harris. Bioethics 2013;27(3):160–8.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

2. Damásio, A. Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Putnam; 1994.Google Scholar

3. Wiseman, H. SSRIs and moral enhancement: Looking deeper. American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 2015;5(4):W1–W7Google Scholar

4. See note 3, Wiseman 2015.

5. Agar, N. A question about defining moral bioenhancement. Journal of Medical Ethics 2013;40(6):359–60.Google ScholarPubMed

6. Jotterand, F. Questioning the moral enhancement project. American Journal of Bioethics 2014;14(4):1–3CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

7. See note 3, Wiseman 2015.

8. Harris, J, On our obligation to enhance. In: Sargent, E, ed. Superhuman: Exploring Human Enhancement from 600 BCE to 2050. London: Wellcome Trust; 2012, at 38–9.Google Scholar

9. Wiseman, H. Can brain implants stop people doing bad things? American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 2015;6(4):38–40Google Scholar

10. Wiseman, H. The Myth of the Moral Brain: The Limits of Moral Enhancement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 2016;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Sparrow, R. Better than men? Sex and the therapy/enhancement distinction. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 2010;20(2):115–44.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

11. Note how the previous paragraph makes use the relevant dichotomies within itself. This hard/soft distinction, explicit attempts to enhance moral functioning, or interventions that, although done for other reasons, have knock on effects of morally significant powers, must also be understood with respect to whether the intervention is being applied coercively, or as a voluntarily self-chosen project (insofar as it is possible to disentangle the two), and likewise, whether it is being used in a therapeutic context, or as part of a project of self-improving an already existing power. The ways that the various distinctions interact and modulate the significance of each other is a very complex business about which a book could be written, but for now I would ask readers to imagine for themselves how the permutations might modulate the various reflections presented here.

12. See note 10, Wiseman 2016.

13. See note 10, Wiseman 2016.

14. Kabasenche, W. Moral enhancement worth having: Thinking holistically. American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 2012;3(4):18–9;Google Scholar Jotterand, F. Psychopathy, neurotechnologies, and neuroethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2014;35(1):1–6.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

15. Grubin D. Chemical castration for sex offenders. British Medical Journal 2010;340, c74.

16. Conrad, P. The Shifting engines of medicalization. Journal of Health and Social Behavior 2005;46(1):3–14.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

17. Allan C. British psychological society response. 2011; available at http://apps.bps.org.uk/_publicationfiles/consultation-responses/DSM-5%202011%20-%20BPS%20response.pdf (last accessed 3 Jan 2016).

18. Rakić, V. Voluntary moral enhancement and the survival-at-any-cost bias. Journal of Medical Ethics 2014;40(4):246–50.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed