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There Can Be No Moral Obligation to Eradicate All Disability

  • REBECCA BENNETT

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Notes

1. Bennett, R, Harris, J. Are there lives not worth living? When is it morally wrong to reproduce? In: Dickenson, D, ed. Ethical Issues in Maternal-Fetal Medicine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2002:321–34, at 325.

2. Harris, J. One principle and three fallacies of disability studies. Journal of Medical Ethics 2001;27:383.

3. See note 1, Bennett, Harris 2002.

4. Harris, J. The wrongs of wrongful life. In: Clones, Genes, and Immortality: Ethics and the Genetic Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1998:99119, at 117.

5. Harris, J. Is there a coherent social conception of disability? Journal of Medical Ethics 2000;26:95100, at 97.

6. See note 4, Harris 1998, at 111.

7. See note 1, Bennett, Harris 2002.

8. Herrisone-Kelly, P. Procreative beneficence and the prospective parent. Journal of Medical Ethics 2006;32:166–69.

9. Parker, M. The best possible child. Journal of Medical Ethics 2007;33:279–83.

10. See note 4, Harris 1998, at 109.

11. See note 1, Bennett, Harris 2002, at 325.

12. See note 5, Harris 2000.

13. See note 5, Harris 2000.

14. Harris, J. Reproductive liberty, disease and disability. Reproductive Medicine Online 2005;10(1):14.

15. See note 5, Harris 2000.

16. Parfit D. The non-identity problem. In: Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1987:352–79, at 363.

17. See note 16, Parfit 1987.

18. See note 16, Parfit 1987, at 378.

19. See note 16, Parfit 1987, at 388.

20. See note 16, Parfit 1987, at 388.

21. See note 16, Parfit 1987.

22. Hurka, T. Value and population size. Ethics 1983;93:496507.

23. Kavka, GS. The paradox of future individuals. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1982;11:93112.

24. Feldman, F. Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1997.

25. Temkin, LS. Intransitivity and the mere addition paradox. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1987;16:138–87.

26. Bennett R. When intuition is not enough: Why the principle of procreative beneficence must work much harder to justify its eugenic vision. Bioethics 2013 July;10. Published online DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12044.

27. See note 2, Harris 2001.

28. See note 1, Bennett, Harris 2002.

29. See note 1, Bennett, Harris 2002, at 30.

30. See note 5, Harris 2000, at 31.

There Can Be No Moral Obligation to Eradicate All Disability

  • REBECCA BENNETT

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