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Rationality, Responsibility, and Brain Function

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2010

TOM BULLER
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Extract

There has been a fair amount of recent discussion about the implications that advances in neuroscience will have on the law and, in particular, legal responsibility. This discussion has been varied and includes, for example, the potential impact of neuroimaging techniques to reveal whether a defendant or witness is telling the truth, and consideration of whether our growing knowledge of brain function will warrant a revision in the law to make it more psychologically relevant.

Type
Special Section: Philosophical Issues in Neuroethics
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 19 , Issue 2 , April 2010 , pp. 196 - 204
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

1. For example, Tancredi L. Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals About Morality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 2005; Gazzaniga MS. The Ethical Brain. New York: Dana Press; 2005:88–9; Morse SJ. New neuroscience, old problems. In: Garland B, ed. Neuroscience and the Law. New York: Dana Press; 2004:157–201; Greene J, Cohen J. For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 2004;B359:1775–85; Glannon W. Neurobiology, neuroimaging and free will. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2005;XXIX:68–82; Morse SJ. Psychopathy and criminal responsibility. Neuroethics 2008;1:205–12; Eastman N, Campbell C. Neuroscience and legal determination of criminal responsibility. Nature Reviews: Neuroscience 2006;7:311–9.

2. See note 1, Morse 2004.

3. See note 1, Greene, Cohen 2004:1780.

4. See note 1, Greene, Cohen 2004:1780.

5. See note 1, Greene, Cohen 2004:1786.

6. See note 1, Greene, Cohen 2004:1781.

7. Langleben DD, Schroeder L, Maldjian JA, Gur RC, McDonald S, Ragland JD, et al. Brain activity during simulated deception: An event-related magnetic resonant imaging study. Neuroimage 2002;15:727–32; Wolpe PR, Foster KR, Langleben DD. Emerging technologies for lie-detection: Promises and perils. The American Journal of Bioethics 2005;5(2):39–49.

8. Libet B. Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1985;8:529–66.

9. Flanagan O. Consciousness Explained. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1992:136–8.

10. Dennett DC. Freedom Evolves. New York: Penguin; 2003:228–42.

11. For a related discussion, see Kaposy C. Will neuroscientific discoveries about free will and selfhood change our ethical practices? Neuroethics 2008;2:51–9.

12. Gurley JR, Marcus DK. The effects of neuroimaging and brain injury on insanity defenses. Behavioral Sciences and the Law 2008;26:85–97.