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Modeling the Social Dynamics of Moral Enhancement: Social Strategies Sold Over the Counter and the Stability of Society

  • ANDERS SANDBERG and JOAO FABIANO

Abstract:

How individuals tend to evaluate the combination of their own and other’s payoffs—social value orientations—is likely to be a potential target of future moral enhancers. However, the stability of cooperation in human societies has been buttressed by evolved mildly prosocial orientations. If they could be changed, would this destabilize the cooperative structure of society? We simulate a model of moral enhancement in which agents play games with each other and can enhance their orientations based on maximizing personal satisfaction. We find that given the assumption that very low payoffs lead agents to be removed from the population, there is a broadly stable prosocial attractor state. However, the balance between prosociality and individual payoff-maximization is affected by different factors. Agents maximizing their own satisfaction can produce emergent shifts in society that reduce everybody’s satisfaction. Moral enhancement considerations should take the issues of social emergence into account.

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References

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Notes

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The ideas behind this article were first discussed in a seminar and subsequent discussion at the Centre for Research in Social Simulation in Surrey, where Jen Badham, Juan Cano, and Corinna Elsenbroich helped in properly shaping our models and assumptions. The article also benefited from discussions with Brian Earp on cooperation and individualism. Emma Bates and Paulo Salem gave much appreciated comments to improve clarity. We have also benefited from the comments and questions from the attendees of the Belgrade “Enhancing the Understanding of Enhancement” conference, October 27–28 2015.

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