William styles was tried at the Oxbridge Assizes on charges of murder and arson. The evidence for the prosecution showed that Styles was the owner and manager of a shop with extensive storerooms, and that at 10 p.m. on the 21st June, Styles deliberately set fire to the building in order to claim the insurance money. John Doe, a storekeeper employed by Styles, was burned to death. No evidence was produced as to why Doe was in the building at that hour. The staff usually left at 6 p.m. though it was not unknown for members to stay later, although no instance of anyone staying as late as 10 p.m. could be adduced. Styles did not search the building before he set it on fire.

No satisfactory definition of Dominium in Roman Law has yet been achieved. Amongst English writers Austin many years ago found great difficulty in this question while in modern times Professor Buckland has written ‘it is thus difficult to define Dominium precisely.’ Again, Poste, dealing with Gaius' discussion of dominium, says that his opening statements are ‘deplorably confused.’ These examples are enough to indicate the condition, of uncertainty which prevails. In my submission this uncertainty exists mainly because the conception of ususfructus has never yet been explained adequately. Of Possessio it has been said ‘the definition of Possessio to give the results outlined is a matter of great difficulty. No perfectly correct solution may be possible,’ and this statement is generally accepted as a correct assessment of the present position in juristic literature. But here, too, in my opinion, the reason is again connected with usufruct, for the possessio of the usufructuary has not yet been adequately determined. Gaius (2.93) tells us ‘usufructuarius vero usucapere non potest; primuum quod non possidet, sed habet ius utendi et fruendi.’ Ulpian holds that he had possessio in fact (‘Naturaliter videtur possidere is qui usum fructum habet’ D.41.2.12). On this subject Roby says ‘the fructuary was not strictly a possessor and therefore if he was deprived from enjoying he had not a claim to the original interdict de vi but in virtue of his quasi-possessio a special interdict was granted him.’ Austin saw difficulty in the whole problem of possessio. He wrote ‘by Savigny in his treatise on possessio it is remarked that the possessio of a right of usufruct … resembles the possessio of a thing, by the proprietor, or by an adverse possessor exercising rights of property over the thing. And that a disturbance of the one possession resembles the disturbance of the other. Now this must happen for the reason I have already stated:—namely, that the right of usufruct or user, like that of property, is indefinite in point of user. For what is possession (meaning legal possession not mere physical handling of the subject) but the exercise of a right ?’

The hall was full of little creatures of all sorts. There was a Mouse, a Duck, a Dodo, a Lory, an Eaglet, and a jet-black Rook wearing a clerical collar.

‘“I,” said the Rook,

“With my little book”’—

murmured Alice to herself.

Before 1926, entailed interests could exist in real property but were impossible in personal property. In order to create an entailed interest in real property, strict words of limitation (e.g., ‘in tail’ or ‘and the heirs of his body’) were essential except in the case of gifts by will. In a will, certain informal phrases, such as ‘and his issue,’ were sufficient. This situation was altered by section 130 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, whereby (a) even personal property may now be entailed, (b) strict words of limitation are now essential in every case.

The reign of Richard I offers certain advantages to those who would A study the land law of that time. Glanvill's De Legibus shows the law as it stood immediately before the reign began; and, five years later, the earliest surviving rolls of the Curia Regis show the King's Justices applying it. These rolls have been printed and so are easily available. They carry the story from the summer of thé year 1194 to the end of the century and beyond. Unfortunately, however, they present certain difficulties. In those days, a plea of land before the King's Justices was ordinarily a lengthy matter, extended by essoins and adjournments over several terms or even years. And when one attempts to trace such a plea to its substantial hearing or to judgment one often fails. Perhaps the roll of the crucial term is missing, or the Justices have adjourned the case from Westminster into the Eyre—whereof few records survive. Perhaps the official scribe has so spelled or altered or contracted the names of the parties as to defy recognition; or the case may have ended prematurely by the death of a party or by some compromise not discoverable among the Feet of Fines. Meanwhile, moreover, one is conscious that these records of the law administered by the King's Justices tell us little or nothing of Shire Court and Court Baron, wherein much of the litigation still lay.

The Penal Code of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic: ‘Article 10. Persons who commit socially dangerous acts shall be liable to the application of measures of social defence of a judicial-correctional character only—

(a) if they acted deliberately, i.e., if they foresaw the socially dangerous consequences of their acts, or desired those consequences, or knowingly permitted them to happen, or

(b) if they acted carelessly, i.e., if they did not foresee the consequences of their acts although they ought to have foreseen them, or if they light-mindedly hoped to avert auch consequences.’