Having completed our review of the historical relations, we are now in a position to inquire how nearly the self-governing Dominions have already approached in actual fact to their theoretical equality with the mother-country. I prefer, for distinctness sake to add the epithet “Self-governing”; for they form only a part of the King's “Dominions” in the wide older sense of that word. The Imperial Conference of 1907 introduced a new and narrower sense, in which it is now limited to such Dominions as have Responsible Government. (Canada in 1867 desired to be called a “Kingdom,” but it was feared that the United States would resent it.)

It is a very difficult matter for me to deliver any remarks whatever to so learned an audience. I had not myself the advantage of a University education, and most of the people whom I had to address during my judicial career were at the same disadvantage as myself. But I did, somehow or another, pass a considerable time either in prosecuting people, all of whom were guilty, or in defending people, nearly all of whom were guilty—I say that as one who really knew. So when I was asked if I would speak to you this evening I thought I would not speak in Greek or Latin, to which you are so thoroughly accustomed, but that I would speak to you about something which if I do not understand better than all of you do, it is, at all events, my own fault. So I thought I would speak on criminal cases, on how to prosecute and how to defend.

The object of this paper is to present a brief outline of the rules of Law applicable to the solution of disputes which involve some foreign element. This body of rules is commonly called “Private International Law”; although this designation is a misnomer, as the rules in question are not concerned with disputes between States, but between individuals.

So far as the present writer is aware very little has been written upon Civil Procedure of a critical or analytical character since the days of JBentham. This deficiency appears to he observable even in the legal literature of the Continent, which is so much richer than our own in the application to legal problems of critical methods.

The question whether a statutory corporation should be held liable for torts committed in the course of an ultra vires undertaking is one of particular interest to the student of law for two reasons. First, the principle of ultra vires emphasises most clearly what Dr. C. T. Carr-calls “the incidents of corporateness.” “Perhaps, indeed,” as Mr. Brice has written, “the Law of Corporations may be considered for most practical purposes as in reality only the application and development of the doctrine of ultra vires.” Secondly, owing to the fact that there are only a limited number of cases dealing with this question, and that even these are but of doubtful authority, a writer is free to suggest his own solution. This lack of precedent does not, however, mean that the problem is devoid of practical importance, for, with the rapid increase in the number of business companies, it is probablethat the courts will have to deal with it in the near future. THE CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL was, therefore, fortunate when it was able to publish Professor Edward H.Warren's article “Torts by Corporations in Ultra Vires Undertakings,” in the 1925 number. This article is of such interest that the writer of the present paper may be excused for discussing at considerable length some of the points raised by it. Professor Warren quotes Sir John Salmond, and, as the latter's view that a statutory corporation ought to be held liable for torts committed in the course of an ultra vires undertaking is familiar to most English students, it will be convenient to consider Salmond's position first.