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PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998: AN IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 November 2007

Stephanie Palmer
Affiliation:
Fellow, Girton College, Cambridge
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Extract

The House of Lords decision in YL v. Birmingham City Council considers the issue of what is a public authority under the Human Rights Act 1998. The question is a critical one as the Convention rights, contained in the Human Rights Act, are directly enforceable only against public authorities. The issue of whether a body is a public authority has proved highly controversial. The hiving-off of many traditional governmental functions through policies such as privatisation, outsourcing and projects under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has led to a blurring of the traditionally understood public-private distinction. The changed nature in the way that public services are delivered has led to sharply divergent views among the judiciary about which functions are those of a public nature for the purposes of the Human Rights Act. This is evident in the YL judgment itself: a split decision, with two dissenting judgements. The division in the House reflects different understandings of the operation of the Human Rights Act, the public-private distinction and, perhaps more fundamentally, competing ideological stances.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2007

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