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EU AGENCIFICATION AND THE RISE OF ESMA: ARE ITS GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS FIT FOR PURPOSE?

  • Elizabeth Howell

Abstract

EU agencies have mushroomed in recent years and new agencies, such as those in the financial arena, can have far-reaching quasi-regulatory and supervisory powers. These developments raise fundamental questions as to their constitutional standing, the delegation of powers and how to wrestle the challenges of independence and accountability. This paper considers ESMA, the most ambitious new financial sector agency. It examines ESMA's governance and accountability mechanisms and makes normative proposals to better balance the competing supranational and national interests within it. Such refinements should also be implemented in conjunction with additional accountability requirements, particularly a greater role for the European Parliament. This reshaping is vital to guarantee ESMA's autonomy and legitimacy.

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Copyright

Corresponding author

Address for Correspondence: Magdalene College, Cambridge, CB3 0AG, UK. Email: ejh86@cam.ac.uk.

Footnotes

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*

Slaughter and May Lecturer in Corporate Law, Faculty of Law, Cambridge.

I am grateful to the two anonymous CLJ referees for their valuable comments. The usual disclaimers apply.

Footnotes

References

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1 European Commission, ESAs' Review: Proposal, COM(2017) 536 Final (2017); European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation as Regards CCPs and Requirements for the Recognition of Third-Country CCPs, COM(2017) 331 (2017).

2 European Commission, Reinforcing Integrated Supervision to Strengthen CMU and Financial Integration in a Changing Environment, COM(2017) 542 (2017), p. 13.

3 Shapiro, M., “The Problems of Independent Agencies in the United States and the European Union” (1997) 4 J.E.P.P. 276.

4 Craig, P., UK, EU and Global Administrative Law: Foundations and Challenges (Cambridge 2015), 541–42; Majone, G., “Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity” (2002) 8 E.L.J. 319.

5 Moloney, N., The Age of ESMA (Oxford 2018), ch. 2.

6 See further e.g. Simoncini, M., Administrative Regulation Beyond the Non-delegation Doctrine (Oxford 2018).

7 Chiti, E., “In the Aftermath of the Crisis – the EU Administrative System between Impediments and Momentum” (2015) 17 C.Y.E.L.S. 311, at 332.

8 Curtin, D. and Dehousse, R., “European Union Agencies: Tipping the Balance?” in Busuioc, M., Groenleer, M. and Trondal, J. (eds.), The Agency Phenomenon in the European Union (Manchester 2012), 201.

9 Curtin, D., “Holding (Quasi) Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account” (2007) 13 E.L.J. 523; European Commission, European Agencies – the Way Forward, COM(2008) 135 Final (2008).

10 Dehousse, R., “Regulation by Networks in the European Community: The Role of European Agencies” (1997) 4 J.E.P.P. 246.

11 Thatcher, M. and Sweet, A. Stone, “Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions” (2002) 25 W.Eur.Pol. 1.

12 Moloney, The Age of ESMA, ch. 2; ibid., at p. 5.

13 Majone, G., “The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe” (1994) 17 W.Eur.Pol. 77; Vos, E., EU Agencies on the Move: Challenges Ahead (Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies 2018).

14 Dehousse, R., “Delegation of Powers in the European Union: The Need for a Multi-principals Model” (2008) 31 W.Eur.Pol. 789.

15 Keleman, D., “The Politics of ‘Eurocratic’ Structure and the New European Agencies” (2002) 25 W.Eur.Pol. 93; Vos, EU Agencies on the Move.

16 Vos, EU Agencies on the Move; M. Egeberg and J. Trondal, “Agencification of the European Union Administration: Connecting the Dots”, ARENA Working Paper 3/2016; Curtin, “Holding”.

17 Groenleer, M., “Regulatory Governance in the European Union: The Political Struggle over Committees, Agencies and Networks” in Levi-Faur, D. (ed.), Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (Cheltenham 2011).

18 Busuioc, M., European Agencies: Law and Practices of Accountability (Oxford 2013), ch. 2.

19 See Art. 263 TFEU.

20 European Commission, The Operating Framework for the European Regulatory Agencies, COM(2002) 718 Final (2002); Craig, P., EU Administrative Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford 2012), ch. 6.

21 Groenleer, M., The Autonomy of European Union Agencies: A Comparative Study of Institutional Development (Delft 2009); Vos, EU Agencies on the Move.

22 C-270/12, UK v Council and Parliament, Judgment of 22 January 2014, EU:C:2014:18. This placed the Banking Union's Single Resolution Mechanism on more secure foundations. See Section V below.

23 C-9/56, Meroni v High Authority, Judgment of 13 June 1958, EU:C:1958:7.

24 Ibid., at p. 152.

26 Ibid., at p. 154.

27 Craig, UK, EU and Global Administrative Law, ch. 4; e.g. Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, Alliance for Natural Health and Others, Judgment of 12 July 2005, EU:C:2005:449, at para. 90.

28 Craig, UK, EU and Global Administrative Law, p. 535.

29 J. de Larosière, The High-level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU: Report (2009); Ferran, E., “Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision” in Wymeersch, E., Hopt, K. and Ferrarini, G. (eds.), Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-crisis Analysis (Oxford 2012).

30 Moloney, N., “The European Securities and Markets Authority and Institutional Design for the EU Financial Market – a Tale of Two Competences: Part (1) Rule Making” (2011) 12 E.B.O.R. 41; Moloney, N., EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 2014), ch. X.5.2.2.

31 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ 2010 L 331 p.84), e.g. Arts. 17–19, 21, 29; see also e.g. Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 (OJ 2011 L 145 p.30) (part of a suite of regulations and which transfers day-to-day supervisory responsibilities to ESMA).

32 European Chemicals Agency, Recommendation for the Inclusion of Substances in Annex XIV to REACH (5 February 2018); Chiti, E., “European Agencies' Rulemaking: Powers, Procedures and Assessment” (2013) 19 E.L.J. 93.

33 Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 ( OJ 2008 L 79 p.1), Art. 17(2)(b); Dehousse, “Delegation of Powers”; Chiti, “European Agencies' Rulemaking”.

34 Regulation 1095/2010, Arts. 10–15.

35 Ibid., at Arts. 10, 15.

36 Marjosola, H., “Regulating Financial Markets under Uncertainty: The EU Approach” (2014) 39 E.L.R. 338.

37 C-270/12, UK v Council and Parliament, Opinion of 12 September 2013, EU:C:2013:562, at para. 78.

38 Craig, UK, EU and Global Administrative Law, ch. 4.

39 Moloney, N., “International Financial Governance, the EU, and Brexit: The ‘Agencification’ of EU Financial Governance and the Implications” (2016) 17 E.B.O.R. 451; Moloney, N., “Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union: Incrementalism or a ‘Big Bang’?” (2016) 13 ECFR 376.

40 ESAs, Opinion on the Commission's Amendments of the Regulatory Technical Standards on Risk Mitigation Techniques for OTC Derivatives Not Cleared by a Central Counterparty (8 September 2016); European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum C(2016) 6329 Final (4 October 2016).

41 C-270/12, UK v Council and Parliament, Judgment of 22 January 2014, EU:C:2014:18, pleas in law and main arguments.

42 C-270/12, UK v Council and Parliament, EU:C:2013:562, Opinion of 12 September 2013, at paras. 6, 85–86.

43 C-270/12, UK v Council and Parliament, Judgment of 22 January 2014, EU:C:2014:18, at para. 78.

44 Ibid., at paras. 79–81.

45 Ibid., at paras. 85–86.

46 Ibid., at para. 85.

47 Marjosola, H., “Bridging the Constitutional Gap in EU Executive Rulemaking” (2015) 10 EuConst 500; Vos, EU Agencies on the Move, s. 3.2.

48 C-270/12, UK v Council and Parliament, Opinion of 12 September 2013, EU:C:2013:562, at paras. 72–74.

49 C-270/12, UK v Council and Parliament, Judgment of 22 January 2014, EU:C:2014:18, at paras. 64–66.

50 Everson, M. and Vos, E., European Agencies: What About the Institutional Balance? (Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper 2014/4, 2014); Moloney, The Age of ESMA.

51 See e.g. Regulation 1095/2010, Arts. 17–19.

52 See e.g. Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 (OJ 2012 L 86 p.1), Art. 28.

53 C-270/12, UK v Council and Parliament, Judgment of 22 January 2014, EU:C:2014:18, at paras. 41–54.

55 J. Pelkmans and M. Simoncini, “Mellowing Meroni: How ESMA Can Help Build the Single Market” (CEPS Commentary, 18 February 2014); Craig, UK, EU and Global Administrative Law, ch. 4.

56 Craig, UK, EU and Global Administrative Law, ch. 4.

57 Marjosola, “Bridging the Constitutional Gap”, p. 518; Vos, EU Agencies on the Move.

58 E. Ferran, “European Banking Union: Imperfect, but It Can Work”, Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No 30/2014, available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2426247> (accessed 20 July 2018).

59 Moloney, N., “European Banking Union: Assessing Its Risks and Resilience” (2014) 51 CML Rev. 1609; C-270/12, UK v Council and Parliament, Opinion of 12 September 2013, EU:C:2013:562.

60 Moloney, “European Banking Union” .

61 Everson and Vos, European Agencies.

62 Craig, UK, EU and Global Administrative Law; Vos, EU Agencies on the Move.

63 Chiti, E., “An Important Part of the EU's Institutional Machinery: Features, Problems and Perspectives of European Agencies” (2009) 46 CML Rev. 1395; European Commission, European Agencies – the Way Forward COM(2008) 135 Final 5.

64 M. Everson, A Technology of Expertise: EU Financial Services Agencies (LEQS Paper No 49/2012, June 2012); Chiti, “An Important Part”.

65 Moloney, EU Securities, ch. X.5.2.2; Everson, A Technology of Expertise, p. 22.

66 Noia, C. Di and Gargantini, M., “Unleashing the European Securities and Markets Authority: Governance and Accountability after the ECJ Decision on the Short Selling Regulation” (2014) 15 E.B.O.R. 1; European Commission, Joint Statement on Decentralised Agencies (2012), p. 5.

67 Regulation 1095/2010, Art. 44.

68 Ibid., at Art. 40.

69 Ibid., at Art. 43.

70 Ibid., at Arts. 48(2), 51(2); Everson, A Technology of Expertise.

71 Ferran, E., “Crisis-driven Regulatory Reform: Where in the World Is the EU Going?” in Ferran, E., Moloney, N., Hill, J. and Coffee, J. (eds.), The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge 2012), 76.

72 Mazars, Review of the New ESFS: Study for the European Parliament's ECON Committee (October 2013 (IP/A/ECON/ST/2012-23)), s. 2.1.3.

73 Regulation 1095/2010, Art. 63.

74 Ibid., at Art. 37. Although concerns, such as of consumers being under-represented have led to complaints, European Ombudsman, Decision Closing His Own-Initiative Inquiry OI/8/2011/IJH Concerning the EBA (27 September 2013).

75 Regulation 1095/2010, e.g. Arts. 1, 42, 46, 49, 59; Busuioc, M. and .Groenleer, M, “The Theory and Practice of EU Agency Autonomy and Accountability” in Everson, M., Monda, C. and Vos, E. (eds.), European Agencies in between Institutions and Member States (Alphen aan den Rijn 2014).

76 Busuioc, M., “Rule-making by the European Financial Supervisory Authorities: Walking a Tight Rope” (2013) 19 E.L.J. 111, at 120.

77 European Commission, ESAs' Review: Proposal; Busuioc, “Rule-making by the European Financial Supervisory Authorities”, p. 121; Vos, EU Agencies on the Move.

78 Mazars, Review of the New ESFS, s. 2.1; Moloney, N., “EU Financial Governance after Brexit: The Rise of Technocracy and the Absorption of the UK's Withdrawal” in Alexander, K., Barnard, C., Ferran, E., Land, A. and Moloney, N. (eds.), Brexit and Financial Services: Law and Policy (Oxford 2018).

79 Payne, J., “Institutional Design for the EU Economic and Monetary Union: Financial Supervision and Financial Stability” in Amtenbrink, F. and Herrmann, C. (eds.), Oxford Handbook on the EU Law of Economic and Monetary Union (Oxford 2019).

80 Moloney, EU Securities, ch. X.5.2.2; e.g. ESMA, Board of Supervisors: Summary of Conclusions (December 2016 (2016/BS/309rev1)), p. 3.

81 Moloney, EU Securities, ch. X.5.2.2; Mazars, Review of the New ESFS, s. 2.1.

82 Vos, EU Agencies on the Move, ch. 4.

83 Busuioc, M., “Accountability, Control and Independence: The Case of European Agencies” (2009) 15 E.L.J. 599, at 601.

84 Busuioc and Groenleer, “The Theory and Practice”.

85 Ibid.; Groenleer, The Autonomy, ch. 2.

86 Busuioc and Groenleer, “The Theory and Practice”; cf. Scholten, M., “Accountability vs. Independence: Proving the Negative Correlation” (2014) 21 MJ 197. See also Simoncini, Administrative Regulation, ch. 4.

87 Bovens, M., Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability: A Conceptual Framework (European Governance Papers No C-06-01, 2006) 9; Curtin, D., “Delegation to EU Non-majoritarian Agencies and Emerging Practices of Public Accountability” in Gerardin, D. and Petit, N. (eds.), Regulation through Agencies in the EU, a New Paradigm of European Governance? (Cheltenham 2005); Vos, EU Agencies on the Move.

88 Busuioc, European Agencies, ch. 3; Craig, EU Administrative Law, ch. 6.

89 Craig, EU Administrative Law, ch. 6.

90 See Regulation 1095/2010, Arts. 1(2), (3) (scope of activities), Art. 1(5) (mandate and objectives), Art. 8 (tasks and powers).

91 Vos, EU Agencies on the Move, ch. 4.

92 Regulation 1095/2010, Arts. 62–64.

93 Ibid., at Art. 68; Moloney, EU Securities, ch. X.5.2.

94 Regulation 1095/2010, Art. 3.

95 Ibid., at Art. 43(4)–(6).

96 ESMA, “Board of Appeal Decisions” (2018), available at <https://www.esma.europa.eu/sections/board-appeal> (accessed 29 March 2019).

97 Regulation 1095/2010, Arts. 60–61.

98 European Ombudsman, Decision Closing His Own-initiative Inquiry.

99 Regulation 1095/2010, Arts. 54–55; Noia and Gargantini, “Unleashing”; Chiu, I., “Power and Accountability in the EU Financial Regulatory Architecture: Examining Inter-agency Relations, Agency Independence and Accountability” (2015) 8 European Legal Studies 67; cf. Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, ch. X.5.2.6.

100 Busuioc and Groenleer, “The Theory and Practice”.

101 The multitude of channels can raise “accountability overload” concerns: Bovens, M., Schillemans, T. and Hart, P., “Does Public Accountability Work? An Assessment Tool” (2008) 86 Pub.Adm. 225, at 227.

102 Amtenbrink, F. and Lastra, R., “Securing Democratic Accountability of Financial Regulatory Agencies – a Theoretical Framework” in De Mulder, R. (ed.), Mitigating Risk in the Context of Safety and Security How Relevant Is a Rational Approach? (Rotterdam 2008).

103 IMF, FSAP: Technical Note on Issues in Transparency and Accountability Country, Report No. 13/65 (March 2013), 10–11; Mazars, Review of the New ESFS, pp. 117–18.

104 Demarigny, F. and Lannoo, K., Navigating the Minefield of the ESA Review (European Capital Markets Institute Commentary, No. 49/27 February 2018).

105 Chiti, “In the Aftermath”, p. 319.

106 Moloney, “EU Financial Governance after Brexit”, p. 106.

107 European Commission, Banking Union: Restoring Financial Stability in the Eurozone (15 April 2014).

108 European Commission, Communication on Completing the Banking Union, COM(2017) 592 Final (2017).

109 The SSM's legal basis is Art. 127(6) TFEU (ECB competence for prudential supervision). The ECB is not subject to Meroni.

110 In line with s. 3, the SRM/SRB's legal basis is Art. 114.

111 ECB, Annual Report on Supervisory Activities for 2017 (March 2018), 74; Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (OJ 2013 L 287 p.63), Art. 6(4).

112 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (OJ 201 L 225 p.1).

113 European Commission, Communication on Completing the Banking Union.

114 Moloney, “European Banking Union”.

115 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (OJ 2013 L 287 p.63), Art. 25, see also Art. 1.

116 Ibid., at Art. 26.

117 Ibid., at Art. 26(3).

118 Ibid., at Art. 26(4).

119 Ibid., at Art. 26(4).

120 Ferran, E. and Babis, V., “The European Single Supervisory Mechanism” (2013) 13 JCLS 255, at 269.

121 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (OJ 2013 L 287 p.63), Art. 26(6).

122 Treaty of Lisbon (2007/C 306/01), Art. 129(1) TFEU.

123 S Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (OJ 2013 L 287 p.63), Art. 26(8).

124 Ferran and Babis, “The European Single Supervisory Mechanism”, p. 267; Moloney, “European Banking Union”.

125 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (OJ 2013 L 287 p.63), see Arts. 20–21, 24; Ferran and Babis, “The European Single Supervisory Mechanism”; Moloney, “European Banking Union”.

126 Interinstitutional Agreement between the Parliament and ECB (2013/694/EU) (OJ L 320 p.1); MoU between the Council and the ECB on the Cooperation on Procedures Related to the SSM (December 2013).

127 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (OJ 2013 L 287 p.63), Art. 20(2)–(5).

128 Ibid., at Art. 20(7).

129 Ibid., at Art. 20(8)-(9).

130 Ibid., at Art. 20(8); Ferran and Babis, “The European Single Supervisory Mechanism”.

131 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (OJ 2013 L 287 p.63), Art. 21.

132 Ibid., Recitals 54, 58, Arts. 22, 24.

133 Vos, EU Agencies on the Move; Moloney, “European Banking Union”.

134 Kuile, G. Ter, Wissink, L. and Bovenschen, W., “Tailor-made Accountability within the Single Supervisory Mechanism” (2015) 52 CML Rev. 155, at 165; Ferran and Babis, “The European Single Supervisory Mechanism”.

135 Moloney, “European Banking Union”.

136 Amtenbrink and Lastra, “Securing Democratic Accountability”, p. 121.

137 Ter Kuile et al., “Tailor-made Accountability”; see also Quintyn, M., Ramirez, S. and Taylor, M., The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the Independence and Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors (IMF Working Paper No. 07/25, 2007), 11.

138 Amtenbrink and Lastra, “Securing Democratic Accountability”.

139 Ferran and Babis, “The European Single Supervisory Mechanism”, p. 271.

140 IMF, FSAP Technical Note: Assessment of Observance of Basel Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, No.18/233 (July 2018); ECB, Annual Report on Supervisory Activities for 2017.

141 European Court of Auditors, SSM – Good Start but Further Improvements Needed (2016), 134; European Commission, Report on the Single Supervisory Mechanism COM(2017) 591 Final (October 2017), 6.

142 SSM Supervisory Manual (March 2018); ECB, Annual Report on Supervisory Activities for 2017.

143 ECB, Annual Report on Supervisory Activities for 2017, s. 5.1; F. Amtenbrink and M. Markakis, “Towards a Meaningful Prudential Supervision Dialogue in the Euro Area? A Study of the Interaction between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in the Single Supervisory Mechanism” (ADEMU Working Paper 2017/081).

144 Amtenbrink and Markakis, “Towards a Meaningful Prudential Supervision Dialogue”.

145 “ECB Supervisor Defends Role in Italian Banking Crisis”, Financial Times (4 July 2017); cf. “Banco Popular Process Is a Model for Failing Banks”, Financial Times (8 June 2017); Moloney, “EU Financial Governance after Brexit”, p. 96.

146 Moloney, N., “Brexit and Financial Services: (yet) Another Re-ordering of Institutional Governance for the EU Financial System?” (2018) 55 CML Rev. 175, at 192–93.

147 Ibid. Note that Moloney identifies that the Treaty competence for this initiative is unclear.

148 Moloney, “EU Financial Governance after Brexit”, p. 106.

149 See further Moloney, The Age of ESMA, ch. 6.

150 Ibid., at ch. 6; see also Colaert, V., “European Banking, Securities, and Insurance Law: Cutting through Sectoral Lines?” (2015) 52 CML Rev. 1579.

151 Amtenbrink and Markakis, “Towards a Meaningful Prudential Supervision Dialogue”.

152 Curtin, “Holding”, p. 540.

153 Demarigny and Lannoo, Navigating the Minefield of the ESA Review.

154 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation as Regards CCPs and Requirements for the Recognition of Third-country CCPs.

155 Moloney, The Age of ESMA, ch. 5.

156 EIOPA is the smallest of the three and although its tasks may grow (particularly in relation to pan-EU pension product proposals), this will take time. The EBA's structure is also fundamentally impacted by the SSM's introduction and the ECB's shadow looms large over it; Ferran, E., “The Existential Search of the European Banking Authority” (2016) 17 EBOR 285.

157 Demarigny and Lannoo, Navigating the Minefield of the ESA Review.

158 A. Sapir, N. Véron and G. Wolff, Making a Reality of Europe's Capital Markets Union (April 2018).

159 European Commission, ESAs' Review: Proposal, Art. 77a.

160 Ibid., at Art. 45.

161 Ibid., at Art. 45a(2).

162 Ibid., at Art. 48.

163 Ibid., at Recital 23.

164 Ibid., at Art. 47; Moloney, “Brexit and Financial Services”, pp. 193–94.

165 European Commission, ESAs' Review: Proposal, Art. 29a.

166 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation as Regards CCPs and Requirements for the Recognition of Third-Country CCPs, p. 19.

167 European Commission, ESAs' Review: Proposal, Art. 40.

168 Ibid., at Art. 44.

169 Ibid., at Arts. 62, 62a.

170 Ibid., at Art. 62.

171 European Commission, Reinforcing Integrated Supervision to Strengthen CMU and Financial Integration in a Changing Environment, p. 9; Moloney, “Brexit and Financial Services”, p. 197.

172 Moloney, “EU Financial Governance after Brexit”, p. 111.

173 Demarigny and Lannoo, Navigating the Minefield of the ESA Review; House of Commons European Scrutiny Commitee, Fifth Report of Session 2017–19, HC 301-v (December 2017), s. 9; LSEG, Response to the ESA Review (January 2018).

174 Asset Management and Investors' Council, Feedback on ESAs Review (January 2018).

175 EFAMA: Review of the ESFS (January 2018); Irish Funds, Position on the Commission's Proposal for Reforming the ESFS (January 2018).

176 For criticism, see LSEG: Commission's CCP Proposals (2017), pp. 8–9.

177 ECOFIN, Presidency Compromise Proposal (5834/19) (February 2019); see also European Parliament, Draft Report on ESA Proposals 2017/0230(COD) (2018) (suggesting amendments including heightened accountability requirements).

178 Bajakić, I. and Beroš, M. Božina, “Examining Agency Governance in the European Union Financial Sector – a Case-study of the European Securities and Markets Authority” (2017) 30 Economic Research 1743.

179 Craig, UK, EU and Global Administrative Law, pp. 541–42.

180 G. Majone, Regulating Europe (J. Richardson (ed.), Abingdon 1996) ch. 13; Craig, UK, EU and Global Administrative Law.

181 Moloney, The Age of ESMA, ch. 2.

182 Amtenbrink and Lastra, “Securing Democratic Accountability” (making the observation in the national context).

183 Mazars, Review of the New ESFS, s. 7; Moloney, The Age of ESMA, ch. 2.

184 More radically (and less likely), the Executive Board could be given full responsibility for supervisory matters enabling swifter action (which can be necessary in the financial sector) whilst requiring the Executive Board to be accountable to the Board of Supervisor, IMF, FSAP.

185 Moloney, The Age of ESMA, ch. 2.

186 Mazars, Review of the New ESFS, s. 2; Moloney, The Age of ESMA, ch. 2.

187 Moloney, The Age of ESMA, ch. 2.

188 Moloney, “International Financial Governance”.

189 Mazars, Review of the New ESFS, pp. 116–17.

190 Demarigny and Lannoo, Navigating the Minefield of the ESA Review, p. 4; Mazars, Review of the New ESFS, s. 2.1.3.

191 Bajakić and Božina Beroš, “Examining Agency Governance”, pp. 1753–54.

192 Craig, EU Administrative Law, ch. 6; Shapiro, “The Problems”, p. 287.

193 Tucker, P., Unelected Power (Princeton 2018).

194 Amtenbrink and Markakis, “Towards a Meaningful Prudential Supervision Dialogue”; Curtin, “Holding”, p. 536.

195 Amtenbrink and Lastra, “Securing Democratic Accountability”; Amtenbrink and Markakis, “Towards a Meaningful Prudential Supervision Dialogue”.

196 Amtenbrink and Markakis, “Towards a Meaningful Prudential Supervision Dialogue”; Moloney, The Age of ESMA, ch. 2.

197 Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability. In this regard although the Council would also need to be involved in any decision to revise ESMA's founding legislation, Moloney argues that Parliamentary disapproval can act as a proxy for formal sanctions and that ESMA has shown itself to be sensitive to institutional displeasure, see Moloney, The Age of ESMA, ch. 2.

198 Moloney, The Age of ESMA, ch. 2; ESMA, ECON Statement (October 2017) where the ESMA Chair commented on their continuous dialogue and looked forward to their continued cooperation.

199 Moloney, “Brexit and Financial Services”, p. 200; Moloney, N., “Brexit and EU Financial Governance: Business as Usual or Institutional Change?” (2017) 42 E.L.J. 112, at 121; Moloney, “Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union”.

200 Curtin and Dehousse, “European Union Agencies”, p. 203.

201 Vos, EU Agencies on the Move.

202 Curtin, “Holding”, p. 536.

* Slaughter and May Lecturer in Corporate Law, Faculty of Law, Cambridge.

I am grateful to the two anonymous CLJ referees for their valuable comments. The usual disclaimers apply.

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