Secret diplomacy is inevitable in wartime. I once heard Lord Grey denounce “secret treaties and bombing from the air”, as its two most evil effects. But between 1815 and 1914 England was only engaged in a major war for three years, and thus secret diplomacy had seldom the excuse pleaded by Grey. How far then is it inevitable in peace time? A careful examination of England's methods during this century, which ended in democracy, leads to some remarkable conclusions. Canning and Palmerston were less secretive than Gladstone, and Salisbury was infinitely less secretive than Lansdowne and Grey. Indeed it seems to be actually the case that our diplomacy became more secret as our constitution became more democratic. The purpose of this paper is to gather up the hints and traces of secret diplomacy, scattered through nearly a century of official papers. For, if these conclusions are to be established, it can only be by surveying long periods and estimating tendencies through several generations of diplomats.

The object of this article is to carry one stage further an analysis which was begun elsewhere of the late medieval receipt rolls of the English exchequer. The technique of this analysis is essentially comparative; thus the first time it was used the two halves of Richard II's reign were compared with each other and with the whole of Henry IV's, while on the present occasion Henry V's reign of nine and a half years, producing nineteen complete rolls, will be compared with the first ten years and nineteen rolls of Henry VI. That is to say, two approximately equal periods are being studied instead of three, but in order to preserve continuity some reference will also be made to Henry IV's reign of thirteen and a half years with its twenty-one complete and four fragmentary rolls. It has been thought that the rough approximation to equality of evidence over these three periods will still justify, as in the former article, the frequent use of absolute totals instead of averages, but it will have to be borne in mind that 1413–22 and 1422–32 are both slightly under-estimated in relation to 1399–1413 wherever absolute totals and not averages are used.

As the Anglo-Spanish dispute which developed between 1756 and 1761 over the taking of Spanish ships by British privateers was undoubtedly one of the chief causes of the declaration of war by King Charles III in 1761, the Spanish story of these events is of considerable interest. A full treatment of the whole problem of the prizing of neutral ships has been promised by Mr Richard Pares, but the present study may be of some interest as showing the Spanish views of the situation as shown in the correspondence between the Spanish Chief Minister, General Richard Wall, and the Spanish chargé d'affaires in England, Don Felix Abreu.

The popular mind loves the dramatic and the macabre, and so it has come about that the two events of British Indian History which the man in the street is aware of are the Black Hole of Calcutta and the Great Mutiny. When there were no Mutiny horrors to contemplate, their place was taken by the legend of Tipu Sultan; even in 1831 Ram Mohan Roy was followed about by crowds in London crying Tipu Tipu. It has been a misfortune for British Indian understanding that these two events seemed discreditable to India; for though Seraja-Daula is now acquitted of responsibility for the Black Hole, and the military revolt theory of the Mutiny generally prevails, the popular legend continues. The well of Cawnpore is remembered where the well of Ujnalla is forgotten.