Skip to main content Accessibility help

Integrated Market and Nonmarket Strategies in Client and Interest Group Politics

  • David P. Baron (a1)


This paper provides a model of integrated market and nonmarket strategies in the context of an industry facing regulation that differentially affects the firms in the industry. The regulation is chosen in a majority rule institution, and to affect the stringency of the regulation, the firms in the industry can take nonmarket action in the form of providing support to legislators based on how they vote. The nonmarket action is considered in the context of client and interest group politics, where the latter involves competition with an environmental interest group. An integrated strategy is composed of the firm's strategy for its market environment and its strategy for its nonmarket environment. Also the integrated strategies of the firms must constitute an equilibrium in their market competition and an equilibrium for their nonmarket competition, including that with the environmental interest group. Collective action in the form of coalition building and rent chain mobilization is also considered.


Corresponding author

Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305–5015, USA. Tel: (650) 723–3757; Fax: (650) 725–6152; E-mail:


Hide All
1. This research has been supported by the National Science Foundation Grant No. SBR-9809177. I would like to thank Daniel Diermeier and two anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier draft.



Hide All
Baron, David P. 1995a. “The Nonmarket Strategy System,” Sloan Management Review, 37(Fall), 7385.
Baron, David P. 1995b. “Integrated Strategy: Market and Nonmarket Components,” California Management Review, 37(Winter), 4765.
Baron, David P. 1996. Business and Its Environment, 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Baron, David P. 1997. “Integrated Strategy in International Trade Disputes: The Kodak-Fujifilm Case,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6(Summer), 291346.
Besanko, David, Dranove, David and Shanley, Mark. 1996. The Economics of Strategy. New York: Wiley.
Groseclose, Tim and Snyder, James M. 1996. “Buying Supermajorities,” American Political Science Review, 90(June), 303315.
Lowi, Theodore J. 1964. “American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory,” World Politics, 16(July), 677–93.
Lynn, Leonard H. and McKeown, Timothy J. 1988. Organizing Business: Trade Associations in American and Japan. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
Olson, Mancur J. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Oster, Sharon M. 1994. Modern Competitive Analysis, 2nd ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Porter, Michael E. 1980. Competitive Strategy. New York: Free Press.
Porter, Michael E. 1985. Competitive Advantage. New York: Free Press.
Procassini, Andrew A. 1995. Competitors in Alliance: Industry Associations, Global Rivalries and Business-Government Relations. Westport, CN: Quorum Books.
Salop, Steven C. and Scheffman, David T. 1983. “Raising Rivals’ Costs,” American Economic Review, 73(May), 267271.
Shubik, Martin. 1982. Game Theory in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Snyder, James M. Jr. 1991. “On Buying Legislatures,” Economics and Politics, 3(July), 93109.
Wilson, James Q. 1980. The Politics of Regulation. New York: Basic Books.
Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Business and Politics
  • ISSN: -
  • EISSN: 1469-3569
  • URL: /core/journals/business-and-politics
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *


Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed