This article examines critically an explanation, first propounded by Austin Ranney, as to the causes of party reform in the United States. Ranney argued that there is an ambivalent attitude to parties in the United States; while there is evidence of popular support for parties, the political culture is also infused by anti-party values. Periodically this has facilitated the enactment of legislation, promoted by anti-party reformers, constraining parties. Focusing on the Australian Ballot, the article argues that its rapid adoption in the United States resulted from its seeming to solve problems facing party elites in the 1880s – problems that arose from the erosion of a face-to-face society. Despite opposition from anti-party reformers, parties in most states legislated for types of ballot that preserved party control of the electorate. Moreover, during the Progressive era the parties generally continued to preserve a type of ballot that favoured them. The ability of parties to defend their interests against anti-party reformers was possible when it was clear where those interests lay. With other reforms, including the direct primary, this was much less evident, and it was then far more difficult for the parties to defend themselves.

Comparative studies of election rules and legislative representation have focused intensively on vote–seat disproportionality as an indication of poor representation. Beginning with citizens' preferences, rather than votes, has important advantages and is especially more appropriate for a majoritarian vision of democracy. We analyse the effect of election rules on both vote–seat correspondence and median left–right correspondence in seventy elections in seventeen countries. We show theoretically the stringent conditions necessary to reduce vote–seat disproportionality in high threshold systems and empirically their high variance (and higher levels) of distortion. Although good median correspondence could be created, in theory, under a wide range of electoral systems, our empirical results suggest that proportional representation (PR) systems tend to outperform single-member district (SMD) systems by this criterion also.

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's version of an expected utility theory of war is one of the most widely cited theories of international conflict. However, the testing of the theory has lagged its theoretical development. To date, the theory has been tested on only 707 dyad-years, all drawn from Europe between 1816 and 1970. We present a broader test of War and Reason's expected utility theory of war using the same methods as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman. Our tests include the full international system from 1816 to 1984. We find that the theory receives empirical support using the set of politically relevant dyads for testing, but the relationship is less clear among the population of all interstate dyads.

Realist and liberal theories of international politics both assume that the essential parameters of international politics are fixed, though they differ as to the character of these parameters. We deploy decision psychology and discourse analysis to show how the seemingly limited choices of actors can and do affect these parameters. Thus realism and liberalism are poor guides to action, for they rest on empirical misconception and faulty logic. Intelligent international action is reflexive in that it attends to the world that actions help constitute, as well as take effect within. We show how actors can and do engage in reflexive action, and how they might do so more consciously and effectively. There are substantial implications for how states and other actors ought to behave in the post-Cold War world.

Our findings suggest that there are systematic differences in the ways that voters use the real values of economic variables when casting a vote depending on how long they have had to learn about the true state of the economy. It is possible that in campaigns of sufficient length voters may have more time to be exposed to competing campaign messages and to learn about the true state of the economy and the true policy positions of candidates. We tested this assertion on 113 elections in thirteen democracies. The test results in a confirmation of the hypothesis. In longer campaigns, voters rely more heavily on the true values of economic conditions to inform their evaluations of parties in power. In shorter campaigns, these effects are mostly absent. Campaign length seems to matter for voter learning.

Some political theorists argue that patriotism differs from nationalism in being compatible with universalist liberalism. The theories offered range from the more cosmopolitan constitutional patriotism of Habermas to more rooted republican versions. Despite their rhetorical effectiveness in certain political situations, none of these variants stands up well to critical analysis, and none succeeds in delivering the promised reconciliation of universal humanitarian principles with limited and particularistic commitments.

This article asks why some ethnically distinct regions fight fiercely to secede while others struggle to save the same multinational state. It tests competing explanations using a new dataset containing forty-five cases, significantly more than any previous study in the Soviet setting. The empirical results confirm arguments that the most separatist regions tend to be those possessing the most wealth, containing the least assimilated ethnic groups and already enjoying the greatest levels of autonomy. Demonstration effects are also found to be powerful. No support is found for prominent theories pointing to group upward mobility and ‘skill sets’ as being decisive. Group histories of grievous exploitation or national independence are found not to explain patterns of secessionism.

The hypothesis is examined that casting a ballot in one election increases the voter's propensity to go to the polls in the future. Voter turnout patterns in the 1972–76 and 1992–96 American National Election Panel Surveys, as well as published experimental research, indicate that the effects of past voter turnout on current voting propensities are sizeable. Moreover, these effects are robust across a wide range of model specifications, including those that take into account the possibility of unobserved factors affecting both past and current turnout. We conclude by discussing the implications of consuetude for political and social behaviour.

This article explains the positions taken by national political parties on the issue of European integration over the period 1984–96. Based on the theory of party systems developed by Lipset and Rokkan, we develop a cleavage account of party response to new political issues. We hypothesize that European integration is assimilated into pre-existing ideologies of party leaders, activists and constituencies that reflect long-standing commitments on fundamental domestic issues.

Whether citizens vote strategically, using their votes to defeat their least-preferred candidate, or vote sincerely, voting for their first choice among the alternatives, is a question of longstanding interest. We offer two innovations in searching for the answer to this question. First, we begin with a more consistent model of sincere voting in multiparty democratic systems than has been presented in the literature to date. Secondly, we incorporate a new operationalization of the objective potential for strategic behaviour. We offer a test of strategic voting in the 1987 British general election based on the variance in strategic setting across constituencies in Britain. We allow voters to use available information about the relative standings of parties in their constituency in deciding whether or not to cast a strategic vote. We estimate a lower level of strategic voting than many other methods have estimated. We also demonstrate that the use of self-reported vote motivation causes errors in estimating the amount of strategic voting, and that this problem is exacerbated the further from the election the self-report is obtained.

This article focuses on one of the central controversies in French intellectual debate since the late 1980s: the extent to which traditional republican principles might be reconciled with a recognition of ethnic and cultural diversity, particularly with relation to North African immigrant communities. After locating the debate in its historical and ideological contexts, the article traces the emergence of three types of response: a ‘traditionalist’ view, which refuses to make any concessions to the claims of multiculturalism and which reaffirms the need to uphold the orthodox republican principles of the secular state; a ‘modernizing’ republicanism, which endorses some elements of cultural pluralism while maintaining the validity of key republican concepts; and a ‘multiculturalist’ republicanism, which calls for a pluralist conception of civic identity and a recognition of the positive value of minority cultures. The article concludes with an assessment of the broader questions of political theory raised by this debate.

The debate over class dealignment is in part a debate about the meaning of class, which cannot be separated from the issue of the relationship between class and voting. Neither the simplified two-class model that has often been used nor the more sophisticated Goldthorpe class schema are adequate either at the conceptual or the empirical level. Both fail to deal coherently with the intermediate positions in the class structure. The argument that `social class' is of continuing significance for the analysis of voting behaviour and of party identification is correct, but only if the nature of the stratification order is properly understood. The Cambridge Scale, a measure of general hierarchical, material and social advantage, based on patterns of social interaction, is shown to be comparable to the Goldthorpe schema in terms of statistical prediction. It is argued that it is preferable in the sense that it most clearly captures the single most important aspect of ‘class’, which is hierarchical position.

Dunleavy's bureau-shaping model has breathed new life into existing debates about the behaviour of senior bureaucrats. This article assesses the utility of this model as an explanation of the development of Next Step agencies in the last decade in Britain, using data drawn from a series of extensive interviews with senior civil servants. Our conclusion is that, although the bureau-shaping model represents a significant advance on previous models of bureaucratic behaviour that stress budget maximization, it is flawed. In particular, we argue that: it pays insufficient attention to the broader political context within which civil servants operate; mis-specifies bureaucrats' preferences; and oversimplifies the distinction between managerial and policy advice work. More specifically, we suggest that any explanation of the development of Next Steps agencies needs to recognize that: politicians rather that civil servants played the major role in their creation; the strategic calculations of bureaucrats were significantly more sophisticated than the model assumes; and the consequence of the reforms has been that senior civil servants have played a greater, rather than a more limited, management role.

This article seeks to show that the rights which protect people's autonomy should be entrenched in the constitution of a democratic state. It is firmly located in egalitarian liberal tradition, as it takes for valid the following claims: (1) people have a fundamental interest in autonomy; (2) people have rights that their interest in autonomy, and the interests to which it gives rise, be protected and promoted; (3) people's respective interests in autonomy must be protected equally. The argument for a bill of rights unfolds as follows: first, it is argued that we have autonomy-protecting rights not only against private individuals but also against the state, and the meaning of having such rights against the state is explained; then it is shown that it is legitimate to turn certain autonomy-protecting moral rights into legal rights, and that doing so in the case of the rights we have against the state amounts to turning them into constitutional rights; lastly, two objections to the argument deployed earlier are countered.

This article analyses the nature of the support given to the candidates in the 1975 Conservative leadership contest, in which Margaret Thatcher replaced Edward Heath. In contrast to the orthodox account of the contest – which interprets it as largely non-ideological – the article argues that there were clear ideological forces at work. The right strongly supported Thatcher in both rounds; the left strongly backed Heath and then Whitelaw. Region, experience and education also influenced the voting. The traditional accounts, which explain those voting for Thatcher as doing so simply because she was not Heath, have, therefore, to explain why only certain types of MPs felt this way. Margaret Thatcher may have won because she was not Ted Heath; but she did not win solely because she was not Ted Heath.

Presidential campaigns are the most obvious means by which American voters receive information about candidates and issues, yet there is strong resistance to the notion that they influence presidential elections. We conduct an examination of presidential campaign effects in the 1992 and 1996 elections that features three departures from previous studies: (1) a stronger definition of campaigning and campaign events, facilitating a clearer idea of what it is that we are testing; (2) detailed data on television and newspaper coverage of the campaigns, allowing us to measure media effects; and (3) an alternative measure of electoral impact that is resistant to survey errors and random movement. We find that campaign events, and particularly media coverage of those events, significantly affect the candidates' chances for electoral success.

Adopted in 1913, the 17th Amendment to the US Constitution requires that members of the US Senate be elected by citizens of their respective states. This article is concerned with understanding what factors have influenced Senate election outcomes and how their effects have changed over time. I focus on three independent variables, state partisan composition, incumbency, and national partisan tides, and then develop a model of Senate election outcomes that allows their effects to change from election year to election year. The results reveal substantial variability and lead to a new and detailed understanding of Senate elections in the United States. The significance of the findings is further demonstrated by showing how the effects of the independent variables have affected actual election outcomes.

Supporters of liberal neutrality distinguish between ‘weak’ conceptions of autonomy which operate as background features of liberal democratic regimes, and ‘strong’ conceptions, which amount to conceptions of the good. These latter are to be excluded from the political realm on the grounds that in order to protect and promote a conception of the good, in the context of a pluralistic society, the state would have to resort to illiberal methods. The result of this will be the destablization and fragmentation of the regime. In this article I argue two things: first, that autonomy ought to be understood, not as a neutral background assumption of liberal theory, but as a partially comprehensive conception of the good in its own right; secondly, that protecting and promoting autonomy need not lead either to illiberalism or to the destabilization and fragmentation of liberal democratic society.

Data from Great Britain and the United States from the late 1950s to the early 1990s show relatively little change in the frequency with which citizens engage in political discussions, with whom they are likely to speak, and the variables that shape their propensity to engage in political talk. In addition, analyses of the data show that discussing politics enhances citizens' knowledge of public affairs, even net of other variables known to affect political knowledge. Students of political behaviour and those interested in strengthening democracy need to treat political discussions as an important form of political participation.

Elections to the Irish presidency belong to the category of those in which hardly any political power is involved. In elections such as this one, according to second-order election theory, voter behaviour reflects mainly preferences in the first-order political arena, where actual policy is made. This theory fails, however, to explain voter preferences in the 1997 Irish presidential elections. An alternative perspective of a popularity contest, suggesting that voters' preferences are largely unconnected to their political opinions, and generally idiosyncratic in nature, also fails to fit the evidence. Nevertheless, the information, framing and priming that voters were subjected to during the 1997 campaign are shown here to result in the development of a significant unidimensional cognitive and preferential ordering of the candidates.