Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) definition of goals is ambiguous between “specific goals” – the end-state of a token action I am about to perform – and “unspecific goals” – the end-state of an action-type (without specifying how this would be achieved). The analogy with selfish genes pushes the authors towards the former interpretation, but the latter would provide a more robust theoretical framework.

The connection between selfish genes and selfish goals is not merely metaphorical. Many goals that shape contemporary cognition and behavior are psychological products of evolutionarily fundamental motivational systems and thus are phenotypic manifestations of genes. An evolutionary perspective can add depth and nuance to our understanding of “selfish goals” and their implications for human cognition and behavior.

I applaud Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) theory that places goals at the center of cognition, and I discuss two ingredients missing from that theory. First, I argue that the brains of organisms much simpler than those of humans are already configured for goal achievement in situated interactions. Second, I propose a mechanistic view of the “reconfiguration principle” that links the theory with current views in computational neuroscience.

The target article falls short of explaining the phenomena, including motivational conflict, that it sets out to. The two main reasons for this are: (1) It is unclear in what sense goals are “selfish”; (2) We need an account of how selfish goals motivate people. If selfish goals are not in the replication business, then what is in it for them? And if they do not offer people something that they want, how do they ever influence what people do?

The Selfish Goal model challenges traditional agentic models that place conscious systems at the helm of motivation. We highlight the need for ongoing supervision and intervention of automatic goals by higher-order conscious systems with examples from social cognitive affective neuroscience. We contend that interplay between automatic and supervisory systems is required for adaptive human behavior.

The metaphor of selfish goals is misguided. Organisms can be considered vessels that further the interests of their genes, but not vessels that further the interests of their goals. Although goals can act at cross-purposes to each other and to longevity, such trade-offs are predicted by evolutionary theory. The metaphor of selfish goals provides no purchase on this problem.

We discuss the implications of the Selfish Goal model for moral responsibility, arguing it suggests a form of skepticism we call the “locus problem.” In denying that individuals contain any genuine psychological core of information processing, the Selfish Goal model denies the kind of locus of control intuitively presupposed by ascriptions of responsibility. We briefly consider ways the problem might be overcome.

In our response, we address commentators' feedback regarding the contributions and limitations of the Selfish Goal model. We first clarify potential misunderstandings regarding the model's contributions and the role of consciousness. Second, we situate evaluations of the selfish metaphor within the similarities and differences inherent to the goal-gene comparison. We then respond to commentators' insights regarding future directions and implications of our model, particularly with respect to the broader organizational systems in which goals may operate. Finally, we reiterate important considerations for goal research moving forward.

This article argues that mirror neurons originate in sensorimotor associative learning and therefore a new approach is needed to investigate their functions. Mirror neurons were discovered about 20 years ago in the monkey brain, and there is now evidence that they are also present in the human brain. The intriguing feature of many mirror neurons is that they fire not only when the animal is performing an action, such as grasping an object using a power grip, but also when the animal passively observes a similar action performed by another agent. It is widely believed that mirror neurons are a genetic adaptation for action understanding; that they were designed by evolution to fulfill a specific socio-cognitive function. In contrast, we argue that mirror neurons are forged by domain-general processes of associative learning in the course of individual development, and, although they may have psychological functions, they do not necessarily have a specific evolutionary purpose or adaptive function. The evidence supporting this view shows that (1) mirror neurons do not consistently encode action “goals”; (2) the contingency- and context-sensitive nature of associative learning explains the full range of mirror neuron properties; (3) human infants receive enough sensorimotor experience to support associative learning of mirror neurons (“wealth of the stimulus”); and (4) mirror neurons can be changed in radical ways by sensorimotor training. The associative account implies that reliable information about the function of mirror neurons can be obtained only by research based on developmental history, system-level theory, and careful experimentation.

I argue that Cook et al.'s attack of the genetic hypothesis of mirror neurons misses its target because the authors miss the point that genetics may specify how neurons may learn, not what they learn. Paying more attention to recent work linking mirror neurons to language acquisition and evolution would strengthen Cook et al.'s arguments against a rigid genetic hypothesis.

Three challenges to the sufficiency of the associative account for explaining the development of mirror mechanisms are discussed: Genetic predispositions interact with associative learning, infants show predispositions to imitate human as opposed to nonhuman actions, and early and later learning involve different mechanisms. Legitimate objections to an extreme nativist account are raised, but the proposed solution is equally problematic.

Existing computational models of the mirror system demonstrate the additional circuitry needed for mirror neurons to display the range of properties that they exhibit. Such models emphasize the need for existing connectivity to form visuomotor associations, processing to reduce the space of possible inputs, and demonstrate the role neurons with mirror properties might play in monitoring one's own actions.

In this commentary, we propose an extension of the associative approach of mirror neurons, namely, ideomotor theory. Ideomotor theory assumes that actions are controlled by anticipatory representations of their sensory consequences. As we outline below, this extension is necessary to clarify a number of empirical observations that are difficult to explain from a purely associative perspective.

Positive and negative reinforcers guide our behaviors as we interact with others in our social environment. Here, we present evidence that highlights a central role for reward in the general functioning of the mirror neuron system (MNS). We also discuss the relevance of reward-related modulation on other previous findings revealing certain properties of the MNS, and on social context and psychopathology.

Cook et al. suggest that motor-visual neurons originate from associative learning. This suggestion has interesting implications for the processing of socially relevant visual information in social interactions. Here, we discuss two aspects of the associative learning account that seem to have particular relevance for visual recognition of social information in social interactions – namely, context-specific and contingency based learning.

The target article offers a negative, eliminativist thesis, dissolving the specialness of mirroring processes into a solution of associative mechanisms. We support the authors' project enthusiastically. What they are currently missing, we argue, is a positive, generative thesis about associative learning mechanisms and how they might give way to the complex, multimodal coordination that naturally arises in social interaction.

In the past decade many studies have demonstrated the existence of a mirror mechanism that matches the sensory representation of a biological stimulus with its somatomotor and visceromotor representation. This mechanism, likely phylogenetically very old, explains several types of mirroring behaviours, at different levels of complexity. The presence in primates of dedicated neuroanatomical pathways for specific sensorimotor integrations processes implies, at least in the primate lineage, a hard-wired mirror mechanism for social cognitive functions.

We challenge Cook et al.'s claim about the vagueness of the notion of action understanding in relation with mirror neurons. We show the multidimensional nature of action understanding and provide a definition of motor-based action understanding, shedding new light on the various components of action understanding and on their relationship. Finally, we propose an alternative perspective on the origin of mirror neurons, stressing the necessity to abandon the dichotomy between genetic and associative hypotheses.

Cook et al. laudably call for careful comparative research into the development of mirror neurons. However, they do so within an impoverished evolutionary framework that does not clearly distinguish ultimate and proximate causes and their reciprocal relations. As a result, they overlook evidence for the reliable develop of mirror neurons in biological and cultural traits evolved to work through them.

From the viewpoint of pattern recognition and computational learning, mirror neurons form an interesting multimodal representation that links action perception and planning. While it seems unlikely that all details of such representations are specified by the genetic code, robust learning of such complex representations likely requires an appropriate interplay between plasticity, generalization, and anatomical constraints of the underlying neural architecture.