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Should an individual composed of selfish goals be held responsible for her actions?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 April 2014
Abstract
We discuss the implications of the Selfish Goal model for moral responsibility, arguing it suggests a form of skepticism we call the “locus problem.” In denying that individuals contain any genuine psychological core of information processing, the Selfish Goal model denies the kind of locus of control intuitively presupposed by ascriptions of responsibility. We briefly consider ways the problem might be overcome.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014
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Should an individual composed of selfish goals be held responsible for her actions?
Related commentaries (1)
The Selfish Goal: Autonomously operating motivational structures as the proximate cause of human judgment and behavior