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Why the empirical literature fails to support or disconfirm modular or dual-process models

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

David Trafimow
David Trafimow
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, MSC 3452, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM 88003-8001. dtrafimo@nmsu.eduhttp://www.psych.nmsu.edu/faculty/trafimow.html
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Abstract

Barbey & Sloman (B&S) present five models that account for performance in Bayesian inference tasks, and argue that the data disconfirm four of them but support one model. Contrary to B&S, I argue that the cited data fail to provide strong confirmation or disconfirmation for any of the models.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , June 2007 , pp. 283 - 284
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

Barrett, H. C. & Kurzban, R. (2006) Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate. Psychological Review 113:628–47.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kruglanski, A. W. & Dechesne, M. (2006) Are associative and propositional processes qualitatively distinct? Comment on Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006). Psychological Bulletin 132:736–39.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Trafimow, D. (2003) Hypothesis testing and theory evaluation at the boundaries: Surprising insights from Bayes's theorem. Psychological Review 110:526–35.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed