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Thinking developmentally about counterfactual possibilities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2008

Kevin J. Riggs
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, London Metropolitan University, London E1 7NT, United Kingdom;
Sarah R. Beck
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, United Kingdom. k.riggs@londonmet.ac.uks.r.beck@bham.ac.uk

Abstract

Byrne implies that working memory development underpins children's ability to represent counterfactuals as possibilities at 3 to 4 years of age. Recent findings suggest that (1) developments in the ability to consider alternatives to reality in children of this age are underpinned by improvements in inhibitory control, not working memory, and (2) children do not develop an understanding of counterfactuals as possibilities until mid-childhood.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

Beck, S. R., Riggs, K. J. & Gorniak, S. L. (submitted) Are developments in preschoolers' counterfactual thinking driven by developments in executive functions? Child Development.Google Scholar
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