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Rationalization may improve predictability rather than accuracy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

P. Kyle Stanford Open the ORCID record for P. Kyle Stanford [Opens in a new window] ,
Ashley J. Thomas  and
Barbara W. Sarnecka
P. Kyle Stanford
Affiliation:
Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of California, Irvine, CA92697-5100. stanford@uci.eduhttps://faculty.sites.uci.edu/pkylestanford/
Ashley J. Thomas
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA02138. athomas@g.harvard.eduhttps://ashleyjothomas.wixsite.com/mysite
Barbara W. Sarnecka
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA92697-5100. sarnecka@uci.eduhttps://sites.google.com/uci.edu/sarneckalab
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Abstract

We present a theoretical and an empirical challenge to Cushman's claim that rationalization is adaptive because it allows humans to extract more accurate beliefs from our non-rational motivations for behavior. Rationalization sometimes generates more adaptive decisions by making our beliefs about the world less accurate. We suggest that the most important adaptive advantage of rationalization is instead that it increases our predictability (and therefore attractiveness) as potential partners in cooperative social interactions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e49
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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