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Putting reasoning and judgement in their proper argumentative place

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2011

Mike Oaksford
Mike Oaksford
Affiliation:
Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College, University of London, London WC1E 7HX, United Kingdom. mike.oaksford@bbk.ac.ukhttp://www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc/staff/academic/moaksford
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Abstract

This commentary agrees with Mercier and Sperber's (M&S's) thesis on the argumentative function of reasoning but suggests that an account of argument strength is required. A Bayesian account of argument strength (Hahn & Oaksford 2007) shows how the deployment of deductive fallacies, weak inductive arguments, and judgment fallacies such as base-rate neglect, can all be rationally defended in the right argumentative context.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , April 2011 , pp. 84 - 85
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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