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Modest and immodest neural codes: Can there be modest codes?

  • Rosa Cao (a1) and Charles Rathkopf (a2)

Abstract

We argue that Brette's arguments, or some variation on them, work only against the immodest codes imputed by neuroscientists to the signals they study; they do not tell against “modest” codes, which may be learned by neurons themselves. Still, caution is warranted: modest neural codes likely lead to only modest explanatory gains.

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Modest and immodest neural codes: Can there be modest codes?

  • Rosa Cao (a1) and Charles Rathkopf (a2)

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