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The Leabra architecture: Specialization without modularity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Alexander A. Petrov ,
David J. Jilk  and
Randall C. O'Reilly
Alexander A. Petrov
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210. apetrov@alexpetrov.comhttp://alexpetrov.com
David J. Jilk
Affiliation:
eCortex, Inc., Boulder, CO 80301. david.jilk@e-cortex.comhttp://www.e-cortex.com
Randall C. O'Reilly
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309. Randy.OReilly@colorado.eduhttp://psych.colorado.edu/~oreilly
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Abstract

The posterior cortex, hippocampus, and prefrontal cortex in the Leabra architecture are specialized in terms of various neural parameters, and thus are predilections for learning and processing, but domain-general in terms of cognitive functions such as face recognition. Also, these areas are not encapsulated and violate Fodorian criteria for modularity. Anderson's terminology obscures these important points, but we applaud his overall message.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 286 - 287
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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