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How important is it to learn language rather than create it?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 June 2024
Abstract
I focus here on concepts that are not part of core knowledge – the ability to treat people as social agents with shareable mental states. Spelke proposes that learning language from another might account for the development of these concepts. I suggest that homesigners, who create language rather than learn it, may be a potential counterexample to this hypothesis.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
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Target article
Précis of What Babies Know
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