Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-zzh7m Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T23:44:12.490Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Dennett versus Gibson

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1998

Alex Byrne
Affiliation:
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 abyrne@mit.edu web.mit.edu/philos/www/byrne.html

Abstract

Pessoa et al. misinterpret some of Dennett's discussion of filling-in. Their argument against the representational conception of vision and for a Gibsonian alternative is also flawed.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)