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Degraded conditions: Confounds in the study of decision making

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2014

Louise Antony
Louise Antony*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003-9269. lantony@philos.umass.edulouise.antony@gmail.com
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Abstract

I raise a consideration complementary to those raised in the target article. Many of the most widely cited studies on decision making involve introspection in degraded conditions, namely, conditions in which agents have no reason for the decisions they reach. But the fact that confabulation occurs in degraded conditions does not impugn the reliability of introspection in non-degraded conditions, that is, in cases in which a subject actually does make a choice for a reason.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , February 2014 , pp. 19 - 20
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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