Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home

Banishing “I” and “we” from accounts of metacognition

  • Bryce Huebner (a1) (a2) and Daniel C. Dennett (a1)

Abstract

Carruthers offers a promising model for how “we” know the propositional contents of “our” own minds. Unfortunately, in retaining talk of first-person access to mental states, his suggestions assume that a higher-order self is already “in the loop.” We invite Carruthers to eliminate the first-person from his model and to develop a more thoroughly third-person model of metacognition.

Copyright

References

Hide All
Bloom, P. (2005) Descartes' baby. Basic Books.
Carruthers, P. (2009) An architecture for dual reasoning. In: In two minds: Dual processes and beyond, ed. Evans, J. St. B. T. & Frankish, K., pp. 109–27. Oxford University Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1978) Mechanism and responsibility. In: Brainstorms. MIT Press.
Haslam, N. (2006) Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social Psychology 10(3):252–64.
Jackendoff, R. (1996) How language helps us think. Pragmatics and Cognition 4(1):134.
Metzinger, T. (2004) Being no one. MIT Press.
Robbins, P. & Jack, A. (2006) The phenomenal stance. Philosophical Studies 127:5985.

Banishing “I” and “we” from accounts of metacognition

  • Bryce Huebner (a1) (a2) and Daniel C. Dennett (a1)

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed