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There is more to thinking than propositions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Derek C. Penn
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095dcpenn@ucla.eduhttp://www.cognitiveevolutiongroup.org/cheng@lifesci.ucla.eduhttp://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/holyoak@lifesci.ucla.eduhttp://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/
Patricia W. Cheng
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095dcpenn@ucla.eduhttp://www.cognitiveevolutiongroup.org/cheng@lifesci.ucla.eduhttp://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/holyoak@lifesci.ucla.eduhttp://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/
Keith J. Holyoak
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095dcpenn@ucla.eduhttp://www.cognitiveevolutiongroup.org/cheng@lifesci.ucla.eduhttp://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/holyoak@lifesci.ucla.eduhttp://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/
John E. Hummel
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820jehummel@cyrus.psych.uiuc.eduhttp://www.psych.uiuc.edu/~jehummel/
Daniel J. Povinelli
Affiliation:
Cognitive Evolution Group, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, New Iberia, LA 70560ceg@louisiana.eduhttp://www.cognitiveevolutiongroup.org/

Abstract

We are big fans of propositions. But we are not big fans of the “propositional approach” proposed by Mitchell et al. The authors ignore the critical role played by implicit, non-inferential processes in biological cognition, overestimate the work that propositions alone can do, and gloss over substantial differences in how different kinds of animals and different kinds of cognitive processes approximate propositional representations.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

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