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Fundamental freedoms and the psychology of threat, bargaining, and inequality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 August 2013

Adam Sparks
Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, Canada.
Sandeep Mishra
Faculty of Business Administration, University of Regina, Regina, SK S4S 0A2, Canada. mishrs@gmail.com
Pat Barclay
Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, Canada.


Van de Vliert's findings may be explained by the psychology of threat and bargaining. Poor people facing extreme threats must cope by surrendering individual freedom in service of shared group needs. Wealthier people are more able to flee from threats and/or resist authoritarianism, so their leaders must concede greater freedom. Incorporating these factors (plus inequality) can sharpen researchers' predictions.

Open Peer Commentary
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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