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Realpolitik or Concert Diplomacy: The Debate over Austrian Foreign Policy in the 1860's
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2009
Extract
The third quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed momentous changes in the style of European diplomacy and statecraft. The generation of Klemens von Metternich, Alexander I, and Viscount Castlereagh gave way to that of Louis Napoleon, Viscount Palmerston, Camillo Benso di Cavour, and Otto von Bismarck. The previous conservative consensus among the great powers that had feared war and revolution and valued harmony, peace, and stability succumbed to other ideas and attitudes that accentuated the diversity and the rivalry of the European family of states. The precepts of Concert diplomacy that had formerly regulated relations between the powers were no longer obeyed or respected. Between 1854 and 1871 Europe experienced five wars involving great powers; from 1815 to 1854 there had been only two. Obviously the old european system that had discouraged direct challenges and confrontations was crumbling.
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- Nineteenth Century Politics and Diplomacy
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- Copyright © Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota 1981
References
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