1 Koyré, A., La philosophie et le problème national en Russia au debut du XIXe siecle (Paris, 1929), p. 26 Google Scholar; Pypin, A. N., Die Geistigen Bewegungen in Russland in der ersten Hälfte des XIX Jahrhunderts, uebertragen von Dr. Boris Menzies (Berlin, 1894), pp. 374-76Google Scholar. See also Pogodin, M., JV. M. Karamzin, (Moscow, 1866), II, 460 Google Scholar; “Imperator Nikolaj Pavlovich i Karamzin v poslednie ego dni,” Russky arkhiv (Moscow, 1906), pp. 122-27.

2 Kizevetter, A. A., “N. M. Karamzin,” Russkij istoricheskij zhurnal (Moscow, 1917), Book I, p. 14 Google Scholar. The first eight volumes of the History were published at St. Petersburg in 1816, and successive volumes appeared through 1826. A French translation, Uhistoire de I'empire de la Russie was published at the same time at Paris, at first under Karamzin's supervision. The edition cited in this paper, unless otherwise indicated, is Istorija gosudarstva rossijskago, 12 volumes (St. Petersburg, 1892). Cited hereafter as 1st. gos. ross.

3 Pypin gives a summary and critical analysis of the “Zapiska,” op. cit., 306ff. Tourgueneff, N. [Turgenev] published a French translation of selections from the “Zapiska” in La Russie et Us russes, 3 volumes, (Paris, 1848), I, 496ffGoogle Scholar. For the memorandum itself, see: “Zapiska o drevnej i novoj rossii,” Russkij arkhiv, 1870, 2229-2350.

4 The high points of the recent period were Alexej Mikhailovich, Peter the Great (qualified), and Catherine the Great. The burden of Karamzin's argument to Alexander was that he should follow the wise principles of Catherine while avoiding her excesses, and recognize that the autocracy in its historic form was essential to Russia's welfare. See: “Zapiska,” op. cit., 2245 ff. On Alexander, see 2271 ff.

5 Kizevetter, op. cit., 19.

6 1st. gos. ross., I, 13-20; 37 ff; 75. Karamzin pointed out that both great men and great nations go through infancy and ought not to be ashamed of it. The pre-political, or pre-Varangian, period was Russia's infancy, and the path to political maturity opened only with the coming of a Prince. The state of nature resumed when monarchy was destroyed by the practice of dividing the Great Prince's estates. See: 1st. gos. ross., I, 119- 20; 131; II , 19. III , passim describes the struggle for power during Kiev's decline.

7 In the introduction, Karamzin expressed both his belief in autocracy and his faith that history guides the statesman, and inspires and comforts the citizen. The History can be read as an extended “statesman's handbook.” See: 1st. gos. ross., (St. Petersburg, 1816), I, ix, xxviii.

8 On Russia's glory and her equality with Europe, Ibid., V, 226ff. On dividing the estates and undermining the monarchy, I, 119-120; 131. Karamzin saw this breakup of authority as feudalism, a word which he used as the antonym of monarchy. II, 19. See also: II, 45-46; III, 128.

9 The organization of the work furthers the sense of emphasis on the Prince. After the opening chapters, the History settles down to a reign by reign pattern. Social and economic conditions are handled in separate chapters, and only occasionally form part of the integrated account. Within each chapter, Karamzin keeps the focus of his interest on the Prince, and he digresses only to return. Even during the civil wars in later Kievan history, he attempts to use this organization and carefully follows the fortunes of the contending princes. Ibid., III , passim. Some of the more interesting judgments in the History are in the “cultural” chapters. See: I, chapter 10; V, chapter 4.

10 On the spirit of independence and individualism, seelbid., I, 37ff. Karamzin criticized Nestor's chronology, but he accepted the story of voluntary submission to the Varangians. I, 34-36. As further proof that the Slavs were not conquered, Karamzin cited Yaroslav's code which made no distinction between Slavs and Varangians. II, 44. The populace was fickle and untrustworthy, and the assemblies in which the people exposed their trust were unstable. See: II, 88; III, 18 (for popular reactions on the death of Andrej of Suzdal); III, 95-96 (On popular rising in Novgorod, 1215); IV, 174.

11 Ibid., I, 158-60. In this passage Karamzin pointed out that the appanage grants were theoretically in the power of the Great Prince, but that their holders came to regard them as patrimonies.

12 Ibid., III , 128.

13 Ibid., V, 227-29.

14 Karamzin noted that only a single council was held at Moscow and that was treated by the annalists as an extraordinary event. Ibid., V, 230.

15 Ibid.,V, 230-31.

16 During the Kievan civil war, some of the men who gained control were men of virtue, as Mikhail II or Yaroslav of Galich, but few were able to attain more than momentary success, and no one of them was able to establish a solid line of succession. See: III, 27; 45-46; and for summation, 128.

17 Ibid., V, 231.

18 Ibid., V, 231-35. Karamzin assigned autocracy a “progressive role,” and it is hard to escape the conclusion that, in spite of its horrors, he regarded the Tartar conquest positively since it advanced autocracy. Karamzin singled out for special mention the very elements which had challenged the Kievan rulers as the elements which were seriously weakened or destroyed by the Tartars, thus clearing the way for autocracy and progress.

19 Karamzin noted these changes when he introduced Ivan III ‘ s reign. He pointed out that Russia's history entered a new phase and that Ivan III realized the promise of autocracy. The History itself, he went on, reflects that promise, for it no longer catalogues the senseless quarrels of princes, but rather describes a nation dedicated to conquering its glory and independence. Ibid., VI, 3-4. The intimate relationship between princely acts and societal responses may be seen in the discussion of Ivan Kalita's crime, which Karamzin severely criticized, and in the miraculous change in Russian life following Sylvester's warning to Ivan IV. See below for discussion. See: IV, 152-153; VIII, 66-67.

20 Ibid., VII, 123-24. Karamzin asserted earlier that the principal end of organized society was the security of the individual and the maintenance of property. II, 31. This idea remained basic, but he expanded it as he discussed the reign of Ivan III. See below.

21 Ibid., VI, 46-50; 110.

22 Ibid., VI, 62ff; 218.

23 Ibid., VI, 62-63.

24 Ibid., VI, 222. This was one of the more striking lessons that Karamzin thought history taught. He praised the foreign policy of Catherine II for it secured the external security of the state. Furthermore, he asserted, Catherine never involved herself in useless foreign wars. Karamzin sharply criticized Alexander I for failing to follow Catherine's lead and for become needlessly embroiled in Europe after 1804. He suggested that the European powers were using Russia, and that Alexander acted against the best interests of the state. See: “Zapiska,” op. cit., 2274-82.

25 Ibid., VI, 222-223. See: “Zapiska,” op. cit. 2249ff. for detailed statement concerning Peter's reforms and the errors involved in them.

26 Ibid., VII, 4.

27 Karamzin critized the regency of Helen Glinsky for she was unable to control her council, and he thought a council without a sovereign was like a body without a head. The oligarchy which resulted was worse than tyranny. Karamzin compared an irascable monarch to an angry deity. The people could accommodate themselves to his whims and recognize his rights to those whims. An oligarchy lacked legitimacy, and men only saw other men tyrannizing over them. This raised a spirit of detestation and ultimately rebellion. Ibid., VIII, 3-6. This point of view did not however, soften Karamzin's criticism of Ivan IV's tyranny. See: IX, 273-275.

28 Ibid., VIII, 54.

29 Ibid., VIII, 59-60.

30 Ibid., VIII, 62-64. The Church played a culture-bearing role in Karamzin's analysis, and at crucial moments, as in the case of Sylvester, would intervene to show the Tsar the way, or as in the case of the Suzdal rioters, to calm the population. The Churchmen were to aid the Prince and were a prop for the state. See: Ibid., I, 155; III, 18; V, 229-30. Karamzin criticized the Metropolitan Cyprion for fleeing Moscow as the Tartars approached. He betrayed his duty to the Church and the people by seeking personal safety. V, 50.

31 Ibid., VIII, 66-67.

32 Ibid., IX, 3-4

33 Ibid., IX, 12; 273-75.

34 Ibid., IX, 106; 273-75.

35 Ibid., IX, 275ff.

36 Ibid., IX, 294; X, 3.

37 Ibid., X, 3-6.

38 Ibid., X, 7.

39 Ibid., X, 43ff.

40 Ibid., X, 141.

41 Ibid., XI, 95.

42 Ibid., XI, 109.

43 Shakespeare impressed Karamzin at an early age, and on occasion his handling of the princely role has Shakespearean overtones. Pogodin was enthusiastic about Karamzin's capacities as a Shakespeare scholar, but Pypin qualified that enthusiasm. See: Pogodin, op. cit., I, 29; 38-39. Pypin, op. cit., 267-268.

44 States, Karamzin pointed out, are not mineral-like aggregations but are the product of their rulers’ genius. 1st. gos. ross., VI, 222.