Max Weber's work has long been considered the property of sociologists. This paper attempts to restore an understanding of the fundamental political nature of his thought and action. Through an examination of Weber's political writings and involvements, beginning with the Freiburg Inaugural Address of 1895, it is demonstrated that Weber developed a political theory which was both critical and empirical, and attempted (unsuccessfully) to put it into practice. The two sides of this attempt are discussed: the critique of Bismarckian and Wilhelmian politics and Weber's own “positive” construction of a new political order. “Bureaucratization” and “democratization” are understood as the key themes of this analysis. Identification with the middle class is stressed as a major determinant of action, transcended only by a profound commitment to political education of the nation. Political education is judged to be the supreme task of theory; it supplies the source of Weber's political and scientific commitments, and the explanation for his ultimate political failure.

The Nebraska nonpartisan legislature serves as a control setting for testing several hypotheses about the impact of party and constituency on voting behavior in legislative bodies. Specifically, in light of the data obtained from a setting where party identification is present but party leadership and organization are absent, the following hypotheses are examined: that political parties are important in structuring voting behavior because of the influence of party leaders and organization; that party is important because party identification is a surrogate for sets of beliefs and attitudes that distinguish members of one party from another; or that party is important because party differences reflect different constituency bases of the party. In a roll-call analysis of five sessions utilizing Guttman-scaling and regression techniques, it was found that in the absence of party leadership and organization, voting is highly unstructured. Further, dimensions of voting that were found are largely unexplainable in terms of standard party and constituency variables. Thus, party identification and constituency influence appear to be insufficient cues for the organization of legislative voting behavior, in the absence of party leadership.

The article introduces two models of political party decision making. Both models assume that the parties are solely interested in policy and that winning the election is just a means to that end. In one, the parties are competitive, while in the other the parties collude. The main result, in either case, is that the parties tend to be unresponsive to the interests of the voters.

The models are analyzed in an intransitive case (an election concerned only with income distribution) and a transitive one (an election where all political attitudes can be put on a left-right continuum), and under the assumptions of perfect and imperfect information.

With perfect information the intransitive case results in the parties ending up with all the income; while in the single peaked case neither party will have a position to the left (right) of the left (right) party's most preferred position whatever the attitudes of the voters.

Finally it is shown that it is rational for the parties to collude and present similar platforms.

The article examines two of Jung's contributions to the study of politics: his conjectures about the origin of culture and politics and his theory of psychic inflation. Culture arises because man is subjected to a series of opposing tensions that divert a part of his libidinal energy from its natural flow and produce a degree of surplus psychic energy. Symbols, rising from the unconscious, transform this energy into cultural manifestations. Through ornaments and rituals, symbols also play a vital role in differentiating individual consciousness from collective consciousness. The gradually evolving consciousness of both the indivdual and the group leads to the inception of politics—of conscious conflict and harmony.

Psychic inflation is the extension of the ego beyond its natural limits as a result of an identification with the contents of the collective unconscious. It leads to an illusory sense of either superiority or inferiority. The atrophy of conscious development follows. On the other hand, the conscious assimilation of the contents of the collective unconscious produces a charismatic personality or group. But these are rare cases. For the most part, psychic inflation is a natural psychic law that can be partially controlled through an awareness of the forces of the unconscious.

The paper focuses on the learning of legislative norms on the part of freshman members elected to the United States House of Representatives in November, 1968. Since a research interest in learning is a longitudinal concern, a two-page panel design was employed, the first set of interviews conducted in late January and February of 1969 and the second set the following May. As the concept of a norm involves the notion of shared expectations, a sample of the nonfreshman members of the 91st Congress was also interviewed.

The main finding of the paper is that the amount of norm learning was surprisingly low; it appeared that freshmen largely knew the general House norms prior to entering Congress. And the extent of attitude change toward the norms once in office was minimal. Freshmen and nonfreshmen generally expressed similar attitudes toward the norms. Support for the norm of apprenticeship was found to be weak, suggesting the need to revise the traditional image of the freshman representative.

This article seeks to apply the hypotheses and findings presented by Ronald Inglehart in his “The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies,” to the Japanese scene. Inglehart argued that affluence had produced changes in value priorities in Western Europe: the older generation has acquisitive values, while the younger age groups have postbourgeois values. An analysis of Japanese data collected by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics in four national surveys in 1953, 1958, 1963, and 1968 suggests that value changes in Japan produced by rapid economic growth may be somewhat different. Three types of change were found, namely intergenerational, life-cycle, and adult. Compared to its elders, the younger generation is less acquisitive, more democratic, and somewhat more inclined to value freedom. The most important value change, however, appears to be intergenerational change from collectivity orientation toward individuation. It is suggested that individuation has led to a tendency toward privatization and less concern for the electoral process on the part of youth. Whether or not this is a temporary phenomenon is not clear.

This study examines in a comparative foreign policy framework the relationship between bilateral foreign aid allocations and pairwise voting agreements between developed and developing nations in the UN General Assembly. The foreign aid donors considered include the United States, the Soviet “bloc,” and the twelve other UN members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee. Two different measures of aid allocations in two three-year periods (1962–1964 and 1965–1967) are correlated with two different measures of the percentage of agreements in the UN between each aid donor and its aid recipients, with both indices calculated on the basis of all roll calls taken in the 1963 and 1966 General Assemblies.

In general, the results of the analysis were found to be consistent with the hypothesized positive association between aid and votes only in the case of the United States. For many of the remaining donors the association was found to be negative rather than positive, suggesting either that enemies are rewarded more than friends, or, alternatively, that there is little relationship of substantive interest between aid and votes for most donor countries. Even in the case of the U.S., however, which of the two variables should be considered a cause and which a consequence remains unresolved.

In the modern House of Representatives party competition for seats is not strongly correlated with or predictive of party voting behavior. The most plausible explanation for this weak relationship is that less than 20 per cent of House seats are competitive from one census to the next. In this study the Hasbrouck-Jones Fluidity Index was applied to House elections in the 1890—1900 period, and almost 50 per cent of House seats in this era were found to have been competitive at that time.

From the 1892—1900 period the 55th and 56th U.S. Houses were selected for analysis. A varimax factor analysis was run on the party votes in these Congresses, and the resultant factor scores formed a unidimensional measure of the number of times a member voted with a party majority. A multiple regression analysis was run, with these party support scores used as the dependent variable and with party competition and occupational composition of the district used as the independent variables. The results showed that in both houses party competition was strongly correlated with and predictive of party support scores. The same analysis on the 89th House yielded much weaker correlations and showed little predictive ability.

The purpose of this research note is to suggest a potential general paradigm for the study of foreign policy processes. It is explicitly synthetic in that it combines Arnold Wolfers's notion of a continuum, the extremities of which he labels the pole of power and pole of indifference, with Theodore Lowi's efforts to affirm the nexus between issue and policy process. Two questions prove crucial in the determination of issue area: Is or is not the domestic impact of the issue symmetrical? And are the political goods at stake exclusively tangible or not? With the answers to these questions it becomes possible to specify the issue area (distribution, regulation, “interaction-protection,” redistribution) in which an event may be classified and to hypothesize the nature of the policy process (the identity of the major actors, the intensity of conflict) to be observed. Particular attention is paid to limited war as a redistributive issue area in order to make the case that redistribution, contrary to Lowi's view, is an important foreign policy process. Finally an effort is made to suggest how issue-based propositions could be utilized in the transnational comparison of foreign policy processes. It is suggested that differences in the policy process across issue areas within a given state may be as great as differences in process within a particular arena of power for two states as different in political system as the United States and the USSR.

This paper examines the committee assignment process for Democratic members of the House of Representatives. Unlike previous studies of committee assignments, this paper employs data on the requests for assignments submitted by members to the Committee on Committees. The theoretical perspective employed is one in which all the participants in the process are rational actors who have goals they want to achieve and who choose among alternative courses of action on the basis of which alternative is most likely to lead to the achievement of those goals. We argue that the allocation of committee assignments affects the goals of all the participants in the process, and thus we consider the choices of actors in the process in terms of their goals; specifically the goals of re-election, influence within the House, and good public policy.

After first considering the process from the point of view of the member making requests, we show that the member's requests are related to the type of district he represents, and that the number of requests he makes is related to such considerations as whether he is a freshman, whether he faces competition from a member from his state, and whether there is a vacancy from his state on his most preferred committee.

The process is also considered from the point of view of the members making the assignments. Decisions on assignments are found to be affected by seniority (where success in getting requested committees is inversely related to seniority), margin of election (where members from marginal districts are more successful), and region (where southerners are less successful than members from other regions).

Perception of discrepancy between optimum level of achievement with respect to desired values and actual level of achievement is a concept that has figured importantly in explanations of collective violence and its subset, political violence (approval of and readiness to engage in behaviors which constitute progressively greater challenge to a political regime). Hypotheses about relationships between a number of static and dynamic achievement discrepancy constructs (labeled “relative gratification,” and built from a variant of the Cantril Self-Anchoring scale) are tested. The achievement discrepancy constructs generally show only a weak degree of association with potential for political violence. However, measures of shift over time in discrepancy show an unexpected and intriguing relationship with potential for political violence: individuals who perceive negative change and individuals who perceive positive change show the highest potential for political violence, while individuals who perceive no change show the lowest potential for political violence; and this V-Curve relationship persists in the presence of various control variables. Moreover, absolute magnitude of shift in discrepancy from present to future shows a moderate degree of correlation with potential for political violence, and makes an independent contribution to a linear additive model. The data base is a sample of a population in which instances of political violence have been relatively frequent in the past.

Senators who seek re-election usually achieve it. Yet it is not clear whether they tend to win mainly because they are incumbents or because their party is strong in their states. Thus, the two principal questions motivating this study are the following: (1) What is the relative importance of party and of incumbency in influencing the outcomes of Senate elections? (2) How has their relative importance changed over the last quarter-century? To answer these questions, a theory is developed accounting for the outcomes of Senate elections in terms of the major potential sources of electoral support given to the candidates, namely, party loyalty, incumbency, “national tides,” and idiosyncratic factors (e.g., issues, personality, local conditions). The theory is then represented in a formal model for which are generated multiple regression estimates of the respective roles of party and incumbency in all postwar Senate contests.

The major finding is that the relative importance of party and incumbency has changed dramatically over the last quarter-century. Party has undergone an overall decline in influence, while incumbency has experienced a roughly proportionate increase. At the same time, the importance of idiosyncratic factors has grown. The implications of these results for broader theories of American politics, including the argument that the United States has been experiencing a “critical realignment,” are noted.

The purpose of this note is to contribute to the analysis of various sorts of institutions for distributing goods to members of a society. The paper examines what happens when a society is faced with distributing ordinary private goods to its members. It can utilize three different sorts of institutions: a voting system, a price system, or a fixed proportions sharing rule. We suggest that a fixed proportions sharing rule generally will be found preferable by the society to majority rule. We argue that Shubik's assertion that a price system will dominate majority rule is not true without qualification.

An enduring fact of life in democratic electoral systems is that the party winning the largest share of the votes almost always receives a still larger share of the seats. This paper tests three models describing the inflation of the legislative power of the victorious party and then develops explanations of the observed differences in the swing ratio and the partisan bias of an electoral system. The “cube law” is rejected as a description, since it assumes uniformity (which is not observed in the data) across electoral systems. Explanations for differences in swing ratio and bias are found in variations in turnout over districts, the extent of the “nationalization” of politics, and, most importantly, in who does the districting or reapportionment. The measures of swing ratio and partisan bias appear useful for the judicial evaluation of redistricting schemes and may contribute to the reduction of partisan and incumbent gerrymandering.

This study, based on the two-wave questionnaire data collected from legislative candidates in Iowa, attempts to test the “congratulation-rationalization effect,” a highly provocative hypothesis that John Kingdon formulated regarding politicians' beliefs about voters. The hypothesis asserts that winning candidates tend to develop complimentary beliefs about voters while losing candidates tend to develop beliefs deprecating to voters. The results of analysis indicate, however, no significant difference between winners and losers in terms of the direction and magnitude of changes in their beliefs about voters, suggesting that the hypothesis is invalid. When the hypothesis is reformulated in terms of “dissonance states” rather than “election outcomes,” the evidence is strongly supportive. Among winners, those who perceive a high degree of dissonance more than those who perceive little dissonance tend to change their beliefs about voters in a favorable direction. Conversely, among losers, those who perceive a high degree of dissonance more than those who perceive little dissonance tend to change their beliefs in an unfavorable direction. Therefore, the “congratulation-rationalization” hypothesis can be sustained only if cast in direct dissonance terms.

Drawing on findings reported in an earlier issue of this Review, the present Note examines the extent to which nine forms of reasoning about the problem of poverty cohere into recognizable structures or cognitive styles among a small sample of eighth and twelfth graders. The degree of structured policy thinking among the respondents is lower than might have been predicted on the basis of cognitive developmental theory. Moreover, a respondent's amount of political interest, activity, motivation, and knowledge is a more accurate guide to his policy-thinking style than is his age. This finding also does not accord with cognitive developmental expectations. When these data are taken together with findings reported in the earlier article, we can conclude only that political involvement and individual maturation interact in complex ways in the development and structuring of policy thinking.

This study examines the assertions of urban scholars that the spatial arrangement of urban populations is important in determining the amount of conflict displayed within American cities. The article analyzes the spatial distribution of class groups within 18 cities and the degree of voting solidarity and conflict displayed within segregated and integrated sections of each community. Data were gathered from precinct voting returns for several local referenda in each city to test the following hypotheses: (1) The residential distribution of social-class groups will significantly influence the degree of electoral cohesion these groups display; (2) The spatial distribution of class groups will significantly influence the amount of electoral disagreement between class groups. The study found that communities that displayed segregated class groups had a high degree of class electoral solidarity. Within cities that manifested spatially integrated class groups, however, the electoral cohesion of each class was low. A social-class group located in an area of a city possessing wide class dissimilarity was not likely to vote in agreement with other groups of the same class located elsewhere in the city. The findings of this article suggest that location may be one of the sources of urban political conflicts.

The conversion of multiple regression analysis to discriminant analysis is not only of theoretical interest, but—in view of the extensive use of these methods in political science—it also has considerable value for applications. It is the purpose of this presentation to explain the underlying theoretical relationship and to demonstrate its application in the form of an example chosen from the judicial process. Specifically, the Supreme Court's acceptance or rejection of the fact that the defendant was not advised of his right to counsel in an involuntary confession case is considered as a function of the appearance, nonappearance, or denial of the fact in lower court records and appellate briefs. Since the acceptance or rejection of the fact by the Supreme Court is a dichotomous dependent variable, discriminant analysis is appropriate. It is shown in this study how discriminant analysis can be employed by initially using regression analysis, not only in the example presented for illustration, but in any situation in which a phenomenon with dichotomous manifestations may be examined as a function of specified variables.

Although, conventionally, vote trading in legislatures has been condemned as socially undesirable by both scholars and lay citizens, a recently popular school of scholarship has argued that vote trading improves the traders' welfare in the direction of Pareto-optimal allocations. This essay is an attempt to reconcile the disagreement by showing formally that vote trading does improve the position of the traders but that at the same time trading may impose an external cost on nontraders. In sum, it turns out that sporadic and occasional trading is probably socially beneficial but that systematic trading may engender a paradox of vote trading. This paradox has the property that, while trading is immediately advantageous for the traders, still, when everybody trades, everybody is worse off. Furthermore, vote trading may not produce a stable equilibrium that is Pareto-optimal either for individual members or for coalitions of members.