John Rawls's theory of justice is best understood as an attempt to adapt Rousseau's theory of the general will to the modern liberal democratic state. Central to the theory is a belief in the rationality of human nature and dynamics. In a well-ordered society men's natural sentiments will prove to be both unified and stable, and they will not permit morally arbitrary advantages to influence their social arrangements. Rawls's theory offers a rational accommodation of freedom and equality. His philosophical perspective opens him to the charge that his theory slights the historical dimension of human justice. His conception of human personality is somewhat ambiguous. There is incongruity between his ethical theory and the realities of democratic politics. Nevertheless, Rawls's formulation of the moral and political principles of liberalism is a major achievement and entirely worthy of his intellectual ancestry

It is argued that Rawls does not offer a viable alternative to utilitarian morality. It is shown that the maximin principle would lead to absurd decisions. Thus, it is unfortunate that Rawls bases his theory on the assumption that the maximin principle would serve as decision rule in the original position. The present writer has shown (prior to Rawls's first paper on this subject) that we can obtain a highly satisfactory theory of morality, one in the utilitarian tradition, if we assume that in the original position expected-utility maximization would be used as a decision rule. Rawls's theory is unacceptable because it would force us to discriminate against the legitimate human needs of all individuals enjoying good fortune in any way— whether by being relatively well-to-do, or by being in reasonably good health, or by having good intellectual ability or artistic talent, etc.

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assumes that the principles of justice are for individuals in a society, and in general he assumes that the society is an ethnically homogeneous state. He thus follows the tradition associated with the dominant form of the social contract theory, which focuses on the individual and the state. His assumptions neglect the fact that almost all states are ethnically plural or heterogeneous, and that many of them confer special status and rights on ethnic groups as collective entities; for example, many of them confer special status and rights on indigenous groups, on groups disadvantaged by prior discrimination, and on minorities and other groups conceded a right to survive as distinct cultural entities. Status and rights for groups necessarily mean differentiation among individuals depending on their membership; and this in turn means that a theory of justice that focuses on the individual and neglects the group both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the practices are at issue.

The argument is made that Rawls's proposed principles of justice would not rationally be chosen in his proposed version of the “original position.” First of all, Rawls's own account of the information available in the original position provides no basis for the conclusions about “primary goods” which he believes would imply his proposed principles. Second, even if those conclusions about primary goods were to be accepted, they would not imply the proposed principles (the “general” and the “special” conceptions of justice) because the claims which Rawls cites in support of “maximin” actually imply a different conception. Lastly, an alternative version of the original position is suggested which would avoid these difficulties and which would, in addition, successfully support a maximin conception of justice. This is not meant, however, as a conclusive argument for maximin, but only as an indication that the objections advanced here do not apply to “social contract theory” as such, but only to the particular version of it which Rawls has proposed.

John Rawls's theory of justice tries to resolve the question of fair allocation: When, if ever, may some members of society claim rightful privilege over their fellows? Rawls's answer is maximin justice: inequalities are just if, by permitting them, society treats best those whom she treats worst. Rawls attempts to show that this rule binds us all under the terms of a social contract. The present paper tries to show that Rawls's theory will not stand scrutiny. The social contract, as he gives it, disfranchises all but a single social stratum: Why are others bound by it? The maximin principle, allegedly agreed to under this social contract, requires that we judge allocations by ignoring all but one of society's many strata. This leads in turn to arbitrary judgments including ones which at once increase inequality and decrease the total shared by society. An alternative argument is offered, beginning with a social contract requiring agreement on all inequalities among agents for a series of hypothetical social strata. This device is meant to bind all strata, and leads to a principle of general advantage: Inequalities are just if but only if they serve the advantage of some strata and the disadvantage of none. This seemingly paradoxical rule has a clear interpretation and avoids the main difficulties attributed to maximin justice. Like maximin, however, the new doctrine would evidently require a radical redistribution of income in a society like our own.

A critical review essay of A Theory of Justice by John Rawls, focusing on his attempt to ground radical egalitarian democracy on a social contract. Rawls tries to construct a new theory of justice with the help of the old state of nature theorists. The reviewer investigates whether this effort is successful and whether Rawls possesses an adequate understanding of the philosophers from whom he draws his inspiration.

The intention of this essay is to raise certain questions about A Theory of Justice in Rawls's own terms—accepting his premises but examining his reasoning by his own stated criteria. I believe that such an examination will show that the abstract justificatory appeal to an “original position” is unsatisfactory in certain vital psychological and philosophical ways; that the Rawlsian analysis raises problems of comparison and measurement not adequately disposed of by the doctrine of justice as fairness and its corollary strategy of “maximin”; and that the appeal to congruence on which the latter part of Rawls's argument depends is founded on an inadequate political and historical sociology—which in turn creates further problems for the argument from the original position. In sum, I wish to show that while Rawls has lit his candle at both ends, he has got neither end to burn.