Collective security is the main purpose of the United Nations, just as it was the main purpose of its predecessor, the League of Nations. What does collective security mean? Under general international law the principle of self-help prevails. The protection of the legal interests of the states against violations on the part of other states is left to the individual state whose right has been violated. General international law authorizes the state, i.e., the individual member of the international community, to resort, in case of a violation of its rights, to reprisals or war against that state which is responsible for the violation. Reprisals and war are enforcement actions. Insofar as they are reactions against violations of the law, and authorized by it, they have the character of sanctions. We speak of collective security when the protection of the rights of the states, the reaction against the violation of the law, assumes the character of a collective enforcement action.

Non-self-governing territories in the past have been too often breeding spots for war. Many contain valuable raw materials or offer rich markets; some command highly desirable shipping or aviation routes; still others offer potential naval and military bases of strategic significance. Such territories frequently become centers of international rivalry or even conflict.

When the Eighth International Conference of American States met at Lima in 1938 it was planned that the Ninth Conference should meet at Bogotá, Colombia, in 1943. The outbreak of the war in 1939, however, called for emergency measures in the form of three consultative meetings of Foreign Ministers and a special conference held at Mexico City in 1945. The First Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Panama in 1939 laid the basis for the maintenance of continental neutrality in accordance with standards of neutral conduct formally set forth in the Declaration of Panama. The Second Meeting of Foreign Ministers, held at Habana in 1940, proclaimed the principle of mutual defense against an attack by a non-American State and adopted measures to prevent the transfer of territory in the Western Hemisphere from one non-American State to another. The Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers, called in January 1942 after the entrance of the United States into the war, called for the breaking of diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers and for other measures of continental defense against the subversive activities of agents of tbp Axis Powers. In 1945, a special conference assembled in Mexico City to consolidate the defensive measures of the American States and to make pla is in anticipation of the conference to be held at San Francisco for the establishment of a general international organization for the maintenance of peace. This was followed by another special conference held at Rio de Janeiro in 1947 in which the collective security provisions adopted at Mexico City were given permanent form in the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

If the twenty-sixth year of the World Court has not been one of intense activity, it has been marked by events of some significance for the future. The single session held by the Court during the year was devoted to administrative questions, largely to those growing out of the reorganization of the previous year. One proceeding was instituted before the Court, the first since its reorganization, and the Court was seized of one request for an advisory opinion emanating from the General Assembly. Some progresswas made in the extension of the Court’s jurisdiction, and a series of resolutions concerning the Court was adopted by the General Assembly on November 14, 1947.

The confusion and lack of information about trials of war criminals continues. In 1945 one of our most highly talented observers on international relations made the egregious error of telling a large and intelligent body of readers that, as regards Germans who had ordered or condoned acts of brutality toward the people of conquered countries, “there is no international law in existence” under which most of them could be brought to trial.

The acceptance of the United Nations Charter by the overwhelming majority of the members of the family of nations brings to mind the first great European or world charter, the Peace of Westphalia. To it is traditionally attributed the importance and dignity of being the first of several attempts to establish something resembling world unity on the basis of states exercising untrammeled sovereignty over certain territories and subordinated to no earthly authority.

The three years that have elapsed since the end of the Second World War in Europe have shown the need for ever-increasing labor in the field of copyright law. With our world drawn ever closer, the two existing systems for the protection of intellectual workers will necessarily meet more frequently. A detailed study of the historical background and present makeup of these two bodies of conventional law should lay the groundwork for their coördination.

Contrary to most international organizations, the Inter-American System lacked, up to now, a treaty basis. It was based merely on resolutions. Among them the famous Resolution of April 14, 1890, which created the “International Union of the American Republics,” has a particular character and importance. This resolution needed ratification which was given, but by the American governments only. By this ratification the American Republics bound themselves legally and consented to be bound for ten years—and still longer if nothing to the contrary was done—and consented to the making of modifications and amendments, concerning the organization, by majority vote. Generally resolutions of the International Conferences of American States and other such meetings constitute only recommendations and are not legally binding but resolutions concerning organization are legally binding at once on the basis of point 16 of the ratified Resolution of April 14, 1890; the latter is, up to now, in a strictly legal sense, the Constitution, the fundamental norm, of the Inter-American System.

In the October, 1947, number of this Journal there was printed the judgment, or as we should say in the United States, the opinion, of the Court of Appeal of England in Szalatnay-Stacho v. Fink. In the following number, that for January, 1948, there appeared an editorial comment on that case by Mr. Arthur K. Kuhn. The present writer begs leave to present certain additional reasons and precedents bearing upon the problem arising in the Fink case, namely, whether and to what degree an official of, or person working under, a government in exile, or an officer or employee of any foreign government, exercising his functions in another country with its consent, is liable to prosecution or suit in the courts of that country on account of his official acts. Though the governments in exile have returned home or ceased to operate, in the event of another war the phenomenon may recur. In any event, the increasing volume and complexity of international relations and the constantly closer ties between friendly nations make probable an increase in the number of officials of one country functioning permanently or temporarily in another with the latter's permission. Among these may be economic, financial, scientific, and military representatives, and all sorts of officers conferring or working with their “opposite numbers” in the host country. A detailed examination of the subject therefore seems timely.

The international frontier is formed by the zones where Great Power interests come together in conflict. It is the main line of structural weakness in the earth’s political crust—the main fissure where wars break through. The powers are constantly at workon the frontier trying to patch up the peace by international arrangements of various kinds.

The Board of Liquidation of the League of Nations closed its accounts as of July 31, 1947, completing the dissolution of the institution established by the Covenant which had been effect since January 10, 1920. The dissolution itself—the cessation of all activities except for liquidation purposes—had been in effect since April 19, 1946, the day following the adjournment of the 21st ordinary session of the Assembly.

The position of justice and law in the international society organized under the Charter of the United Nations seems to have become a matter of controversy among scholars commenting on the Charter. Conflicting views on this matter have been expressed, and they seem to obscure one of the very basic problems arising from the Charter of the United Nations. Professor Clyde Eagleton maintains that “the Security Council was not restricted to legal principles, solutions, and procedures; security was set above justice, and the establishment of order was to precede the reign of law.” Senator Henri Rolin, Delegate of Belgium to the San Francisco Conference, expressed a different view by saying that ”with regard to peace, we felt the need to emphasize, that our first object was to be strong to maintain peace, to maintain peace by our common effort and at all costs, at all costs with one exception—not at the cost of justice.” Professor Alfaro, Delegate of Panama, seconded him. He stressed that “we will not maintain peace and security at the cost of justice; that is to say, sacrificing the rights of any nation.”

The spotlight which has played on the international military trials at Nuremberg and elsewhere has left in relative darkness and obscurity the trials by the military commission of the American fighting and occupation forces.