Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-m42fx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-22T20:50:07.273Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

U.S. Adoption of New Doctrine on Use of Force

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 March 2017

Sean D. Murphy
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 97 , Issue 1 , January 2003 , pp. 203 - 205
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2003

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See 50 U.S.C. §404a (2000).

2 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 25-29 (Sept. 17,2002), at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.

3 Id. at 15. For adverse reactions by European allies to the new doctrine and other Bush administration actions perceived as unilateralist in nature, see Frankel, Glenn, New U.S. Doctrine Worries Europeans, Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 2002, at A1 Google Scholar. For application of the doctrine in the context of a strategy focused specifically on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), see White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Dec. 2002), at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf>. It states, in part:

Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially devastating consequences of WMD use against our forces and civilian population, U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures. This requires capabilities to detect and destroy an adversary’s WMD assets before these weapons are used.

Id. at 3. The Bush administration reportedly included a classified appendix, envisaging preemptive strikes against specified states and terrorist groups (such as Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria) that are close to acquiring weapons of mass destruction or long-range missiles capable of delivering them. See Allen, Mike & Gellman, Barton, Preemptive Strikes Part of U.S. Strategic Doctrine, Wash. Post, Dec. 11, 2002, at A1 Google Scholar.

4 Haass, Richard N., Director, U.S. Dep’t of State Policy Planning Staff, Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities, Remarks at Georgetown University (Jan. 14, 2003)Google Scholar, at <http://www.state.gOv/s/p/rem/2003/16648pf.htm>.