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Towards the Rule of Law?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2017

Sidney B. Jacoby*
Affiliation:
Georgetown University

Abstract

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Type
Notes and Comments
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1958

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References

1 “Towards the Rule of Law?”, 51 A.J.I.L. 517 (1957).

2 General List, No. 34 (1957). See Hudson, , The Thirty-Sixth Tear of the World Court, Fenwick A.J.I.L. 4 (1958).Google Scholar Proceedings were held on a request of Switzerland, dated Oct. 3, 1957, for the indication of provisional measures. Following hearings on Oct. 12 and 14, the request was denied by an Order of the Court dated Oct. 24, 1957, [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 105, but none of the points made by Professor Briggs became an issue in these proceedings.

3 “Nous ne sommes pas les seuls à être étonnés de 1'attitude prise sur la question de 1'arbitrage par le Gouvernement américain. Dans un article publié dans le ‘American Journal of International Law', importante revue améiricaine de droit international, le professeur Briggs, juriste éminent, relève que le refus des Etats-Unis de soumettre 1'affaire Interhandel à une procédure d'arbitrage ou de conciliation est difficilement conciliable avec les principes proclamés par les Etats-Unis dans leurs relations Internationales. Le professeur Briggs engage les Etats-Unis à renoncer à leurs réserves et à se soumettre à 1'arbitrage de la Cour internationale de justice.”

4 For details see the memorandum of the Department of State attached to its ] note of Jan. 11, 1957, 36 Dept. of State Bulletin 350, especially 351-352 (1957).j

5 See 50 A.J.I.L. 438 (1956), and 51 Ibid.818 (1957).j

6 At p. 529. See also the introduction to the article (pp. 517-518), where Professor Briggs lists the propositions which he contends the State Department “comes j close” to advocating. He maintains, inter alia, that the Department has advocated I that “ a state may set up its constitution and laws to provide an interpretation, j binding upon the other party, of what it has agreed to by a treaty“; that “the j interpretation of a treaty is a question falling within the jurisdiction of a state“; j and that “whether or not a state has violated the provisions of a treaty is a domestic question for purposes of a treaty providing for arbitration or conciliation.”

7 14 Dept. of State Bulletin at 1121-1124 (1946).

8 36 Dept. of State Bulletin at 354 (1957); see also 355.

9 See P.C.I.J., Case of Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway, 4 Hudson, World Court Reports 347, at 359 (1939); 2 Moore, Digest of International Law 33 (1906); 2 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 6-7 (1941).

10 Likewise, there was no denial of justice, and in fact Switzerland has not claimed that there was such a denial. 36 Dept. of State Bulletin at 356 (1957).

11 See Ambatielos Case (Merits—Obligation to Arbitrate), [1953] I.C.J. Rep. 18-19 (arguments must be of a “sufficiently plausible character” to warrant conclusion that claim is based on treaty; there must be an “arguable construction” of the treaty); digested in 47 A.J.I.L. 708 (1953); Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, Judgment of July 6, 1957, [1957] I.C.J. Kep. 24 (fact that parties are signatories of the Second Hague Convention of 1907 does not deprive one party of the right to invoke domestic jurisdiction); digested in 51 A.J.I.L. 777 (1957).

12 58th Cong., 3rd Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 161, pp. 21, 31. The rejection by the Senate was for the reason that adoption of the treaty even as amended was considered “more dangerous than the possible failure to settle all these questions by diplomacy, or by special arbitration, applicable in each case as it may arise.” 58th Cong., 3rd Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 155, p. 21.

13 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 93; 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Sen. Doe. No. 476; Dennis, “The Arbitration Treaties and the Senate Amendments,” 6 A.J.I.L. 614-628 (1912).

14 Cong. Bee, Vol. 59, Pt. 5, 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 4576. On the final vote of ratification of the Peace Treaty with Germany, which included adherence to the Covenant, there were fewer affirmative votes, 49 : 35, i.e., not the two-thirds majority required for ratification. Ibid., p. 4599.

15 See Preuss, , ‘'The International Court of Justice and the Problem of Compulsory Jurisdiction,” 40 A.J.I.L. 720, 727, 736 (1946).Google Scholar

16 Bundesblatt 1931, I, p. 931, at 935, 936.

17 The German text reads as follows: ‘'Der erste Vorbehalt, der gestattet, einseitig diejenigen Streitfragen der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit zu entziehen, die sich auf Fragen der ausschliesslichen Zustaendigkeit eines jeden Staates beziehen, erscheint einigermas- sen verstaendlich. Er findet sich bereits in unseren Schiedsvertraegen mit Polen nnd der Tuerkei… . Erscheinen, nach allseitiger Pruefung, die erwaehnten Vorbehalte nicht geeignet, die Moeglichkeiten der Beilegung von Streitigkeiten, die nonnalerweise zwischen den beiden Laendern entstehen koennten, fuehlbar zu beeintraechtigen, so ist man dagegen vielleicht geneigt, geltend zu machen, dass der Vertrag keine rechtlichen Garantien bietet mit Bezug auf die Moeglichkeit, dass eine Partei im gegebenen Zeitpunkt in etwas willkuerlicher Weise den einen oder anderen Vorbehalt anrufen koennte, um sich einem Schiedsgerichtsverfahren zu entziehen. In der Tat ist jeder Staat hinsichtlich seines Verhaltens sein oberster Riehter. Es gibt keine Berufung gegen die von einer Partei auf Grund des Artikels VI des Vertrages vorgebrachte Einrede der Unzustaendigkeit. Wir verhehlen uns nicht dass, in letzter Analyse, diese Feststellung die ernsthafteste Einwendung bedeutet, die man dem Vertrag vom 16. Februar 1931 entgegenhalten kann. Es waere jedoch unmoeglich gewesen, in dieser Hinsicht ein Zugestaendnis zu erhalten; in keinem ihrer Vertraege haben die Vereinigten Staaten den Grundsatz der schiedsrichterlichen Beurteilung der Vorbehalte zugelassen.”

18 3 U. S. Foreign Relations (1928) 940-950. Professor Briggs quotes from a statement which, at a later stage of the negotiations, long after all the difficulties had become manifest, was handed by the Turkish Ambassador to the State Department, suggesting that the treaty spell out the specific topics to be excluded. The sentence quoted by Professor Briggs merely was in justification of the desired specification, outlining the obvious power of the negotiators to set forth specifically in the text of a treaty the subject matters to be excluded. The statement was not ; concerned with the procedure to be followed after the making of the treaty.

19 Wehberg, “Die Schiedsgerichts- und Vergleichsvertraege der Schweiz,” 42 Die Friedens-Warte 49, 63 (1942); Garner, “The New Arbitration Treaties of the j United States,” 23 A.J.I.L. 598 (1929); Hudson, “The New Arbitration Treaty with ? France,” 22 A.J.I.L. 370 and 371 (1928); Hyde, “Safeguarding Peace—A Constructive \ Suggestion,” ibid. 263; 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law 31 (7th ed., 1955); ? Newlin, The Arbitration Policy of the United States since 1920, p. 186 (1940); Preuss, j “The International Court of Justice, the Senate, and Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction,” 40 A.J.I.L. 720, at 736 (1946); Wilson, The International Law Standard in ) Treaties of the United States 44 (1953) ; and idem, in 23 A.J.I.L. 74 (1929).