1 163 Recueil des Cours 169 (1979 II). See also Weil, , Vers une normativité relative en droit international?, 86 Rev. Générale Droit Int’l Public 5 (1982)Google Scholar, translated, modified, and expanded supra at p. 413; and Schachter, , Alf Ross Memorial Lecture: The Crisis of Legitimation in the United Nations, 50 Nordisk Tidsskrift Int’l Ret: Acta Scandinavica Juris Gentium 3 (1981)Google Scholar.

2 One author distinguishes between legal norms and ethical values or political principles and goals, and thinks that the term “soft law” has been applied to the last two of these three categories, with the result that confusion has been created. The term can be, and has been, applied, however, to legal norms that, for various reasons, are not absolute in their firmness. Horn, , Normative Problems of a New International Economic Order, 16 J. World Trade L. 338, 347–48 (1982)Google Scholar.

3 Baade, , The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 22 German Y.B. Int’l L. 11, 39–40 (1979)Google Scholar.

4 The First Amendment did not modify the par value system of the original Articles. For detailed examination of the legal aspects of the par value system, see Gold, J., Legal and Institutional Aspects of the International Monetary System: Selected Essays 520–73 (1979)Google Scholar [hereinafter cited as Gold, Selected Essays].

5 Id. at 538–39.

6 Id. at 148–80.

7 Some of the U.S. criticisms of the way the par value system had worked are set forth in a memorandum the United States submitted to the deputies of the Committee of Twenty in November 1972, entitled The U.S. Proposals for Using Reserves as an Indicator of the Need for Balance-of-Payments Adjustment, Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress January 1973, at 160–74 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Economic Report of President, 1973]. See also id. at 120–31.

8 Ando, , United States Foreign Economic Strategy as Seen in “Classified” Documents, The World (Tokyo), Aug. 9, 1981.Google Scholar

9 Art. IV, sec. 7 (of original Articles and First Amendment). For the original Articles, see 60 Stat. 1401, TIAS No. 1501, 2 UNTS 39. For the First Amendment, see 7 ILM 473 (1968).

10 An objective of this plan might have been to avoid the need for congressional action because of the delay and publicity that would have been involved in a devaluation of the dollar. It is doubtful, however, that congressional action could have been avoided even though the net effect of the plan would have been no change in the par value of the U.S. dollar in terms of gold. Under section 5 of the U.S. Bretton Woods Agreements Act (Pub. L. No. 79–171, 59 Stat. 512 (1945)), the authorization of Congress was necessary not only for a proposal to change the par value of the dollar but also for U.S. approval of any uniform proportionate change in the par values of all currencies. Article IV, section 7 of the Articles before the Second Amendment required a majority of the total voting power for such a decision under that provision, but in addition the approval was necessary of every member that had 10% or more of the total of quotas. Under that caveat, the approval of the United States and the United Kingdom would have been necessary. The desire to avoid the need for congressional action is an explanation of the character of the action taken on Aug. 15, 1971. See Dam, K. (who was present at Camp David), The Rules of the Game: Reform and Evolution of the International Monetary System 188–89 (1982)Google Scholar.

11 K. Dam, supra note 10, at 187. He states that “[t]o the top U.S. decisionmakers the British request was the beginning of a run on the U.S. gold bank. The British move led directly to the decision, that weekend at Camp David. . . .” He notes the contest among authors on the facts relating to this incident. Id. at 187 n.58. An authoritative account has not yet been published.

12 Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House 659–86 (1977). Safire quotes a statement by the President that he and John Connally, the Secretary of the Treasury, had agreed on the plan 60 days earlier. Id. at 684.

13 Id. at 672–73. For the doubts of Arthur Burns, see p. 673. An article based in part on interviews with “insiders” makes no mention of concern about legal aspects of the action taken on Aug. 15, 1971. Odell, , The U.S. and the emergence of flexible exchange rates: an analysis of foreign policy change, 33 Int’l Org. 57 (1979)Google Scholar.

14 Breaking what the United States considered deadlock may help to explain the sense of exhilaration that the decision induced in most participants. W. Safire, supra note 12, at 677 (“It was also more fun than any of the men there had ever had in their lifetimes”) and 680.

15 See note 7 supra.

16 See Henkin, L., How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy passim, and particularly pp. 62, 64–66 (2d ed. 1979)Google Scholar. Professor Henkin does not discuss the action of Aug. 15, 1971. No representative of the State Department attended the Camp David meeting, although the Department knew about the meeting. W. Safire, supra note 12, at 671. Kenneth W. Dam has advanced some “quasi-legal” points and some points of “considerably broader significance” in support of the U.S. action of Aug. 15, 1971, but they do not rebut the conclusion of illegality. K. DAM, supra note 10, at 187–88.

17 De Vries, , The Inconstant Dollar, Foreign Pol’y, No. 32, Fall 1978, at 161–83 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Economic Report of President, 1973, supra note 7, at 120–31, 160–74. See also International Monetary Fund [IMF], International Monetary Reform: Documents of Committee of Twenty 26–27, 51–52 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Documents of Committee of Twenty]; and Gold, Selected Essays, supra note 4, at 182–216.

19 IMF, Selected Decisions of the International Monetary fund and Selected Documents, Ninth Issue 306–09 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Selected Decisions]; Gold, , The Fund’s Interim Committee on the International Monetary System, Fin. & Dev., No. 3, 1979, at 32–35 Google Scholar.

20 Amendments of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].

21 4 IMF Surv . 350 (1975).

22 The text of Article IV is reproduced in Appendix A, p. 487 infra.

23 The clause could serve, however, to elucidate the obligations if problems of interpretation arose.

24 The object was also to create an affinity with the “purposes” of Article I even though they are the purposes of the Fund, while the “purpose” in Article IV is that of the international monetary system.

25 Art. IV, sec. 2(c).

26 Gold, Selected Essays, supra note 4, at 319–51.

27 Art. IV, sec. 2(b).

28 Art. IV, sec. 3(b).

29 This statement is subject to the caveat that there will be an automatic breach of obligation if the principle repeats an obligation in Article IV. It will be seen that the Fund’s guideline A repeats an obligation.

30 Art. XIX, sec. 5. For the text of the Second Amendment, see 15 ILM 546 (1976).

31 Art. XIX, sec. 4; Art. XXIII, sec. 2(a).

32 A distinction is made sometimes between obligations of result and obligations of conduct. See, e.g., Wyatt, , New Legal Order, or Old, 7 Eur. L. Rev. 147, 152–54 (1982)Google Scholar.

33 Art. IV, sec. 1.

34 Ibid. Richard W. Edwards, Jr., has concluded from public statements of U.S. and French officials and from private inquiries that, in their preparatory work and in later negotiations, the officials did not develop examples of conduct that would be considered violations of subparagraphs (i) and (ii). Edwards, , The Currency Exchange Rate Provisions of the Proposed Amended Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 70 AJIL 722, 737 (1976)Google Scholar.

35 Gold, Selected Essays, supra note 4, at 34–41, 65, 96, 115, 390–409, 558.

36 Art. IV, sec. 4.

37 On the whole subject, see Gold, J., Voting Majorities in the Fund: Effects of Second Amendment of the Articles (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 20, 1977)Google Scholar.

38 Id. at 30–33.

39 U.S. National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, Special Report to the President and to the Congress on Amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and on an Increase in Quotas in the International Monetary Fund 23 (1976).

40 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 2–5, 19–20.

41 Id. at 132–33, 135, 137. See also To Provide for Amendment of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10–12, 37 (1976); International Monetary Fund Amendments: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15–16, 41(1976); Briefing on the International Monetary Fund: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976). A similar note is heard within the EMS:

The institutional framework required for the functioning of the EMS as an exchange arrangement is perfectly adequate for the time being, inclusive of the virtually unlimited credit facilities. Any further institutional steps would amount to transferring certain powers of the participating central banks to a supranational institution, in effect to the nucleus of a European central bank. But essential preconditions for any such shift of powers are lacking, especially in the political field, where the unresolved question of the responsibilities and competence of such an institution and its relations with national and Community bodies is involved.

Karl Otto Poehl, President of the Bundesbank, speech to European Management Forum, Davos (Feb. 3, 1982).

42 Ecclesiastes 7:10.

43 Cooper, , Prolegomena to the choice of an international monetary system, 29 Int’l Org. 63, 95–96 (1975)Google Scholar.

44 IMF, Proposed Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, A Report by the Executive Directors to the Board of Governors 1 (1976), reprinted in 15 ILM 501 (1976).

45 This comment applies only to Article IV, section 1, and not to restrictions, multiple currency practices, or discriminatory currency arrangements under section 2 or section 3 of Article VIII.

46 Gold, , Recent International Decisions to Prevent Restrictions on Trade and Payments, 9 J. World Trade L. 63 (1975)Google Scholar.

47 Gold, Selected Essays, supra note 4, at 148–216.

48 Art. XII, sec. 1.

49 Art. XII, sec. 2(a).

50 Gold, Selected Essays, supra note 4, at 238–91.

51 Schedule D (see note 30 supra).

52 Selected Decisions, supra note 19, at 308–09.

53 Id. at 10–15; IMF, Annual Report 1982, at 128–32.

54 See IMF, 1980 Summary Proc. 39–40, 94–97. See also IMF, Annual Report 1981, at 62.

55 Selected Decisions, supra note 19, at 14–15; IMF, Annual Report 1981, at 62; Annual Report 1982, at 130.

56 Gold, Selected Essays, supra note 4, at 151–53. The Effectiveness of International Decisions (Schwebel, Stephen M. ed. 1971)Google Scholar.

57 Selected Decisions, supra note 19, at 14.

58 Brau, , The consultation process of the Fund, Fin. & Dev., No. 4, 1981, at 13, 16Google Scholar.

59 It will be apparent also that these conclusions are approbatory.

60 The Managing Director’s views on why the surveillance exercised by the Fund is not stronger are reported in some detail at pp. 21–22 of Chambre Nationale des Conseillers Financiers, L’Ajustement Économique International (Paris 1982).

61 de Larosiere, Jacques, April 6, 1981, 10 IMF Surv. 104 (1981)Google Scholar.

62 Gold, Selected Essays, supra note 4, at 148–81.

63 The Executive Board, in a decision of April 9, 1982, approved the continuation of surveillance procedures in the light of the Managing Director’s summing up of the Executive Board’s debate. IMF, Annual Report 1982, at 128–32. The summing up is an illuminating account of numerous aspects of surveillance. In the course of it, the Managing Director said: “[I]t is important for members to cooperate by taking seriously into account, in their national process of decision making, the views expressed and conclusions reached by the Board. . . .” Id. at 129.

64 Art. IV, sec. 3(b).

65 Guidelines for Exchange Market Intervention: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Economics of the Joint Economic Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1976) (statement of Yeo, Edwin H. III, Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury)Google Scholar.

66 IMF, Selected Decisions of the International Monetary Fund and Selected Documents, Eighth Issue 21–30 (1976).

67 Art. IV, sec. 4(a) (of original Articles and First Amendment; see note 9 supra).

68 Selected Decisions, supra note 19, at 11–12.

69 Cooper, Richard N., in The New International Monetary System 69, 69–71 (Mundell, Robert A. & Polak, Jacques J. eds. 1977)Google Scholar (and see generally pp. 53–108).

70 4 IMF SURV. 350 (1975).

71 Dep’t Treasury News, No. S253, 1978.

72 See note 65 supra.

73 On Jan. 4, 1978, the United States declared that the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund and the swap network would be employed actively in joint intervention with foreign central banks in order to check speculation and reestablish order in the exchange markets. Dep’t Treasury News, supra note 71. The Bundesbank issued a parallel statement. 7 IMF Surv. 1 (1978). On March 13, the monetary authorities of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany announced that on occasion in the recent past disorder had occurred in the exchange markets, including excessively rapid movements in exchange rates that went beyond what was justified by underlying economic conditions. Both authorities asserted that they would continue to take forceful and cooperative action to counter disorderly conditions in the exchange markets, for which purpose resources were available and would be used. On April 19, 1978, the U.S. Treasury Department announced a series of monthly public auctions of gold, and declared that it planned to study the sale of gold against deutsche mark as a means of obtaining that currency for use in countering disorderly conditions in foreign exchange markets. Dep’t of the Treasury, Annual Report of the Treasury on the State of the Finances, 1978, at 465.

74 Joint Statement by W. Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury, and G. William Miller, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Press Release, Nov. 1, 1978, reprinted in 64 Fed. Reserve Bull., Nov. 1978, at 917.

75 The Dollar Rescue Operations and their Domestic Implications: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On International Economics of the Joint Economic Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978).

76 Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1981, at 6.

77 Statement before the Joint Economic Committee, Dep’t Treasury News, No. R.158, 1981, at 18.

78 Once again, U.S. officials denied that there was any change of policy, although it was explained that the policy had been misunderstood as one of intervention only at times of “extreme market disorder,” while “the actual definition of the guidelines has always been much looser.” The United States seemed, however, to be expanding its holdings of foreign currencies. The U.S. Widens Currency-Trading Role, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1982, at Dl, D10.

79 Wallich, Henry C. (member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), Exchange Market Intervention: Issues and Views, J. Com., Aug. 12 and 13, 1982, at 4A Google Scholar.

80

When the world first moved over to floating exchange rates, firms engaged in international trade seemed to manage surprisingly well with the additional uncertainty. More recently, with the increased volatility of exchange markets, complaints from industry have multiplied. The present degree of volatility inevitably creates great difficulty for firms in planning their sales strategy in foreign markets and complicates investment decisions. It is difficult or impossible for firms to hedge against such uncertainty; and even when they can, it no doubt entails significant expense. Exchange rate volatility must therefore represent a barrier to international trade, with effects not altogether dissimilar to the protectionist barriers which we are accustomed to deplore.

Gordon Richardson, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Annual Banquet of the Overseas Bankers Club, London (Feb. 1, 1982).

81 Fritz Leutwiler, President of the Swiss National Bank and now President of the Bank for International Settlements, in a speech to the Swiss Forex Club in Zurich on Oct. 24, 1981, did not question the U.S. policy of intervening only in situations of crisis, but he noted that the concept was undefined. It probably had to remain undefined because of the difficulty of foreseeing the character and timing of a critical situation. He urged, however, that the monetary authorities of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and Switzerland “should continue in greater depth their talks on the organization of joint intervention. This may seem modest compared with more ambitious plans, but it has the advantage that it is capable of being put into effect.” Dr. Leutwiler in a later speech (Feb. 5, 1982) also noted that, although the export element in the U.S. economy is relatively small, the United States should cooperate in preventing the sharpest fluctuations in exchange rates, and that the United States should heed the experience of the European Monetary System in stabilizing exchange rates, notwithstanding the different rates of inflation among members. Intervention by the United States would have an important psychological effect on the markets.

82 Peter B. Kenen, in The New International Monetary System, supra note 69, at 202, 208. Professor Kenen adds the following footnote to p. 208:

The U.S. Government seems to be worried about this problem, and not without justification. The managed float toward which we are drifting contains the seeds of grave international disorder. Large numbers of countries would appear to hold strong views about exchange rates. Many have chosen to peg their currencies; others are intervening actively to prevent or attenuate movements in floating rates. It is not too wrong to say that we have devised a system of gliding parities in which the parities and rates of glide do not have to be announced and are thus hidden from the scrutiny required to guarantee overall consistency. There is, then, the danger that the dollar will become again the nth currency in the system—that practice, if not law, will come to resemble in this respect the par value system we have just supplanted. Should this occur, the United States may seek someday to free itself from the constraints imposed by others, by acting as it did in 1971, with convulsive consequences for international financial, economic, and political relationships. Were I to advise the U.S. Treasury, however, I would counsel a response different from the one it appears to have adopted. I would urge the rapid, complete articulation of explicit rules to regulate intervention, rules proscribing any intervention designed to drive exchange rates away from target rates or zones that the IMF, acting on its own initiative, would promulgate from time to time. I leave open a number of complicated questions—whether the IMF should publish the targets and how it should obtain them, to what extent it should rely on its own research, including its own econometric models, and to what extent it should proceed by consultation with the governments concerned. I do believe, however, that we need to move in this direction. Proposals to impose rules for floating that do not include well-defined procedures for setting and altering target rates or zones miss the basic point at issue. The nth country problem will not go away. It is sure to arise from the verbiage of Article IV, to plague us when we are most vulnerable to its implications.

See also Emminger, O., Exchange Rate Policy Reconsidered 18–20 (Group of Thirty Occasional Papers No. 10, 1982)Google Scholar.

83 There is evidence that this view does prevail to some extent in the domestic law of the United States. See Chown, , The Tax Treatment of Foreign Exchange Fluctuations in the United States and the United Kingdom, 16 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 201 (1982)Google Scholar.

84

I continue to believe that the way to deal with actual or potential instability of exchange rates is through close co-operation between central banks. The emergence of a multi-currency reserve system over the past decade or so makes such co-operation ever more necessary, especially between the central banks that are responsible for the so-called reserve currencies. Central-bank co-operation has helped us to overcome crises in the past, and we have reason to be confident that it will enable us to deal with any emerging situation. A return to a global system of fixed exchange rates is not on the cards as far as one can see ahead, and effective surveillance of exchange rate policies by the IMF on a worldwide scale is likely to run up against a number of conceptual and practical difficulties, though it may have to play an increasingly greater role over time. Hence the central role of central banks in this area, which after all is an area of special competence for them.

Karl Otto Poehl, President of the Bundesbank, speech to the Conference Board of Europe, London (Oct. 20, 1981).

85 11 IMF Surv. 189(1982).

86 N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1982, at Al, D8; J. Com., Dec. 7, 1982, at 6A. Later, the Secretary explained that he had in mind some mechanism for more prompt balance-of-payments assistance. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1982, at Dl, D 11 .

87 Gold, Selected Essays, supra note 4, at 390–409.

88 A member could be required by the Fund to consult if it was applying measures that required the Fund’s approval. Selected Decisions, supra note 19, at 210–11.

89 Id. at 209–11. The justification avoided an authoritarian tone: “. . . the Fund is able to provide technical facilities and advice, and to this end, or as a means of exchanging views on monetary and financial developments. . . .” Id. at 210–11.

90 Id. at 10–15; IMF, Annual Report 1982, at 128–32.

91 Kirbyshire, , Floating: A Burden for Trade, J. Com., Sept. 16, 1981, at 4A Google Scholar.

92 Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community and the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, Texts Concerning the European Monetary System (1979).

95 Polak, J., Coordination of National Economic Policies (Group of Thirty Occasional Papers No. 7, 1981)Google Scholar.

94 Id. at 6, 7.

95 Id. at 3.

96 See note 60 supra.

97 Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress February 1982, at 187–88 (1982). See also Wash. Post, May 30, 1982, at A16, in discussing the forthcoming summit meeting at Versailles:

“Perhaps if we can get more guidance [on economic policy] from the IMF—not to make it an international superagency, but it does have a body of knowledge—we could get a greater converging of policy, and there would be less need or cause for intervention,” Regan said. Regan said he believed that “the dollar and franc might move together” through such coordination.

It was learned that when British Prime Minister Thatcher heard of the Regan plan, she exploded: “No one is going to tell me how to run economic policy.” But Britain and other nations have been assured that there is no such intention. “We wouldn’t want to have the IMF order us around, in that sense, either,” an administration official said.

98 Pardee, , International Monetary System Is Adrift, J. Com., Sept. 15, 1981, at 4A Google Scholar. For his proposals, see US Urged to Take Initiative, id., Sept. 16, 1981, at 4A.

See also the following answer by President François Mitterand:

Q. Is this week’s devaluation of the franc symptomatic of a greater disorder within the international monetary system?

A. It is one of the consequences, but not a cause of monetary disorder. There is a currency war, an economic war, and this is one of the most disquieting points for the future of Western relations. Today, it is every man for himself. The U.S., so it says, needs a very high interest rate. That’s its business. But it cannot ignore the fact that this measure exacerbates already dangerous movements of capital. Likewise for the fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate. This disorganizes the Western economic system. Since each nation is undergoing a crisis, they all tend toward egotism. Each country first wants to rescue itself, whereas they will only be rescued together.

Time, Oct. 19, 1981, at 57.

99 EC Asks Members to Practice Better Economic Cooperation, J. Com., July 23, 1981, at 23B.

100 The usefulness of these meetings is sometimes challenged.

The financial commitment [at the Bonn summit] to continue to intervene “to counter disorderly conditions in the exchange market” was interpreted in financial markets as continuation of the status quo and therefore an inability to agree on more concrete guidelines. In particular, it was interpreted as unwillingness on the part of the U.S. to act to stabilize market expectations. It could even be argued that the weak wording of the Bonn summit declaration on this point helped push the U.S. dollar lower in subsequent months.

Atlantic Council Working Group on Political Affairs, Summit Meetings and Collective Leadership in the 1980’s, at 25 (1980). This policy paper is a detailed examination of the subject of summit meetings. See also Group of Thirty, Annual Report 1982, at 5 (1982); and Owen, , Don’t Let This Summit Be the Last, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1981, at F4 Google Scholar.

101

The Committee [i.e., the Committee of Twenty] recognizes that, in view of present uncertainties related to inflation, the energy situation, and other unsettled conditions, it is not appropriate to attempt to determine the full details of all aspects of the future international monetary system, many of which can better be decided in the light of future developments.

Outline of Reform (June 14, 1974), in Documents of the Committee of Twenty, supra note 18, at 7, reprinted in 13 ILM 1004, 1004 (1974).

102 Gold, Selected Essays, supra note 4, at 469–519; Gold, , Symmetry as a Legal Objective of the International Monetary System, 12 N.Y.U. J. Int’l. L. & Pol. 423 (1980)Google Scholar.

103 Other classifications are recognized in the law or practice of the Fund. For example, for some purposes the United States and the issuers of other reserve currencies are perceived to constitute a class. Other perceived classes are: members in deficit and members in surplus in their balances of payments; developed and developing members; among developing countries, oil-exporting and non-oil-exporting countries; members with pegged and unpegged currencies; etc.

104 See, e.g., The Prospects for an International Monetary System, Bank of Eng., Q. Bull., Sept. 1979, at 280 (The Henry Thornton Lecture, delivered by Gordon Richardson (now Lord Richardson), Governor of the Bank of England, on June 14, 1979 at the City University, London); de Vries, , Jamaica, or the Non-Reform of the International Monetary System, 54 Foreign Aff. 577 (1976)Google Scholar; Deniau, , Discipline of Stable Monetary Structure Urged, J. Com., Dec. 17, 1981, at 4A Google Scholar.

105 Regan, Donald T., Secretary of the Treasury and Governor of the Fund for the United States, in International Monetary Fund Board of Governors, Annual Meeting Press Release No. 24, Sept. 30, 1981, at 4 Google Scholar.

106 IMF, Annual Report 1982, at 129.

107 See note 60 supra.

108 For the view that surveillance would be hampered by more specific guidelines, and that a case-by-case approach under satisfactory procedures will be most effective, see Artus, J. & Crockett, A., Floating Exchange Rates and the Need for Surveillance (Essays in International Finance No. 127, Princeton 1978)Google Scholar. But see Artus, , Toward a more orderly exchange rate system, Fin. & Dev., No. 1, 1983, at 10–13 Google Scholar.

109 Guitián, M., Fund Conditionality: Evolution of Principles and Practices (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 38, 1981)Google Scholar; Gold, J., Conditionality, particularly at pp. 30–31, 34 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 31, 1979)Google Scholar.

110 See, e.g.. The Problem of Exchange Rates, in Group of Thirty, supra note 100, at 27–32; J. Artus & A. Crockett, supra note 108.

111 “. . . Cecily, you will read your Political Economy in my absence. The chapter on the fall of the Rupee you may omit. It is somewhat too sensational. Even these metallic problems have their melodramatic side.” Oscar Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest.

112 Art IV, sec. 4; Schedule C (see supra note 30).

113 Selected Decisions, supra note 19, at 10–14.

114 Schedule D, para. 2(a) (see supra note 30).

115 Art IV, sec. 1.

116 Selected Decisions, supra note 19, at 308.

117 Id. at 12–13, 14.

118 Id. at 14.

119 See Brenner, M., The Politics of International Monetary Reform—The Exchange Crisis (1976)Google Scholar.