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Sovereign Debt Restructuring and the Law: The Holdout Creditor Problem in Argentina and Greece. By Sebastian Grund. New York: Routledge, 2022. Pp. xvi, 182. Index.

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Sovereign Debt Restructuring and the Law: The Holdout Creditor Problem in Argentina and Greece. By Sebastian Grund. New York: Routledge, 2022. Pp. xvi, 182. Index.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2024

Astrid Iversen
Astrid Iversen*
Affiliation:
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences
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Book Reviews
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 118 , Issue 2 , April 2024 , pp. 401 - 409
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Society of International Law

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References

1 Preferential Treatment of Claims of Blockading Powers Against Venezuela (Ger., Gr. Brit., and It. v. Venez.), PCA Case No 1903-01, Award (Feb. 22, 1904) [hereinafter Venezuela Preferential Case].

2 Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recover of Contract Debts, Hague Convention II, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, 1 Bevans 607.

3 Astrid Iversen, Intercreditor Equity in Sovereign Debt Restructuring 18–19 (2023).

4 The World Bank, Debt & Fiscal Risks Toolkit: Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA), at https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/debt-toolkit/dsa (visited Jan. 12, 2023).

5 Edwin M. Borchard, State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders, General Principles, Vol. I (1951).

6 Michael Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before International Courts and Tribunals (2011); Hayk Kupelyants, Sovereign Defaults in Domestic Courts (2018).

7 Aimed at a broad readership rather than a specialist legal readership, it shares some qualities with certain anthologies: Sovereign Debt Management (Rosa Lastra & Lee Buchheit eds., 2014); Sovereign Debt: A Guide for Economists and Practitioners (S. Ali Abbas, Alex Pienkowski & Kenneth Rogoff eds., 2019).

8 See, e.g., Gelpern, Anna, Sovereign Debt: Now What?, 41 Yale J. Int'l L. Online 45 (2016)Google Scholar (special edition on sovereign debt); Grund, Sebastian, Enforcing Sovereign Detb in Court: A Comparative Analysis of Litigation and Arbitration Following the Greek Debt Restructuring of 2012, 1 U. Vienna L. Rev. 34 (2017)Google Scholar; Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, Trebesch, Christoph & Gulati, Mitu, The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy, 28 Econ. Pol'y 513 (2013)Google Scholar; Waibel, Michael, Opening Pandora's Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration, 101 AJIL 711 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Weidemaier, Mark C., Scott, Robert E. & Gulati, G. Mitu, Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 38 L. & Social Inquiry 1 (2011)Google Scholar.

9 Lock Law, Law No. 26017, Feb. 10, 2005, B.O. 30590 (Arg.).

10 Greek Bondholder Act, Nomos 4050/12, (Feb. 2012), Government Gazette 2012, A:36 (Greece) [hereinafter Greek Bondholder Act].

11 Plaintiffs claimed that the debt restructuring violated the Greek Constitution, with bondholders alleging a breach of the rule of law (1975 Syntagma [Syn.] [Constitution] 5 (Greece)), the principle of equality (Syn. 4), and property rights more generally (Syn. 17). See Sebastian Grund, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and the Law: The Holdout Creditor Problem in Argentina and Greece 112 (2022).

12 Mamatas and Others v. Greece, 2016 Eur. Ct. H.R. 694.

13 F.A. Mann, Further Studies in International Law 188–89 (1990).

14 Chamon, Marcos, Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph, Foreign-Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing Costs?, 114 J. Int'l Econ. 164 (2018)Google Scholar.

15 See also the debate on the potential increase in the cost of borrowing related to the implementation of collective action clauses in sovereign debt, Kay Chung & Michael G. Papaioannou, Do Enhanced Collective Action Clauses Affect Sovereign Borrowing Costs? (IMF Working Paper WP/20/162, 2020).

16 The Paris Club is an established group (but not a formal international organization) of Western bilateral creditors cooperating by providing common debt restructuring to debtor states.

17 See Iversen, supra note 3, at 421–22.

18 See, e.g., Gelpern, Anna, Sovereign Debt: Now What?, 41 Yale J. Int'l. L. Online 45, 68 (2016)Google Scholar (special edition on sovereign debt).

19 See Krueger, Anne O. & Hagan, Sean, Sovereign Workouts: An IMF Perspective, 6 Chi. J. Int'l L. 203 (2005)Google Scholar.

20 GA Res. 69/319 (Sept. 29, 2015).

21 Id. See also Martin Guzman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, A Soft Law Mechanism for Sovereign Debt Restructuring Based on the UN Principles 4 (2016).

22 See Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo & Goldmann, Matthias, An Incremental Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Sovereign Debt Sustainability as a Principle of Public International Law, 41 Yale J. Int'l. L. Online 13 (2016)Google Scholar (special edition on sovereign debt).