¹ Art. 34ff of the Statute of the Permanent Court, concerning its jurisdiction, read as follows:

Article 34

Only States or Members of the League of Nations can be parties in cases before the Court.

Article 35

The Court shall be open to the Members of the League and also States mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant.

The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other States shall, subject to the special provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by the Council, but in no case shall such provisions place the parties in a position of inequality before the Court.

When a State which is not a Member of the League of Nations is a party to a dispute, the Court will fix the amount which that party is to contribute towards the expenses of the Court.

Article 36

The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in Treaties and Conventions in force.

The Members of the League of Nations and the States mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant may, either when signing or ratifying the protocol to which the present Statute is adjoined, or at a later moment, declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other Member or State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning:

• (a)

  (a) The interpretation of a treaty;

• (b)

  (b) Any question of international law;

• (c)

  (c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;

• (d

  (d The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

The declaration referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several of certain Members or States, or for a certain time.

In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.

² Publications of the Permanent Court, Series A, No. 2 (Mavrommatis Case), p. 16 ; Series A, No. 9 (Chorzôw Case), p. 32; ef. the opinions voiced by Judges Moore (Series A, No. 2, p. 60) and Négulesco (Series A, No. 15, p. 69); see also Manley O. Hudson, “Independence of the Permanent Court of International Justice,” American Bar Association Journal, 1931, p. 432; G. de Magyary, La juridiction de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, 1931, pp. 286-287.

³ See e.g. Series A, No. 20, dissenting opinion by Judge Novacovitch, p. 77 ; T. Sobolewski, “La Cour permanente de Justice internationale et les droits et intérêts des particuliers,’’ Revue générale de droit international public, 1931, p. 427; Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1934, pp. 356-357.

⁴ Cf. Salvioli, G., “La jurisprudence de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale,” Recueil de» Cours, 1926, II, pp. 39-40 Google Scholar; G. de Magyary, op. cit., pp. 200-201; Series A, No. 2, pp. 12-13, contra, dissenting opinion by Judge Lord Finlay relative to the terms of the Mandate (p. 38).

⁵ Serifes A, No. 20, p. 18; A, No. 21, p. 101, and in the case relating to the Royal Hungarian Peter Pàzmâny University (Series A/B, No. 61, p. 221) where a judgment given in a litigation to which one of the parties was a private individual formed the subject of a dispute between two States submitted to the Court.

⁶ Edwin M. Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 1922, treating exhaustively this problem relative to diplomatic protection; c/. A. Raestad, “La Protection Diplomatique des Nationaux à VÉtranger,” Revue de droit international, 1933, pp. 538-542.

⁷ Preliminary objection, Series A/B, No. 52, pp. 15-16.

⁸ Cf. Series C, No. 13, III, pp. 44-45, 77, 98-99, 379, 464-165, 485-486.

⁹ Series A, No. 9 (claim for indemnity; jurisdiction), where the problem was treated by the representatives of the two parties (see Series C, No. 13,1, pp. 49, 64-69, 102-103); cf. N. Feinberg, La Juridiction de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale dans le système dp In Pr/dApfjinn Triiemnf.innnJjP dp» Afrnn'rii fa nn fi/5—fiQ.

¹⁰ Edwin M. Borchard, op. cit., in particular, section 381.

¹¹ Art. 31 of the General Act of Geneva, 1928, expressly states the right of a party to oppose the different procedures so long as no final decision has been given by the internal authorities.

¹² Cf. Frede Castberg, “La Compétence dee Tribunaux Internationaux,” Revue de droit international et de législation comparée, 1925, p. 323: the principle need not be applied if the treatment is contrary to a respective treaty.

¹³ Series A, No. 20, p. 19.

¹⁴ Cf., contra, Salvioli, G., “Compétence de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale dans les controverses défait,” Rev. de dr. intern, et de lég. comp., 1932, p. 84 Google Scholar; but see, on the similar problem of the “intérêt à agir,” p. 74, note 5, p. 76, note 7, stating that condition to be observed more rigorously in the case of a unilateral than in the case of a bilateral request ; as to a number of arbitral awards reasoning that by the submission of the case to arbitration the two governments must have intended to confer jurisdiction upon the tribunal and to supersede the local remedy, cf. Edwin M. Borchard, op. cit., p. 819.

¹⁵ Series A, No. 6 (German interests in Upper Silesia), p. 14. Cf., contra, N. Kaasik, “La clause de négociations diplomatiques dans le droit international positif et dans la jurisprudence de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale,” Rev. de dr. intern, et de lég. comp., 1933, p. 76ff, especially pp. 82-95.

¹⁶ Series A, No. 2, p. 15. Cf. Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1934, p. 366.

¹⁷ Cf. Hackworth, “Fundamental Principles Governing International Claims,” American Bar Association Journal, 1931, p. 193, requiring “some act or omission . . . amounting to an international delinquency”; see G. Salvioli, loc. eit., p. 85, holding the Court to be competent, if a State “demande cette chose sur la hase d'une violation de son droit subjectif international à ce que son ressortissant soit traité conformément au droit international.”

¹⁸ Series A, No. 20, p. 19; cf. also G. Salvioli, loc. eit., passim.

¹⁹ Series A, No. 20, p. 20.

²⁰ Cf. Edwin M. Borchard, “International Loans and International Law,” American Society of International Law, Proceedings, 1932, pp. 148,165.

²¹ M. Pessôa, p. 62ff, M. Novaeovitch, p. 76ff.

²² T. Sobolewski, loc. eit., p. 420ff; C. Ténékidès, “Les litiges entre États et particuliers devant la Cour permanente de Justice internationale,” Rev. de dr. intern, et de lig. comp., 1930, pp. 483-486; R. Genet, “L’affaire des emprunts serbes et brasiliens devant la Cour permanente de Justice internationale et les Principes du Droit international,” Revue générale de droit international public, 1929, p. 685ff ; idem, Précis de jurisprudence de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, 1933, p. 199ff; but in favor of the Court’s opinion, C. Ténékidès, “La protection internationale des intérêts privés,” Rev. de dr. intern, et de lég. comp., 1932, p. 98ff (admittedly altering his opinion); Paul de Vineuil, “La Cour permanente de Justice internationale en 1989,” Rev, de dr. intern, et de lég. comp., 1930, pp. 776-776; S. Rundstein, “L’arbitrage international en matière privée,” Recueil des Cours, 1928, III, pp. 342-343; Germain Watrin, “Les nouvelles tendances de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale,’’ Revue de droit international, 1931, pp. 175, 189; A. Hammarskjoeld, “La Cour permanente de Justice internationale et le Droit international privé,” Revue critique de droit international, 1934, p. 315ff, particularly p. 321S, p. 342fi.

²³ Ténékidès, “La protection, ” loc. cit., note 25, is not justified in holding that Art. 36, par. 2b (“any question of international law”) also applies; for it is just the international character which cannot be predicated on this case, where only municipal law questions were in dispute.

²⁴ In this particular the doubts uttered by Judge Pessôa (Series A, No. 20, p. 64) are apparently not well founded.

²⁵ Series A, No. 1 (Wimbledon Case), Series A, No. 2 and A, No. 5 (Mavrommatis Case), Series A, No. 6 and A, No. 9 (German interests in Polish Upper Silesia; Factory at Chor-zéw). Cf. Series A/B, No. 44 (advisory opinion concerning the treatment of Polish nationals in Danzig), p. 25 : “it is not the Constitution and other laws, as such, but the international obligation that gives rise to the responsibility of the Free City.”

²⁶ Treaty of Versailles (Series A, No. 1), Palestine Mandate and Protocol of Lausanne (Series A, No. 2, A, No. 5), Geneva Convention (Series A, No. 6, A, No. 9); cf. T. Sobolewski, loc. cit., p. 434, “ telles décisions sont toujours prises en considération d’un rapport de droit international.” Likewise, public international law was taken into consideration in the case concerning an appeal from a judgment of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (Series A/B, No. 61); for, by instituting the Permanent Court as a court of appeal against the judgments of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals with respect to questions of jurisdiction or merits—Art. X of the Paris Agreement, April 28, 1930—the contracting Powers created public international law, notwithstanding the fact that the judgment of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal was given in a litigation to which one of the parties was a private individual. The Court also dealt with international law in the Lighthouses Case (Series A/B, No. 62), by discussing whether a successor State is subrogated as regards concessionary contracts entered into with the Ottoman Government (cf. Art. 9 of Protocol XII of Lausanne).

²⁷ Series A, No. 20, p. 41.

²⁸ Series A, No. 20, p. 20.

²⁹ Loe. eit., p. 775; see also G. de Magyary, op. cit., p. 68, holding the Court competent to consider “des affaires privées, que de celles, rentrant dans le droit public ou le droit administratif.”

³⁰ Cf. J. Spiropoulos, Die allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsaetze im Völkerrecht, 1928, p. 6ff, holding them to be a sort of “natural law ”; H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, 1927, p. 81ff; K. Strupp, “Le droit du juge international de statuer selon l’équité,” Recueil des Cours, 1930, III, p. 473ff, contending that private law may enter into the domain of international by means of an analogy; particularly Haerle, Die Allgemeinen Entscheidungsgrundlagen des Staendigen Internationdien Gerichtshofes, 1933, p. 130ff, where the whole bibliography may be found.

³¹ Cf. Series A, No. 7 (German interests in Polish Upper Silesia), p. 19: “The Court is certainly not called upon to interpret the Polish Law as such”; see R. Genet, loc. eit., p. 694; D. Négulesco, “La jurisprudence de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale,” Revue générale de droit international public, 1926, p. 200; contra, the observations by Judge Kellogg, Series A, No. 24, p. 40, holding that “general principles of law might include, not only international law, but such rules of domestic law as would be applicable to the decision of the case in hand.”

³² As claimed by P. de Vineuil, loc. cit., p. 776; contra, Ten Years of International Jurisdiction (1922-1932), p. 31.

³³ Cf. Salvioli, “La compétence,” loc. cit., pp. 72-73, 79-80 (deeming the Court only competent to decide “toutes affaires internationales”) ; T. Sobolewski, loc. cit., p. 426ff.

³⁴ “Les questions d’intérêt général au point de vue juridique dans la jurisprudence de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale,” Recueil des Cours, 1932,1, p. 220, note 1.

³⁵ Series A, No. 17, p. 28. Not quite as clear are the views in Series A, No. 9, p. 27; cf. Jean Collette, Le» principe» de droit dee gent dan» la jurisprudence de la Cour permanente de Juttice internationale, thèse, Université de Paris, 1931, p. 130ff (“double dommage”).

³⁶ Series A/B, No. 62, p. 15.

³⁷ Cf. Salvioli, “La compétence,” loe. cit., pp. 87-88, justifiably holding that, in general, the reparation may be directly awarded to an individual. “La réparation n’est done pa* une indemnité pour la viciation du droit tubjectif international de l’État, mai» elle e»t l’élimination du fait dommageable pour le particulier, qui constitue la bate matérielle formant l’origine de la violation du droit subjectif international de l’État.”

³⁸ Series A, No. 20, p. 19; Ténékidès, “La protection,” loc. cit., p. 98.

³⁹ Series A, No. 20, p. 19. This argument, however, is, in the Court’s opinion, apparently not of a decisive nature, for the Court interprets Art. 36, par. 2, also as giving jurisdiction in matters not pertaining to international law.

⁴⁰ With reference to other agreements cf. F. Castberg, loc. cit., pp. 313ff, 329ff as to the application of internal law.

⁴¹ Series A, No. 20, dissenting opinion by Judge Pessôa, p. 65; Series A, No. 24 (Free Zones Case), observations by Judge Kellogg, p. 37; cf. Salvioli, “La compétence,” loc. cit., pp. 81-82, considering the nature of the Court, “qui n’a pas été constitué pour être mis au service exclusif de ces deux États.” Only if the two governments admit “que la justice interne re-guliére fait défaut, et que la possibilité d’un recours juridictionnel n’existe pas,” the controversy has an international character; see also, contra, G. Watrin, foe. cit., p. 183.

⁴² Cf. Albert Andrews Roden, “La compétence de la Cour permanente. Les observations Kellogg,’’ Rev. de dr. intern, et de lig. camp., 1931, p. 759, n. 8, holding that the Court might have been able to decide the Free Zones Case “si le Compromis spécial avait indiqué un accord antérieur devant servir de base aux nouvelles dispositions.”

⁴³ Series A/B, No. 62.

⁴⁴ This subordination is clearly expounded by Judge Anzilotti in his separate opinion, p. 30ff. The legal meaning of the expression “dûment intervenu” in the special agreement, decided differently by the Court and by Judge Anzilotti, does not relate to the jurisdiction.

⁴⁵ Cf. de Magyary, op. cit., p. 68, not requiring the matter to be of a juridical character.

⁴⁶ Cf. de Magyaiy, op. cit., p. 57.

⁴⁷ Cf. Art. 15, par. 8, of the Covenant of the League of Nations; Art. 39, par. 2b, of the General Act.

⁴⁸ Cf. J. C. Baak, “La Session d’Oslo de l’Institut de droit international,” Rev. de dr. intern, et de lég. comp., 1932, p. 827 (Art. III oí the Resolutions adopted by the Eighth Commission).

⁴⁹ Series B, No. 4 (Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees), p. 24.

⁵⁰ Viktor Bruns, “ Voelkerrecht ais Rechtsordnung II,” Zeitschriftfuer auslaendisches oeffenl-liches Recht und Voelkerrecht, III, Teil I, p. 455, holds that in such a case the claim of the party must be deemed ill founded. But it is rather doubtful whether the Court must decline jurisdiction in such a case, or whether the substantive claim must be deemed ill founded. It is equally doubtful whether the general statements of Viktor Bruns may apply to the Permanent Court, since its jurisdiction is restricted by the Statute and since the substantive contents of the domaine réservé are not of an international character, regardless of the fact that the question as to the extension of this domain is, as such, governed by international law; cf. D. Schindler, “Le progrès de l’arbitrage obligatoire,” Recueil des Cours, 1928, V, p. 271ff; contra, S. Ségal, “Le domaine réservi,” Rev. de dr. intern, et de lêg. comp., 1933, p. 723.

⁵¹ Cf. Viktor Bruns, loc. cit., p. 463, holding that “dieses der einzelstaatlichen Hoheü ueberlassene Cebiet von der Voelkerrechtsordnung erfasst tcird” D. Schindler, loc. cit., pp. 301303; James Brown Scott, “L’Institut de droit international à Oslo,” Revue de droit international, 1933, pp. 31-33; J. C. Baak, loc. cit., pp. 824ff, 827; cf. the text of the resolution adopted by the Eighth Commission, Art. 1, par. 2, and Art. 2.

⁵² As maintained by Judge Négulesco (Series A/B, No. 46: Free Zones Case, p. 190); his reference to the Tunis-Morocco Case is not valid, since in that case it was substantive international law that was deemed to restrict the content of the domestic jurisdiction.

⁵³ Series A, No. 24 (Free Zones Case, pp. 40-41). Cf. Series A, No. 20, dissenting opinion by Judge Pessôa, p. 65; contra, J. Blociszewski, “De la compétence de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale,” Rev. gén. de dr. intern, pvhl., 1922, p. 26.

⁵⁴ Notwithstanding the fact that it is international law which recognizes the matters to be solely within the jurisdiction of the State (Series B, No. 4, p. 25).

⁵⁵ Series B, No. 4, p. 26.

⁵⁶ Venire contra factum, proprium; cf. the doctrine of estoppel in common law.

⁵⁷ In the Free Zones Case, the French Government objected to the jurisdiction of the Court (Series A/B, No. 46, p. 163), although the case had been brought before the Court by aspecial agreement.

⁵⁸ Series A, No. 24, p. 41; çf. contra this definition, H. Morgenthau, La Notion du “Politique” et la Théorie dee différends internationaux, 1933, p. 26.

⁵⁹ Cf. Manley O. Hudson, “Nature of the World Court’s Jurisdiction,” American Bar Association Journal, 1931, pp. 147-148; Albert Andrews Boden, loc. cit., pp. 767-773.

⁶⁰ Cf. Viktor Bruns, loc. cit., p. 445 et seq.; Sir John Fischer Williams, “Justiciable and Other Disputes,” this Journal, Vol. 26 (1932), pp. 31—36; C. Bilfinger, “Betrachtungen ueber politisches Recht,” Zeitschrift f. ausl. oeffentl. Recht und Voelkerrecht, I, Teil I, 1929, pp. 68-76; Charles Cheney Hyde, “Legal Problems Capable of Settlement by Arbitration, ” Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, 11, p. 7ff; H. Lauterpacht, “The Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes in International Law,” Economics, 1928, pp. 298-314; idem, “La théorie des différends non-justiciables en droit international,” Recueil des Cours, 1930, IV, pp. 663-584; J. Hostie, “Différends justiciables et non-justiciables,” Rev. de dr. intern, et de lég. comp., 1928, pp. 263-281, in particular pp. 273ff, 571, 576ff; Erich Kaufmann, Probleme der internationalen Gerichtsbarkeit, 1932, pp. 7-11; Philip Marshall Brown, “The classification of justiciable disputes,” this Journal, Vol. 16 (1922), pp. 254-259 (holding that the problem should be approached from the political side, in order to prevent the Court from entertaining various disputes involving political considerations); cf. General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration, Jan. 4, 1929, Art. I, and Treaty of Arbitration between the United States and France, Feb. 6, 1928, Art. II (justiciable in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law or equity).

⁶¹ Cf. Series D, No. 5, p. 21, enumerating a certain number of special treaties entrusting to the Court the settlement of political disputes in which the legal element is, to some extent, eliminated.

⁶² Cf. Manley O. Hudson, “World Court and Austro-German Customs Regime,” American Bar Association Journal, 1931, p. 793; Hans Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 24-26; Albert Andrews Roden, loe. cit., pp. 767-770.

⁶³ This is not altered by the fact that the Court’s jurisdiction covers decisions of “legal disputes” (Art. 36, par. 2, of the Statute).

⁶⁴ Cf. Viktor Brims, Vodkerrecht ate Rechtsordnung, loc. cit., I, p. l£f, II, p. 466; Charles Cheney Hyde, op. cit., p. 8; Brierly, “The General Act of Geneva,” British Yearbook of International Law, 1930, p. 128; cf. contra, e.g., Baker, “The Obligatory Jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice,” British Yearbook of International Law, 1925, p. 93; J. Hostie, loc. cit., p. 572; see also Albert Andrews Roden, loc. dt., pp. 763, 772-773. Due to lack of space we may not deal with the bases of the above-adopted jurisprudential theory as to the nature of public international law, expounded in particular by Viktor Bruns; we admit that this theory is contrary to the points of view of a majority of American and European authors.

⁶⁵ As to a decision ex aequo et bono cf. infra, note 80.

⁶⁶ As in the case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the district of Gex.

⁶⁷ Cf. F. Castberg, loc. cit., p. 160; Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1934, p. 364.

⁶⁸ Judge Kellogg (Series A, No. 24, p. 37) is warranted in holding that the provisions of Article 36 have to be viewed in the proper perspective of the frame of the Court’s Statute and to be construed in conjunction with the provisions of Article 38 (concerning the law to be applied by the Court). But this conclusion, denying the jurisdiction of the Court over political questions, must be restricted to disputes concerning the creation of new law; as to municipal law cf. supra, note 20ff. ■

⁶⁹ Cf. dissenting opinion by Judge N6gulesco (Series A/B, No. 46, p. 190) contra dissenting opinion by Judges Altamira and Sir Cecil Hurst (Series A/B, No. 46, p. 184) neglecting the fact that no substantive law has been created by the agreement, since the “present conditions’’ apparently do not represent such law in the opinion of the parties.

⁷⁰ In this case, proceedings were broken off (Series A/B, No. 61), since the parties concluded an agreement in settlement of the dispute. Cf. the case concerning the Statute of the Memel Territory, preliminary objection, Series A/B, No. 47. Judge Baron Rolin-Jaequemyns, p. 258, was uncertain of the existence of a legal dispute but held that the attention of the Court may be called to these questions during the deliberations on the merits. Since the question pertains to the problem of jurisdiction, the opinion is not quite correct. Cf. Series A/B, No. 49, pp. 311-328, dissenting opinion by Judge Anzilotti, p. 350.

⁷¹ Cf. Series A/B, No. 46, p. 162. This point of view must be considered valid at least with respect to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The award in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case, rendered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Sept. 7, 1910 (Hague Court Reports, p. 141£f) may not weaken this statement. In addition to the differences as to the character of the two courts, it must be observed that the regulations laid down by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in this case were based upon a provision of the respective special agreement, by which the court was asked to recommend rules and a method of procedure. These regulations were merely a recommendation which was to become binding upon the States only if the States themselves would adopt the rules.

Likewise, the award in the Fur Seal Arbitration {cf. John Bassett Moore, International Arbitrations, I, pp. 755-961), by which, based upon a treaty of arbitration, Feb. 29, 1892, regulations for the proper protection and preservation of the fur seal were laid down in a detailed manner, is of a different character; for in this Case a tribunal of seven arbitrators was established exclusively for this one purpose; there was no question of a permanently established court. The correctness of this viewpoint is not weakened by the practice of the Supreme Court of the United States which has in several cases laid down regulations to be followed by the parties; cf. New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U. S. 473: a special master was authorized to report to the court a form of decree declaring what may be considered a reasonable time within which the City of New York must carry into effect its proposed plan for the erection and operation of incinerators to destroy the garbage. In the case New Jersey v. The City of New York, 283 U. S. 336, 805, a detailed regulation as to the diversion of water from non-navigable tributaries of the Delaware was ordered by decree. Cf. the decree of April 21,1930 (281 U. S. 696), concerning the Chicago Drainage Canal; Wis-consm v. Illinois, 289 U. S. 395, 411, enlarging this decree; Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660, 671 (“the court will determine what is an equitable apportionment of the use of such waters”;—the Connecticut, a navigable river flowing through Massachusetts and thence through the State of Connecticut); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 496 (decree), 260 U. S. 1 (modification of decree), 286 U. S. 494, etc. It may be noted that the Permanent Court of International Justice cannot be compared too closely with the Supreme Court— though its capacity to render advisory opinions has been established under the impression of American law. With regard to other matters, e.g., to the binding force of a judgment rendered (c/. Art. 59 of the Statute), it is, nevertheless, similar to continental European conceptions of courts. In particular, the importance of Art. 38, par. 2, of the Statute (ex aeguo et bono agreement) would be minimized without justification, if the Court should be considered competent to lay down regulations and, thus, to create new law, even in cases where no ex aequo et bono authorization exists.

⁷² Cf. dissenting opinion by Judge Dreyfus, Series A/B, No. 46, pp. 200,211-212, as to the French point of view.

⁷³ Series A/B, No. 46, p. 172.

⁷⁴ Cf. Manley 0. Hudson, “The Aftermath of the Permanent Court’s Judgment in the Free Zones Case,” this Journal, Vol. 28 (1934), p. 322ff.

⁷⁵ See supra, note 22.

⁷⁶ Cf. Viktor Bruns, be. cit., p. 467; D. Schindler, be. eit., p. 337ff; De Bustamante, La Cour permanenb de Justice intemationab, 1923, p. 59; cf. Series D, No. 5, pp. 40-41 (the Court may be called upon by a special arrangement to settle disputes in which the legal element is to a large extent eliminated).

⁷⁷ Observations by Judge Kellogg (Series A, No. 24, p. 40); K. Strupp, be. cit., p. 478.

⁷⁸ Haerle, op. cit., p. 288; cf. contra, Judge Kellogg, p. 41.

⁷⁹ Series A, No. 24, pp. 10,11,15; Series A/B, No. 46, p. 150ff, in particular, p. 153.

⁸⁰ Cf. F. Castberg, loc. cit., p. 172; Mr. Beckett, loc. tit., p. 231, is justified in holding that “cette important question n’est pas encore rtsolue” by the Court.

⁸¹ Cf. contra, N. Politis, La Justice intemationale, 1924, p. 170.

⁸² Erich Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 16, unjustifiably deems the Court to have ruled that “tin mit dieser Aufgabe besonders betrautes Schiedsgericht dazu befugt sei,” since the Court did not require that a special tribunal, not the Court itself, may be authorized; cf. A. A. Roden, loc. cit., note 26.

⁸³ No wider freedom, as maintained by Judges Altamira and Sir Cecil Hurst (Series A/B, No. 46, p. 182) because of “constitutional difficulties or difficulties of a similar kind which the Court does not have to encounter,” since, even by a special agreement, nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet.

⁸⁴ It is true that the advisory procedure of the Court tends to assimilate with the contentious procedure. Cf. amendments of Arts. 71ff of the Rules in 1926, 1927; MM. de Lapradelle-N¿gulesco, “Rapport sur la nature juridique des avis consultatifs de la Corn permanents de Justice intemationale,” Annuaire de VInstitut de droit international, 1928, pp. 423-425, 428-429, holding that the interested governments may intervene in advisory proceedings (Arts. 62, 63 of the Statute); contra, R. Erich, “Quelques observations sur le carac-thre juridique des avis consultatifs,” Rev. de dr. intern, et de lig. comp., 1928, p. 866; A. Philipse, Lee Fonctions consultatives de la Cour permanente de Justice intemationale, 1928, p. 52S; Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1934, p. 372.

⁸⁵ Cf. Minutes of the session of the Council of the League of Nations, June 11,1929 (Official Journal, Spec. Suppl. No. 73, pp. 21-30), in particular p. 26. M. Briand: The Court would have to leave it to the Council to find the necessary compromise between these two principles (the principle of the protection of the minority and the principle of State sovereignty).

⁸⁶ Cf. as to this distinction Series E, No. 9, p. 81 ; A. Philipse, op. cit., p. 38; MM. de Lapradelle-Négulesco, loc. cil., p. 446ff, not coinciding with that maintained by N. Politis, op. cit., p. 173 (“sur un point quelconque qui ne soit pat encore un litige proprement dit ou sur un différend déjà né”).

⁸⁷ Cf. Series A/B, No. 46 (advisory opinion concerning the interpretation of the Caphan-daris-Molloff Agreement), p. 87.

⁸⁸ Cf. MM. de Lapradelle-Négulesco, loc. cit., p. 464, similar to the request for an advisory opinion in the Nationality Decrees Case (Series B, No. 4) containing a further agreement of the parties that if the opinion of the Court upon the above question is that it is not solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction, the whole dispute will be referred to arbitration or to judicial settlement under conditions to be agreed upon between the governments. Contra, Alexander P. Fachiri, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1932, p. 106, overlooking this special case.

⁸⁹ Series A, No. 16 (Minority Schools in Upper Silesia), p. 22; cf. Series A, No. 17 (Factory at Chorzéw; indemnity, the merits), p. 37.

⁹⁰ Cf. Ténékidès, “La protection, ” loc. cit., note 22, declaring this exception only to be an application of the rule specialia generaMbus derogant.

⁹¹ Cf. R. Genet, Précis de jurisprudence de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, 1933, p. 197.

⁹² Annuaire, p. 173ff, p. 195ff; cf. Beckett, loc. cü., p. 242, note 3, affirming the question with reference to the Court’s decision, Series A, No. 2, p. 29.

⁹³ Annuaire, p. 201.

⁹⁴ Anzilotti, D., Corso di diritto internationale, 1929, p. 73ff Google Scholar; N. Politis, op. cit., p. 246. See also N. Feinberg, La juridiction de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale dans le système des mandats, p. 169, p. 173ff, with regard to the special problem concerning the mandatory jurisdiction; cf. N. Politis, Annuaire, p. 175, deeming that in case of the optional clause, “il ne s’agit pas d’une obligation liant deux États seulement, il s’agit d’une obligation collective établie entre tous les États, déjà nombreux, gui ont signé le protocole.”

⁹⁵ Cf. N. Politis, op. cü., pp. 245, 246. Similarly with respect to a question involving substantive law, the judgment in the Oscar Chinn Case, Series A/B,*No. 63, p. 80; contra, separate opinions of Judges van Eysinga (p. 135), and Schuecking (p. 148).

⁹⁶ Art. 11, par. 2, of the Covenant which might be applicable in exceptional cases constitutes only a means of political pressure.

⁹⁷ Cf. contra, Séries A, No. 15 (Minority Schools, Upper Silesia) dissenting opinions by Judges Nyholm (p. 59), and Négulesco (pp. 71-72), unjustifiably deeming the parties unable to conclude an agreement, since the convention, on the basis of which the suit was brought, was imposed on the parties by the Conference of Ambassadors. The question considered above acquires practical importance in the exceptional cases where a multipartite treaty instituting a union (cf. D. Anzilotti, op. cit., p. 236) provides for jurisdiction of a tribunal other than the Permanent Court, or where such a treaty attempts to restrict the jurisdiction of the Court. Cf. Salvioli, “La Jurisprudence,” loc. cit., pp. 19-20, while holding the States to be able to submit to the Permanent Court a dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the Council, does not consider the limitations relating to the substantive contents of an agreement.

⁹⁸ See Series A, No. 20 (Loan Case), p. 19, Series A/B, No. 46 (Free Zones Case), p. 138, where the Court dealt with the question of jurisdiction, although an agreement existed.

⁹⁹ Series A, No. 15, pp. 23, 29; cf. Salvioli, “La Jurisprudence,” loc. cit., pp. 41-44, who is not justified in denying the possibility of simultaneous procedures before the Court and the Council, in order to prevent parallel procedures.

¹⁰⁰ Series A, No. 15, p. 23. Cf. Judge Nyholm, p. 62. N. Feinberg, La juridiction de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale dam le système des minorités, p. 199S, in an analysis of the conflicts between the jurisdiction of the two institutions, is justified in stating that an exception of litispendance derived from the fact that the Council examines the question, is not well founded since the criterion of a prevention of time does not exist within this problem.

¹⁰¹ Series A, No. 15, p. 29. Even if the decision of the Council was based on an advisory opinion of the Court, this opinion creates no exeeptio reijudicatae as to the contentious judgment. Cf. MM. de Lapradelle-N£gulesco, loc. cit., p. 443; N. Feinberg, op. cit., p. 20411.

¹⁰² Series A/B, No. 44, pp. 24-25; cf. Series B, No. 15 (advisory opinion concerning the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig), p. 24.

¹⁰³ Series A/B, No. 47, p. 248.

¹⁰⁴ Cf., ccmtra, dissenting opinion by Judges Count Rostworowski and Roemer’is (Series A/B, No. 47, p. 254), in so far as the cases in point are also covered by Art. 17, par. 1, creating a jurisdiction of the Council. See dissenting opinion by Judge Baron Rolin-Jaequemyns (p. 2555), who requires that the Council be resorted to first, for only in that way, in his opinion, the requirement that a difference of opinion exists can be fulfilled; this argument is inconsistent with the Court’s conception which, in general, does not require that any dispute should have manifested itself formally {cf. Series A, No. 6, pp. 14,22; Series A, No. 7, p. 18; Series A, No. 13, p. 10).

¹⁰⁵ See also the award of the Tribunal of Arbitration concerning the Venezuelan Preferential Case (The Hague Court Reports, p. 58): “The Tribunal has no competence at all either to contest the jurisdiction of the Mixed Commissions of Arbitration established at Caracas, nor to judge their action.”

¹⁰⁶ Series A, No. 6 (German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, preliminary objections), p. 20ff.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. contra, Salvioli, “La jurisprudence,” loc. cit., pp. 27-36, affirming litispendance, because a possibility of contradicting sentences should, at any rate, be prevented.

¹⁰⁸ This basis is, by itself, not decisive, for the Court (Series A, No. 9, p. 26) overruled also a plea that a suit could not be entertained, although it stated expressly that “the present application seeks an indemnity which is not necessarily different from that which the companies on whose behalf it is claimed, might obtain from another tribunal, assuming that there was one which was competent.” Cf. G. de Magyary, op. cit., pp. 282-285, denying the existence of identical claims.

¹⁰⁹ A fortiori, the same point of view is taken by the Court with regard to the Polish Civil Tribunal of Kattowitz. Cf. Ténékidès, “L’exception de litispendance devant les organismes internationaux,” Revue générale de droit international public, 1929, pp. 502-527, in particular p. 522ff.

¹¹⁰ Cf. contra, Judge Count Rostworowski (p. 39), who, according to his tendency to limit the Court’s jurisdiction, holds the Court, by virtue of Art. 23, bound to confine itself to determine only differences of opinion between the two governments concerned, without endeavoring to impose by its decision on one or the other government any obligation regarding individuals, e.g., in the matter of reparation or indemnity.

¹¹¹ Series A, No. 9, p. 30.

¹¹² Series A, No. 7 (German interests in Polish Upper Silesia, the merits), p. 33.

¹¹³ As maintained by Haerle, op. cit., p. 204. It is rather doubtful whether the question of Its pendens might be considered a “general principle” according to Art. 38, No. 3, of the Statute.

¹¹⁴ G. Salvioli, “La jurisprudence,” loc. cit., p. 34.

¹¹⁵ Op cit., pp. 238-240.

¹¹⁶ As well as by the national tribunals.

¹¹⁷ Cf. G. de Magyary, op. cit., pp. 234-236, who further holds that the litispendance before a national tribunal should be recognized by international tribunals.

¹¹⁸ Series A, No. 2, p. 32.

¹¹⁹ The fact that the Court (Series A, No. 11, réadaptation of the Mavrommatis concessions, p. 22) upheld the preliminary objection denying the Court’s jurisdiction, is due to a construction of the provisions of Arts. 11 and 26 of the Palestine Mandate and is, thus, of no general interest; cf. N. Feinberg, La juridiction de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale dans le système des mandais, p. 1293; Edwin M. Eorchard, “The Mavrommatis Concession Cases,” this Journal, Vol. 19 (1925), p. 738, warning the Court against seeking to enlarge its compulsory jurisdiction by judicial construction; Arthur K. Kuhn, “The Mavrommatis Case on Réadaptation of the Jerusalem Concessions, ” ibid., Voi. 22 (1928), p. 385; Michel de la Grotte, ‘‘Les affaires traitées par la Cour permanente de Justice internationale,” Rev. de dr. intern, et de lig. comp., 1929, p. 399.