1 Historically, the burden of preparation for general international conferences has fallen largely on the governments. It is best that preparation be made by an international authority, not only because of the improvement in preparation, but also to relieve the governments of this task. See Manley O. Hudson, International Legislation, Carnegie Endowment, 1931, Vol. I, p. xxxix. Tor a brief discussion and bibliography of the International Labor Organization, see the sketch by the author in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. The author was able to study the Organization in Geneva during 1931-32 as the holder of a Fellowship of the Social Science Research Council.

2 The analytical minutes of the Labor Commission of the Peace Conference are published in the Official Bulletin of the International Labor Office, Vol. I (1923). (Cited hereafter as Official Bulletin.)

3 Ibid., p. 158.

4 Ibid., pp. 20-21. The emphasis at this time on the protest of a government against an item on the agenda must be related to the British proposal that unless a state rejected a convention within a given time it would be bound by it. Since the final text of Article 405 of the Treaty of Versailles does not contain this provision, but merely stipulates that the conventions and recommendation must be submitted within a given time to the competent national authority, the right of protest against an item on the agenda has become almost a dead letter. It was exercised once, in 1921, when the French Government denied the competence of the Organization to deal with agricultural workers. The Conference, however, affirmed its competence and later the Permanent Court of International Justice sustained this view.

5 Official Bulletin, ibid., pp. 41-42. An early notion was that the information gathered by the Office would be communicated to the Conference rather than to the governments, as is now considered absolutely essential. One thing the commission did realize was the importance of precision as to the scope of the agenda; however, this has been a much more difficult problem than was thought in 1919 would be the case. Ibid., p. 142.

6 Official Bulletin, ibid., p. 267. One of the reasons the Labor Committee, which considered certain questions after the adjournment of the general commission, objected on May 15, 1919, to the admission of Germany before the conclusion of the Washington Conference, was that the preparation for the Conference had already been launched among the Allied and Associated Powers, leaving out of consideration German social legislation. This shows plainly that the Peace Conference not only failed to realize the importance of preparation, but also saw no need of universality in preparation. See D. H. Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris, Vol. XVIII, pp. 233-34.

7 See Reports of the International Labor Conference in 1919, Report No. 1, p. 149. The questionnaire was used by the International Association for Labor Legislation in working up comparative reports, as in the case of the 1911 Report on Factory Inspection. See International Labor Office, Questionnaire on Factory Inspection, 1923, Preliminary Note.

8 For the work of the Organizing Committee, see Official Bulletin, Vol. I, Pt. II, pp. 349-407.

9 In 1919 and 1920 it was felt by the leaders of the Office that the preparation for international action protecting seamen would be one of the easiest tasks of the Organization because of the international character of the work of seamen. In fact it has been one of the most difficult of the duties of the Office.

10 See International Labor Conference, 1921, Questionnaire No. 2, Agricultural Questions, Introductory Memorandum. The rejection by the 1920 Conference of the proposed draft convention of the hours of work at sea was believed by the Office to be the result of faulty preparation technique. It was this failure in 1920 which drove the Office to a thorough reconsideration of the method of preparing conventions, and especially the r61e of the questionnaire in preparation for the Conference. The shipowners in the 1920 Conference were noticeably relentless in their criticism of the preparation which had been made for the discussion of this convention.

11 See International Labor Conference, Final Record, 1922, pp. 322, 608. (Cited hereafter as Final Record.) The Governing Body felt as to this particular proposal, however, that it would be a mistake not to have both preparation and discussion during the same Conference. See Final Record, 1923, p. xiii. The genesis of the double-reading procedure which was adopted in 1924 is, apparently, a suggestion made in the 1922 Conference by one of the British delegates. A final comprehensive report on the discussions of 1921 and 1922 as to how to secure ratifications was submitted to the Conference in 1924. See Report on the Institution of a Procedure for Amendment of Conventions. The original proposal of the Governing Body was that one session be devoted to administrative and technical matters and the next to labor legislation. It had been suggested previously in the body that the Conference alternate between light and heavy agenda. Official Bulletin, Vol. V (1922), p. 185.

12 The official regulations on preparation are found in the standing orders of the Conference and the Governing Body. The standing orders of the Conference are published in the Final Record of the Conference which adopted them, and the amendments are likewise published as adopted. A special publication of the Office gives the texts of the standing orders of the Conference and the body. See Constitution and Rules.

13 Final Record, 1922, p. 322. The Conference resolution of Oct. 31, 1922, speaks of alternative sessions of preparation and decision: “In the examination of items inscribed on the agenda, the first session should be devoted to the general discussion of drafts for conventions or drafts for recommendations, demanding a vote by simple majority only. The final vote upon these decisions in the conditions provided for by Paragraph 2 of Article 405, that is to say, by a two-thirds majority, should be held at the opening of the following session.” Official Bulletin, Vol. VI (1922), pp. 536-37. [Italics are mine.]

14 Official Bulletin, Vol. VII (1923), pp. 82-86, 166; Vol. VIII (1923), pp. 265-67.

15 For the text of these provisional standing orders, see Final Record, 1925, Vol. II, App. 3.

16 In a letter of March, 1925, the Office, in commenting on the proposed amendments, felt that it should have been given the power to examine the admissibility of amendments. Official Bulletin, Vol. X (1925), p. 38.

17 See Final Record, 1925, pp. 423 ff., 467, 524 ff., 545 ff.

18 See the statement made by the British government delegate, ibid., p. 525.

19 The situation in the 9th Session of 1926 was somewhat different from the ordinary session of the Conference of that year. It was a continuation of the 1920 maritime session which dealt with the international codification of law relating to seamen. Furthermore, extensive outside preparation had been undertaken by the Joint Maritime Commission, which had been dealing since 1920 with the technical aspect of the proposed draft conventions and recommendations concerning seamen.

20 Final Record, 1926 (8th Session), pp. 191-200, 368 ff.

21 Report of the Director, 1928, Sec. 18. The first to propose the double-discussion procedure was apparently Professor Alfred O'Rahilly, Irish Free State delegate. See Final Record, 1924, pp. 436-37.

22 It is of importance to note that in the provisions submitted to the Conference by the Governing Body, the actual drafting of the questionnaire was to be left to the Office. During the Conference discussion, however, this function was transferred from the Office to the Conference.

23 The Office in 1921, however, took practically the same position as the workers and employers in the committees under this type of procedure. See Questionnaire No. 2 (1921), Agricultural Questions, Introductory Memorandum. See also Report No. 2 (1921), pp. 60-61.

24 Director's Report, 1930, Sec. 16; Final Record, 1929 (12th Session), pp. 361, 804 ff. When the double-discussion draft conclusion procedure was adopted, the workers’ motion to go back to the original procedure in drafting conventions which was employed until the Conference of 1924, was defeated in the committee which considered reform of Conference procedure.

25 The committee in the 1931 Conference which considered draft conclusions on the admission of children to non-industrial occupations requested that in the future the Office include in the Grey Reports on law and practice not only general conclusions, “but also a list of points for consideration by the committee with a view to the preparation of a questionnaire.” Final Record, 1931, p. 441.

26 A convention regulating the hours of work at sea was defeated in the Conference of 1920. The proposals of the Office for first discussion in 1929 were more flexible than the text of the convention of 1920, and this may account for the greater conciliatory spirit.

27 Final Record, 1930, p. xvii ff.

28 Director's Report, 1930, Sec. 17.

29 It is clear, however, that the Director had in mind substituting the preparatory technical conference for the special session of the Conference dealing with maritime questions. This substitution has been categorically rejected by the ship owners.

30 See Final Record, 1930, p. 468. The resolution to this effect proposed by the Indian workers’ delegate was not adopted owing to lack of a quorum. The Conference of 1932, however, adopted a resolution proposed by the Indian workers’ delegate asking the Governing Body to consider calling a preparatory advisory conference in which native or colonial elements would be represented. See Official Bulletin, Vol. XVII (1932), Supplement No. 2, pp. 91-92; Director's Report, 1930, Sec. 189. Late in 1932 the Governing Body decided to call a preparatory conference on the question of international action on the forty-hour week. This conference was held in January, 1933. The first suggestion that preparatory technical conferences be used came apparently from Switzerland in the discussion of the periodicity of the Labor Conference in the Swiss Council of States. Official Bulletin, Vol. V (1922), pp. 109-112.

31 Cf. League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 83, October, 1930, pp. 12-16, for the resolution adopted by the Assembly in 1930 on the procedure to be followed in drafting League of Nations conventions. The resolution, after noting the importance of preparation in obtaining ratifications, suggested the general procedure which should befollowed. The resolution approves extensive freedom for the Secretary-General in securing information as to why no action has been taken by the states, this being in contrast with the practice of the Labor Organization, where such discretion is quite limited. The Council may consider the question of the revision or amendment of conventions on the basis of such information. The resolution makes provision for the adhesion of non-member states, and urges, in technical matters especially, agreements not requiring ratification. The procedure as to League conventions is to be, briefly, the following: (1) When an organ of the League wants a convention, a full memorandum shall be submitted to the Council; (2) if the Council approves, the draft convention shall be communicated to the members, in some cases with a specific questionnaire; (3) the draft convention and the government views shall be sent to the Assembly, which shall decide if a conference shall be called; (4) if the Assembly wants such a conference, the Council shall consult the governments again with a revised draft of the convention; (5) in the light of the second consultation, the Council shall decide whether to call such a conference and fix the date; and (6) these rules shall be common as to the technical organizations of the League. See Dix ans d'Organisation Internationale du Travail (Geneva, 1931), pp. 95-96, for a statement of the influence of the Labor Organization on the League system of drafting conventions.

32 An early proposal in 1922 was that the Governing Body might take the place of the Selection Committee, which is charged with directing the work of the Conference. This proposal was rejected, however, and a direct connection between the body and the Conference has never been established. Final Record, 1922, pp. 184 ff., 192. This decision was invoked by the workers in 1926 as an argument against a sharp increase of the participation of the Governing Body in the preparation for the Conference.

33 Int. Labor Conf., Standing Orders, Art. 6, Par. 4. On maritime questions reports for the Conference are submitted in practice to the Joint Maritime Commission as a part of the preparation of draft conventions and recommendation. Official Bulletin, Vol. XIV (1929), p. 47. Previously, in April, 1921, the Governing Body had decided that the questionnaires on agenda items should be submitted to the Governing Body before their dispatch to the governments. The present submission of the Grey Reports performs something of the same function under the older types of procedure. The Governing Body decided quite early, in contrast with the procedure in maritime questions, that the preparation for agricultural items on the agenda should not necessarily be carried out with a consultation of the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome, with which the body has a permanent liaison through a mixed committee. A most exhaustive discussion of the position of the Governing Body in the preparation for the Conference took place in January, 1926, when the double-discussion procedure was up for approval. The employers made numerous suggestions for increasing the power of the body over preparation and the Conference, all of which were rejected. These proposals were that all the documents of preparation should be submitted to the body, that the questionnaires, or the Blue Reports, must be approved by the body before communication to the governments. The present situation, noted above, developed out of the refusal to accept the employers’ suggestions. In February, 1930, it was decided that the Grey Reports should be considered by the body as a whole.

34 Official Bulletin, Vol. IX (1924), pp. 1-5.

35 The Office has developed the practice of indicating to the body whether it considers a subject “ripe” for international treatment. Sometimes a question is ripe merely for serious study preliminary to its consideration as a possible item on the agenda. The Office view seems to be that a question is ripe when the will to find an international settlement exists. In the early years of the Organization, collective agreements seemed to be about as important as national legislation as a basis of action. For instance, the report to the Genoa Conference (1920) on hours at sea, stresses certain collective agreements. The Office has always emphasized collective agreements in agriculture. See Studies and Reports, Series K, No. 11, Collective Agreements in Agriculture, Adaptation of the Washington Decisions to Agriculture.

36 Until October, 1932, the first discussion took place in October and the agenda was finally determined in January. The employers proposed in 1920 that the body institute an elaborate procedure of general consultation of governments before items are placed on the agenda. This proposal was rejected as unduly retarding the work of the body.

37 The Conference has been of importance at times itself in settling its agenda. The 1924 Conference prevented the further consideration of the anthrax question, and the 1925 Conference practically determined the program which has been followed in regard to social insurance. In both cases the Conference examined general reports on these questions.

38 The length of time a proposal is before the Governing Body is no guarantee of a place on the agenda. The proposal that holidays with pay be treated by an international convention has been before the Organization since 1919, but it was placed in the agenda for 1935 only in October, 1933. Proposals which fit in with the general program of the Organization, such as those for social insurance or regulation of hours of work, have a much greater chance of adoption.

39 The jealous attitude of the Governing Body on the question of the scope of the agenda has been a matter of development. For instance, in 1923 the body virtually placed in the hands of the Conference the problem of the scope of international action against the use of white lead. Official Bulletin, Vol. Ill (1921), p. 539.

40 Final Record, 1929 (12th Session), pp. 488, 498.

41 The correspondence of the Director with the governments concerning the agenda and the convocation of the Conference is published at the beginning of each Final Record. The wishes of the Governing Body have been expressed frequently in these letters.

42 Thus when certain important amendments to the Office draft are introduced, it can be alleged that the matter has been excluded already by the Governing Body, or that a new subject is being put before the Conference and that it should be placed on the agenda in a proper manner, i.e., by the Governing Body. Cf., the Office's discussion of the 1925 questionnaire on seamen's inspection, in which the shipowners’ view is presented that the Office had enlarged the scope of the item on the 1926 agenda. The Office defended its action both as to the intentions of the Governing Body and as to the necessity of a complete consultation of the governments. Official Bulletin, Vol. X (1925), pp. 135-41.

43 The Governing Body is plainly divided as to the control it ought to exercise over the scope of the agenda. The employers have, with the exception of their views on the revision of conventions, wanted to limit the freedom of the Conference in defining the scope of its action. However, it has been recognized frequently that the double-discussion procedure imposes on the first Conference the authoritative determination of the scope of an item. One reason for not using the double-discussion procedure in revising conventions is merely that under the revision process the entire function of defining the scope of the revision items is assumed by the Governing Body.

44 In 1927 the Governing Body made it clear that the right to strike was not included in theitem on the agenda on freedom of association, but questions adopted by the committee of the Conference, over the objection of the workers, practically included an implied limitation on the right to strike. Discussions of the regulation of the hours of work have consistently raised the question of weekly rest, and questions dealing with the protection of children have raised the problems of education. The discussion of accident prevention evoked a debate on industrial health. However, the mutilation of the dockers’ convention in 1928 and 1929 is probably the best example of the inclusion of a body of extraneous material in a draft convention. In 1931 and 1932 the discussion of the age of admission of children to non-industrial occupations, for instance, raised the question, from the workers’ side, of the regulation of the hours of work and the night work of children.

45 A questionnaire addressed to the governments for information is often employed by the Office in the preparation of this report. The United States Government usually gives answers to these questions, though not to the official questionnaire leading to the formulation of the final Blue Report.

46 This process of interpretation and evaluation has brought sharp criticism on the Office at times. Thus, in 1921, during the discussion of the proposed action against white lead, the British Government and the employers said the preparation of the Office was neither impartial nor complete. Director Thomas replied that it was the duty of the Governing Body, and not of a committee of the Conference, to supervise the Office. In the same Conference, the Office proposal for international disinfection against anthrax spores was rejected in part on the ground of insufficient preparation. Final Record, 1921, pp. 866-867. The Office proposals of 1920 for the regulation of hours at sea (which was defeated), and the 1921 rejection of its proposal as to collective agreements to regulate the hours of work in agriculture (which was removed from the agenda), together with the criticism of the white lead and anthrax preparations, indicate perhaps the weakness of the system of preparation in use at the time.

47 It is difficult to overemphasize the influence of the Office on the final contents of draft conventions and recommendations. While this influence is very great, and while the function of the Conference is essentially that of amendment or modification of the Office texts, a few qualifications must be made. As the answers to the questionnaires, especially from the leading European Powers, control the Office, the function of the Office in regard to these answers is fundamentally mechanical and clerical. As to the twenty or twenty-five states whose answers are not received, the Office draft is virtually controlling; that is, the answers actually received determine the content of the draft. One weakness of the Office drafts has been that the predominantly European staff in Geneva has been quite unable to visualize the reactions and needs of overseas countries, and therefore in certain cases these countries have seen no authoritativeness in the final drafts submitted to the Conference.

48 Other colors for the reports have been used. In 1925 the reports to the Conference on the amendments proposed to the provisionally adopted draft conventions of 1924 under the double-reading procedure were called Orange Reports. When a report on a general problem is made to the Conference upon which no action is to be taken, it is usually a Green Report. A White Report is presented to a preparatory technical conference. Naturally, all reports issued by the Office are communicated to the governments.

49 This control extends to the work of drafting done in the Conference after the discussion on the draft texts has been completed. Recent standing orders also provide that each committee shall have its own drafting committee. The control of the Office over the drafting of texts in the committees is much less than over the Conference as a whole, since such drafting is in essence the statement of the compromises reached in the committees.

50 Official Bulletin, Vol. III (1921), pp. 39-41.

51 Under the double-discussion procedures, the Office has to explain carefully the background of the questions in the light of the first discussion in the Conference. This is done either in the preliminary note to the questionnaire, or in the letter sent to the governments with the questionnaire. See Official Bulletin, Vol. XIV (1929), pp. 102-106. See, ibid., Vol. XII (1927), pp. 107-12, for the Office discussion of the questionnaires for the 1928 Conference which were adopted by the Conference in 1927. The Office displayed a very critical attitude toward the work of the Conference of 1927. The Office indicated, among other things, that the ideas of the Governing Body as to the scope of certain items were difficult to maintain in the Conference because of the freedom assumed in drafting the questionnaires.

52 The 1929 Committee on Salaried Employees agreed that a commentary on the questionnaire, as approved by the committee, should be circulated to the governments. This commentary included particularly certain amendments of the British Government which were rejected by the committee.

53 The Governing Body decided at its Stockholm meeting in July, 1921, that the workers’ and employers’ organizations should be consulted through the governments in regard to the preparation of draft conventions and recommendations, rather than directly through the Office. This position was confirmed in 1928 by the body. The consultation of such organization is, therefore, national rather than international as far as the treaty and the practice of the Organization are concerned. A suggestion was made, however, in the Conference committee of 1920 which dealt with the hours of work at sea, that the international organizations should be consulted. The questionnaires for the second session of the Conference were sent by the Director directly to certain workers’ organizations, and this produced immediate objection in the Governing Body. See Final Record, 1926 (8th Session), pp. 198-99, where the Director states that his relations are with states, and not with organizations within states, where preparation for the Conference is involved.

54 Perhaps one reason a longer time has not been given in which to reply to questionnaires is that the double-discussion procedure really makes it unnecessary, as the questionnaire comes after the first discussion. It is clear that more time is needed to obtain the overseas replies, but it may be true that there would be less chance of conciliation if the views of the workers and employers were included in the answers of the governments. In any case, the importance of the answers of the governments arises from the fact that they must decide finally the question of the ratification of draft conventions.