¹ See statements of Mr.Stevenson, and Mr.Zorinto, the First Committee of the General Assembly on Dec. 13, 1961. U. N. Doe. A/C.1/P.V. 1218, pp. 4-12.Google Scholar

² U. N. Doc. A/EES/1722 (XVI), Jan. 3, 1962. The resolution, which was approved unanimously, also endorsed the composition of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee.

³ This article only covers the period from March 14 to June15, 1962. No substantial discussions took place concerning the subject of peace-keeping between July 16 and Sept. 7, when the second recess began.

⁴ Peace-keeping measures were proposed by Secretary of State Herter in his speech of Feb. 18, 1960, prior to the opening of the 1960 Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament; see Documents on Disarmament (1960) 44, 50 (Dept, of State Pub. No. 7172 (1961)). At the Ten-Nation Conference, the Western proposals of March 16, April 26, and June 27, 1960, called for the establishment of peace-keeping measures. Ibid. 68, 81, and 126.

⁵ There were also meetings of a Committee of the Whole, meetings of a Subcommittee on a Treatyfor the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, informal meetings, and meetings of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference (the delegations of theSoviet Union and the United States). See the Report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, ENDC/42 (May 31, 1962), for a general description of the work of the Conference up to June1, 1962. All records of the Conference of the Eighteen- Nation Committee on Disarmament begin with the letters “ENDC.”46

⁶ U. N. Doe. A/4879 (Sept. 20, 1961); 45 Dept, of State Bulletin 589 (1961); ENDC/5 (March 19,1962); U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 439. (Throughout this paper when multiple citations exist for one document, reference will be made onlyto the Eighteen-Nation Conference document after the initial citation.) The Joint Statement ofAgreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations resulted from an extensive bilateral exchange of views in 1961 between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two countries recommended the eight agreed principles “as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament.”

⁷ ENDC/2 (March 19,1962);56 A.J.I.L.926 (1962).

⁸ ENDC/30 (April 18,1962);46 Dept, of State Bulletin 747 (1962); Blueprint for the Peace Race (U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Pub. No. 4, General Series No. 3, May, 1962); 56 A.J.I.L. 899 (1962).

⁹ It is difficult to estimate the exact amountof time devoted to peace-keeping, since the subject never occupied the entirety of particular plenary meetings. However, the followingsummary may give some idea of the extent of the discussion: the U. S. Delegation made four, the British Delegation two, and the Indian Delegation one, major statements on peace-keeping; the Soviet Delegation made lengthy rebuttals of most of these statements; the Soviet-bloc delegations echoed in numerous statements the points made by the Soviet Delegation; miscellaneous observations were made by practically all delegations; and general conference discussions took place on questions relating to peace-keeping in connection with the negotiation of the Preamble and Part I of the Disarmament Treaty.

¹⁰ The author has not attempted to quote or mention every view on peace-keeping expressed by each delegation.

¹¹ In addition to the two proposals particularly discussed, the United States made proposals concerning: obligation to refrain from the use or threat of force; utilization of appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes; support in Stage I of a U.N. General Assembly study to make existing arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputes more effective, and the institution of new arrangements where needed;agreement in Stage II to such new arrangements as might be necessary; submission in Stage I of all unresolved disputes concerning the Disarmament Treaty to the International Court of Justice; acceptance in Stage II of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to decide all international legal disputes;support of measures strengthening the ability of the United Nations to maintain international peace; support of the establishment in Stage I of a U. N. Peace Observation Corps and its expansion in Stage II; and enactment of national legislation by the end of Stage II in support of the treaty. See Stage I, Sec. II, Stage II, Sec. 6, and Stage III, Sec. H, of the U. S. Outline, ENDC/30, pp. 17-18, 25-26, 32 (April 18, 1962).

¹² ENDC/5, p. 1 (March 19, 1962).

¹³ Ibid.3.

¹⁴ ENDC/P.V. 40, pp. 9, 10, 11 (May 21, 1962). Sir Michael Wright, for the United Kingdom, likened a disarmament plan to a three-legged stool—the first leg, disarmament, the second, verification, and the third, strengthened peace-keeping machinery: “The stool cannot rest on one leg or on two legs only, it must rest on all three.” ENDC/P.V. 43, p.12 (May 28, 1962).

¹⁵ ENDC/P.V. 51, p. 12 (June 7, 1962). Similar statements were made by Mr.Zorin, on a number of occasions, e.g., see ENDC/P.V. 27, p. 29 (April 25, 1962).Google Scholar The philosophy stated by the Soviet Delegation was reflected in the Soviet draft treaty of March 15, 1962, which, compared to the United States outline of April 18, 1962, contains relatively few specific provisionsfor peace-keeping measures; the only provisions, in addition to those discussed below, requiring placement of forces at the disposal of the Security Council are Arts. 3 and 40. Art. 40 is quoted in the next paragraph below. Art. 3 provides, in effect, (1) that states “confirm their resolve” to base their relationson principles of peaceful co-existence, to refrain from resorting to the threat or use of force to settle international disputes, and to strengthen the United Nations as “the principal institution” for maintaining peace, and (2) that states undertake not to use their “police (militia)” remaining after general and complete disarmament except to safeguard internal security and to discharge obligations for maintaining international peace under the U. N. Charter. ENDC/2, p. 4 (March 15, 1962).

¹⁶ Ibid. 25.

¹⁷ ENDC/P.V. 50, p. 29 (July 23, 1962).

¹⁸ The draft preamble, ENDC/L. 11/Bev. 1 (April 17, 1962), was approved by the Committee “as so far developed by the co-chairmen [the heads of the U. S. and Soviet delegations]” on April 17, 1962; see press communiqué issued by the Conference, contained in ENDC/P.V. 22, p. 44 (April 17, 1962). Pars. 14 and 16 of the preamble read: “14. Affirming that to facilitate the attainmentof general and complete disarmament (in a peaceful world) it is important that all states abide by existing international agreements, refrainfrom any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means; …“. Have resolved to conclude the following treaty on general and complete dis-armament under strict and effective international control (in a peaceful world).”

¹⁹ Par. 15 is quoted and discussed below.

²⁰ The device of negotiating texts with passages in parentheses or brackets to indicate preferences of the United States or the Soviet Union not accepted by the other country was also utilized extensively in negotiation of the working draft of Part I of the treaty. “(Outlineof) ((General)) Treaty Obligations,” ENDC/40/Rev. 1 (May 31, 1962).The technique of negotiating treaty texts with parentheses or brackets consists more or less of the following. Divergent texts, both as to substance and form, are incorporated into one document by juxtaposing in brackets phrases and clauses preferred by one side or another. Each side may prepare its own bracketed draft. Then, after study of its own and the other side's bracketed drafts, each side may offer to alter certain phrases in its own draft so as to “bring the two drafts closer together.” Instructions may be sought as to substantive changes. New bracketed drafts will be prepared and exchanged. Discussions will follow. Then, more alterations and more bracketed drafts—and so forth, possibly through half a dozen or more drafts, until finally a draft is presented for the scrutiny of the entire Committee.It is interesting to contrast this practice with the traditional mode of negotiation in which, for the most part, points of policy are agreed upon first, and subsequently the task of drafting is turned over to specialists. Sir Harold Nicolson, a member of the British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, made the following entry in his diary several days after the subcommittee dealing with Czechoslovak questions had ironed out points of policy and had approved its report to the Supreme Council: “March 18, Tuesday—More drafting of the Treaty. The Legal experts, Hurst and Fromageot, are marvelous. Impassive and quick. Like electricians fixing a circuit.” Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919, p. 285 (1933).Those who labor to produce agreed treaty texts with the Soviet Union before points of policy have been agreed upon, can be likened, in the view of this author, not to electricians quickly fixing a circuit, but to piano movers hauling a Steinway grand up the stairs to the second story.

²¹ ENDC/P.V. 22, p. 7 (April 17, 1962). The fourth paragraph of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles reads: “Affirming that to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world it is importantthat all States abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and that they seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means.” ENDC/5 (March 19, 1962).

²² ENDC/P.V. 22, p. 11 (April 17, 1962).

²³ ENDC/L.ll/Eev. 1, p. 2 (April 17, 1962).

²⁴ ENDC/P.V. 22, p. 8 (April 17, 1962). In the 17th meeting, the representative of India had said:“… I think that this [the clause in question] has reference to change not within a country but between States; the former is a matter which is not within the purview of the Charter of the United Nations. Therefore, I do not think it is necessary to have any great apprehension regarding that clause.” ENDC/P.V. 17, p. 38 (April 10, 1962).

²⁵ ENDC/P.V. 17, p. 21 (April 10, 1962). Mr.Zorin, made a very similar statement in the 22nd meeting, ENDC/P.V. 22, p.12 (April 17, 1962).Google Scholar

²⁶ ENDC/30, Sec. H, par. 2, p. 17 (April 18, 1962).

²⁷ Ibid., Sec. G, par. 2, pp. 25-26.

²⁸ Ibid., Sec. H, par. 2, p. 32.

²⁹ ENDC/P.V. 41, p. 13 (May 24, 1962). In explaining the need for an effective and reliable peace force, Mr. Dean again alluded to the fact that “even after general and complete disarmament one State could still interfere, directly and even violently, with the sovereignty and independence of another State.” ENDC/P.V. 55, p. 38 (June 13, 1962).

³⁰ ENDC/P.V. 41, p. 14 (May 24, 1962).

³¹ ENDC/P.V. 51, p. 40 (June 7, 1962). Mr. Zorin, when first commenting on the U. S. proposal, saw the United States as proposing the establishment of “… compulsory rules of international conduct that would be dictated by some parties to the treaty to other parties.” ENDC/P.V. 27, p. 35 (April 25, 1962).

³² Statement of Mr. Zorin, ENDC/P.V. 41, p. 44 (May 24, 1962). Under the U. S. plan as originally submitted, the question of transition from Stage I to Stage II or from Stage II to Stage III was to be placed before a special session of the U. N. Security Council if one or more of the permanent Members (the “major signatory Powers”) of the Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization declared that certain conditions specified in the treaty had not been met, including whether all the undertakings of the previous stage had been carried out and whether all preparations for the next stage had been made, ENDC/30, Sec. I, p. 19, and Sec. H, pp. 26-27 (April 18, 1962). Under amendments to the U. S. outline submitted to the Conference on Aug. 8, 1962, the decisions concerning transition would be taken without referral to the Security Council, by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States and the Soviet Union. ENDC/ 30/Add. 2 (Aug. 8, 1962).Mr. Hajek, the representative of Czechoslovakia, suggested that the U. S. Delegation really wished to brand as indirect aggression “strikes or actions resulting from national liberation movements against colonialism” these “manifestations of peoples trying to fulfill their justified aspirations” should not provide a pretext for intervening, as has been the case in the past. ENDC/P.V. 41, p. 22 (May 24, 1962).

Mr. Hajek, the representative of Czechoslovakia, suggested that the U. S. Delegation really wished to brand as indirect aggression “strikes or actions resulting from national liberation movements against colonialism”; these “manifestations of peoples trying to fulfill their justified aspirations” should not provide a pretext for intervening, as has been the case in the past. ENDC/P.V. 41, p. 22 (May 24, 1962).

³³ The relevant part of Art. 13 reads: “1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:

“a. . . encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codi-fication;. . .” 59 U. S. Stat. 1031; U. S. Treaty Series, No. 993.

³⁴ ENDC/P.V. 55, p. 54 (June 13, 1962). Mr. Lall, the representative of India, in discussing the relationship of the U. S. proposal to Art. 13 of the U. N. Charter, commented:

“I am not saying that rules of conduct are international law but they impinge upon international law and I think we ought to conform to United Nations procedure where it exists and to approach this matter through United Nations bodies, even if it means expanding a little the interpretation of United Nations Articles, rather than to do things which might conceivably be contradictory to the Charter.” ENDC/P.V. 55, p. 20 (June 13, 1962).

³⁵ A Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and a Protocol were signed at Geneva 011 July 23, 1962. 47 Dept, of State Bulletin 259-263 (1962).

³⁶ ENDC/P.V. 55, p. 15 (June 13, 1962).

³⁷ ENDC/5, par. 7, p. 3 (March 19, 1962).

³⁸ ENDC/30, Sec. H, par. 5, p. 18 (April 18, 1962).

³⁹ Ibid., Sec. G, par. 3, p. 26.

⁴⁰ 40Ibid., Sec.H,par.3,p.32.

⁴¹ ENDC/P.V. 55, p. 37 (June 13, 1962).

⁴² Sir Michael expanded on his theme: “ We can find analogies for this throughout our ordinary life. There are civilian police, but the fact of their existence means that private citizens do not carry revolvers and do not feel it necessary to search the house of their neighbours; the fire brigade exists, and consequently it is not necessary to exercise control over every house by ensuring that it is built exclusively of fireproof materials, and so on.” ENDC/P.V. 43, p. 10 (May 28, 1962).

⁴³ ENDC/P.V. 54, p. 14(June 12, 1962).

⁴⁴ ENDC/P.V. 55, p. 59(June 13, 1962).

⁴⁵ Ibid. 39.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 55. For an analysis of the legality of various types of peace forces, see Sohn, “The Authority of the United Nations to Establish and Maintain a Permanent United Nations Force,” 52 A.J.I.L. 229-240 (1958); and Halderman, “Legal Basis for United Nations Armed Forces,” 56 ibid. 971 (1962). For a full discussion of peaee forces, particularly the United Nations Expeditionary Force, see Frye, A United Nations Peace Force (1957).

⁴⁷ See quotation on pp. 56-57 above. Art. 43 of the Charter provides:

“1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

“2: Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers andtypes of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

“3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.” 59 U. S.Stat. 1031; U. S. Treaty Series,No.993.

⁴⁸ ENDC/P.Y. 55, p. 40 (June 13, 1962). At the 27th meeting Mr.Zorin, had said that the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament “will radically alter the international situation and establish all the necessary conditions for implementing” the provisions of Art. 43 of the Charter. ENDC/P.V.27, p.32 (April 25, 1962).Google ScholarFor a full description of the effort to achieve agreement on the implementation of Art. 43 of the Charter, see Blaisdell, “Arms for the United Nations,” 1 Dept, of State Documents and State Papers 141-158 (1948), and Dept, of State Pub. 3203, International Organization and Conference Series III, No. 8. For general accounts, see Goodrich and Simons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security 398-405 (1955); and Claude,The United Nations and the Use of Force 346-355 (International Conciliation, No. 532 (1961)).

⁴⁹ See quotation on pp. 56-57 above.

⁵⁰ ENDC/P.V. 55, p. 40 (June 13, 1962).

⁵¹ ENDC/P.V. 54, p.17 (June 12, 1962).

⁵² This basic principle is contained in the Joint Statementof Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of Sept. 20, 1961, principles 2 and 3 b (ENDC/5, March 19, 1962); and U. S.-Soviet agreement on the objective, although not on the language to express it, is revealed in the working draft of Pt. I of the treaty, Art. I, pars. 1(b) and 2(b), ENDC/40/Rev. 1 (May 31, 1962). The basic difference between the two sides relates, therefore, to method rather than objective, since the Soviet Union proposes the complete elimination of nuclear weapons all in Stage II (ENDC/2, Art. 22, pp. 14-15, March 19, 1962), while the U. S. proposes that the elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of states take place throughout all three stages of disarmament (ENDC/30, pp. 8-10, 23-24, 29-30).

⁵³ ENDC/P.Y. 51, p. 17 (June 7, 1962). Similar statements were made by Mr. Dean for the United States, see ENDC/P.V. 46, p. 37 (May 31, 1962) and ENDC/P.V. 51, pp. 35-36 (June 7, 1962).

⁵⁴ Pt. I of the draft treaty, Art. 3, par. 3, ENDC/40/Rev. 1, p. 5 (May 31, 1962).

⁵⁵ ENDC/P.V. 47, pp. 32-33 (June 1,1962). Mr. Stelle's rebuttal, on behalf of the United States, emphasized that U. S. proposals provided that, upon and after completion of general and complete disarmament, nuclear weapons would be eliminated from the arsenals of states; as to the need to arm the peace force with nuclear weapons, the U. S. Government was not prepared to take a position for or against until after further thought, discussion and negotiation. Ibid. 41.

⁵⁶ ENDC/P.V. 51, pp. 12-13 (June 7, 1962).

⁵⁷ Mr. Lall, , ibid. 19-20. In his opening statement at the Conference, Mr. Krishna Menon, on behalf of India, had said in a passing remark: “… my country would never agree to the idea that there should be an international force which would use nuclear weapons in the future.” ENDC/P.V. 5, p. 33 (March 20, 1962).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ ENDC/P.V. 49, pp. 18-19 (June 5, 1962). Mr. Lall's argument was subsequently pursued by Mr. Hajek, the representative of Czechoslovakia, ibid. 25, by Mr. Zorin, the representative of the Soviet Union, ENDC/P.V. 50, p. 30 (June 6, 1962), and by Mr. Naszkowski, the representative of Poland, ENDC/P.V. 55, p. 9 (June 13, 1962).

⁵⁹ Principle 7, ENDC/5, p. 3 (March 19, 1962).

⁶⁰ ENDC/P.V. 55, pp. 13-14 (June 13, 1962).

⁶¹ ENDC/P.V. 54, p. 14 (June 12, 1962). “..he proceeded to fashion out of cardboard a kind of half-helmet, which, when attached to the morion [a visorless headpiece], gave the appearance of a whole one. True, when he went to see if it was strong enough to withstand a good slashing blow, he was somewhat disappointed; for when he drew his sword and gave it a couple of thrusts, he succeeded only in undoing a whole week's labor. The ease with which he had hewed it to bits disturbed him no little, and he decided to make it over. This time he placed a few strips of iron on the inside, and then, convinced that it was strong enough, refrained from putting it to any further test; instead, he adopted it then and there as the finest helmet ever made.” Cervantes, Don Quixote, p. 61 (Putnam trans., New York, 1951).

⁶² ENDC/P.V. 41, p. 33 (May 24, 1962).

⁶³ ENDC/30, Sec. H, paT. 3, p. 32 (April 18, 1962), quoted on p. 57 above.

⁶⁴ ENDC/P.V. 54, p. 44 (June 12, 1962).

⁶⁵ See discussion on pp. 52-56 above.

⁶⁶ ENDC/P.V. 55, pp. 57-58 (June 13, 1962).

⁶⁷ ENDC/P.V. 50, p. 31 (July 23, 1962). Mr. Zorin's outburst was prompted by a statement of Mr. Cavalletti, therepresentative of Italy, that if there were to be a legal rule making it a crime against international law to use nuclear weapons, there would be required, to prevent infringement, a United Nations peace force “sufficiently strong to enforce respect for international law.” ENDC/P.V. 49, p. 30 (June 5, 1962).Throughout the course of the debates, Mr. Zorin made a number of interesting statements on the nature of relations between sovereign states and settlement of disputes. In reply to a remark of Mr.Godber, , the British representative, that “It is no good our seeking to create a world safe for bandits” (ENDC/P.V. 54, p.53 (June 12, 1962))Google Scholar, Mr. Zorin, said:“This is a very remarkable utterance, and one that reflects the attitude of the Western Powers to the honor, dignity and prestige of States. A treaty on disarmament is, after all, not the same thing as internal legislation applied to the private citizens of a State but is the expression of relations between States. Here modern States are being treated as potential criminals. The conduct of States and the conduct of the individual are quite different things that, I would have said, could not be compared. The same criteria cannot be applied to the conduct of a State as to the conduct of an individual. To do so would represent a purely mechanical and incorrect approach.” ENDC/P.V. 55, p. 53 (June 13, 1962).United States proposals for third-party settlement of disputes were described in the following manner: “Free and equal negotiations between sovereign States are replaced by the capricious and despotic decision of an arbitrator.” ENDC/P.V. 56, p. 31 (June 14, 1962). The Soviet view of peaceful settlement of disputes was set forth:“The Soviet Union is an ardent advocate of the peaceful settlement of disputes between States. We are against any attempts to settle disputes by force of arms. But the peaceful settlement of disputes means negotiation without encroaching upon the rights and interests of any particular party; it means mutual concessions and seeking mutually-acceptable settlements without encroaching upon the sovereign rights of any State. The United States proposal emphasizes something else: compulsory arbitration, the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the establishment of a special Peace Observation Corps and enforcement measures to ensure compliance with international agreements. No matter what fine words have been used, it would mean, in practice, an encroachment upon the sovereign rights of one State or another and an attempt to set up a supra-national international authority acting in favor of those who would be at the head of it.” ENDC/P.V. 26, p. 29 (April 24, 1962).

⁶⁸ ENDC/40/Bev. 1, p. 5 (May 31, 1962).

⁶⁹ ENDC/P.V. 27, p.34 (April 25, 1962).

⁷⁰ ENDC/P.V. 55, p. 55 (June 13, 1962).

⁷¹ Ibid. 56.

⁷² Ibid. 41. Ibid. 18.

⁷³ ENDC/2, p. 13 (March 19, 1962).

⁷⁵ Ibid. 23.

⁷⁶ Ibid. 23-24.

⁷⁷ ENDC/P.V. 41, pp. 32-33 (May 24, 1962).

⁷⁸ ENDC/P.V. 54, p. 19 (June 12, 1962).

⁷⁹ ENDC/2, Art. 37, par. 2, p. 24 (March 19, 1962). Concerning this language, Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden, stated: “I would prefer that we avoid at all times any phraseology that lumps together the non-aligned countries in a bloe which they do not wish to form.” ENDC/P.V. 27, p. 19 (April 25, 1962)..

⁸⁰ ENDC/P.V. 51, p. 51 (June 7, 1962).

⁸¹ ENDC/P.V. 54, p. 15 (June 12, 1962).

⁸² ENDC/P.V. 55, p. 59 (June 13, 1962).

⁸³ ENDC/P.V. 54, p. 18 (June 12, 1962).

⁸⁴ ENDC/30, Stage III, Sec. H, p. 32 (April 18, 1962).

⁸⁵ Ibid., Stage I, Sec. H, pp. 17-19, and Stage II, Sec. G, pp. 25-26.

⁸⁶ In his oral statement to the International Court of Justice in the case concerning Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Mr. Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser of the U. S. Department of State, said: “The Court needs no reminder that it is dealing with a constitutive instrument, regulating, within its scope, important relations among men and nations, meant to endure for many years, designed to promote great ends and intended to grant powers adequate to serve the purposes for which it was established.” Reproduced in 47 Dept, of State Bulletin 30, 39 (1962).In 1949 the Court stated: “Under international law, the [U. N.] Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.” Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 174, 182.

⁸⁷ Dallin, ,The Soviet Union at the United Nations 11 (1962).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ See Dallin, op. cit.

⁸⁹ Dallin, ibid. 87. The author refers to “the shift in the Soviet position since 1960 regarding an international police force in a 'disarmed’ world …”

⁹⁰ Quoted in Sohn, Cases and Materials on World Law 1046 (1950). Lincoln Bloomfield in “Arms Control and World Government,” 14 World Politics 645 (1962), points to the doctrinal continuity between Litvinoff's assertion and Khrushchev's statement that there may be neutral nations but there are no neutral men.

⁹¹ McCloy, “Balance Sheet on Disarmament,” 40Foreign Affairs 354 (1962).

⁹² In the Eeport on the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties, Jan. 6, 1961, Premier Khrushchev, in speaking of the “uprisings against rotten reactionary regimes,” declared that “The communists fully support such just wars ...” Quoted in U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament (1961) 8 (1962).

⁹³ In order to “justify” a statement during the Eighteen-Nation Conference debates on the problem of disarmament control, Mr. de Mello-Franco, the representative of Brazil, explained:“The purpose of our [the eight-nation] collaboration compels us to adopt an attitude of caution and reserve here, which may sometimes give an impression of inaction or uncertainty, whereas in reality it is merely the application of a special technique, which we might call 'the technique of non-involvement.’ We can understand how difficult it is to be the constant witnesses of political and diplomatic controversy, to be always attentive to the course of the discussion and always ready to co-operate in order to guide it towards the general objective of agreement, though without ever opting for one partyor the other. To make the definition I have just given moreprecise, it might be said that this is 'the technique of participation without involvement’.” ENDC/P.V. 54, p. 22 (June 12, 1962).