1 Juris et judicii fecialis, give juris inter gentes, etc.(Brierly's translation), I, 1, 1. It will be noted that the definition seems to make a distinction between customary and conventional law in this respect. Note that Zouche recognized the existence of an international community, and that he did not consider it necessary that all states bound by them should share in the enactment of customary rules.

2 See Samuel Rachel, Dejure naturae et gentium dissertationes,par. 5, p. 159; par. 56, p. 190 (Bate's translation). And see J. W. Textor, Synopsis juris gentium,I, 3a (Bate's translation).

3 For a well known statement of the theory, see Oppenheim, International Law(4th ed. by McNair), Vol. i, pp. 19-25. And see P. E. Corbett, “The Consent of States and the Sources of the Law of Nations,” in B.Y.B.I.L.,1925, p. 20. Professor Corbett's more recent article, “Fundamentals of a New Law of Nations,” University of Toronto Law Journal,Vol. I, p. 3, is, as the author himself says, “to some extent … a retraction.”

4 See the admirable summary of Jellinek's theory of self-limitation in Lauterpacht, H., The Function of Law in the International Community, Oxford, 1933, p. 409.Google Scholar

5 Triepel argues that the ordinary contract (and the same thing is true of the ordinary treaty) cannot create a common will, because the parties have different ends in view. In the Vereinbarung,on the other hand, the content of the wills of the various parties is the same. See Droit international et droit interne(trans. René Brunet), Paris, 1920, p. 32. On p. 68 Triepel says: “Le contrat ne pent pas produire de régles juridiques, parce que, d'aprés sa nature, il ne peut pas faire naître une volenté commune. Mais ce que le contrat ne peut jamais, la Vereinbarung le peut. Les Etats peuvent créer du droit objectif, quand ils adoptent par Vereinbarung une régil qui doit régir leur conduite ultérieure d'une façon permanente. Id non plus la Vereinbarung ne ment pas à sa nature. Elle consiste en plusieurs manifestations de volenté, dont le contenu est la même. Chacun veut la même chose: la création d'une norme juridique, qui doit les régir Urns egalement dans l’avenir.… “

6 Note, however, that in one respect international law accords less respect to consent than does the contract law of modern states; for, while the latter considers a forced consent as being non-existent, in international law a state that enters into a treaty as the result of force or duress is nevertheless bound by it.

7 Permanent Court of International Justice, Eastern Carelia Advisory Opinion, Publications,Series B, No. 5, p. 27.

8 Law of Nations(3rd ed., 1942), p. 43.

9 Brissaud, J., Manuel d'histoire du droit privé,Paris, 1935, p. 452.Google Scholar

10 Quebec Civil Code, Art. 984. See Art. 1108 of the French code.

11 See, for example, Zouche's definition of international law quoted above. Among modern authorities, John Westlake may be quoted: “When one of those rules is invoked against a State it is not necessary to show that the State in question has assented to the rule either diplomatically or by having acted on it, though it is a strong argument if you can do so. It is enough to show that the general consensusof opinion within the limits of European civilization is in favour of the rule.” International Law,Part I, p. 16. Finch, George A., The Sources of Modern International Law,Washington, 1937 Google Scholar, p. 37, repeats Westlake's language. And see Brierly, Law of Nations,p. 50: “ It would hardly ever be practicable, and even the strictest positivist admits that it is not necessary, to show that every State has recognized a certain practice… . “

12 See, for example, Oppenheim, International Law,p. 19: “New States which came into existence and were through express or tacit recognition admitted into the Family of Nations thereby consented to the body of rules for international conduct in force at the time of their admittance. It is therefore not necessary to prove for every single rule of international law that every single member of the Family of Nations consented to it.”

13 On the historical development of this branch of the law, see Dunn, F. S., The Protection of Nationals,Baltimore, 1932, p. 46.Google Scholar

14 See, for example, Georges, Scelle, Précis de droit des gens,Paris, 1932, Vol. I, p. 2.Google Scholar “l’étude des société primitives et des sociétés modemes nous apprend que le droit est un produit spontané du milieu social, antérieur et supérieur a toute acceptation, peut-étre méme á Unite conscience claire des individus dont il régit les comportements.”Scelle, who finds the source of law in biological necessity, defines it as “un impératif social traduisant une nécessité née de la solidarié naturelle.”See same, p. 3. His “droit objectif”is, as he admits himself, a type of natural law.

15 Cours de droit international(trans, by Gidel), Paris, 1929, Vol. I, p. 67, “Le droit international se constitue par le moyen d'accords entre lea Etats qui tirent leur valeur obligatoire de la régie pacta sunt servanda et il existe settlement dans les limites où des accords de ce genre sont intervenus.”Anzilotti analyses custom as “accord tacite.”

16 See Corbett, P. E., “Fundamentals of a New Law of Nations,” University of Toronto Law Journal,Vol. I, p. 10.Google Scholar

17 See Corbett,as cited, p. 11.

18 Note that Lauterpacht, as cited, pp. 421-2, uses both terms without, however, distinguishing their meaning. He also uses the formula, volunts civitatis maximae est servanda.His “super-State of law” is substantially what we would call the international society.

19 This distinction has been suggested to us by Ferdinand Tönnies’ distinction between Gemeinschaftand OeseUschaft.See “Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,” Handtwörterbueh der Soziologie(1931) as translated by Loomis, Fundamental Concepts of Sociology(1940). It will be noted, however, that we do not follow him in his definition of a society. For to a jurist a society can only mean an association united and governed by legal rules, whatever that term may mean to sociologists.

20 Tractates de legibus ac deo legislatore,Book II, ch. xix, sect. 9. And see Zouche's definition of international law quoted on p. 232 above.

21 See Scelle, work cited, p. 3.

22 See Coulanges, Fustel de, La cité antique,Strasbourg, 1875 Google Scholar (rev'ded.), in general.

23 Cf. Scelle, p. 4. “ Toute sociiti de fait est en meme temps une société de droit… .”

24 We are here translating societasas meaning society, not community.

25 Törries distinguishes between natural and rational will as follows: “The whole intellect, even in the plainest man, expresses itself in his knowledge and correspondingly in his volition. Not only what he has learned but also the inherited mode of thought and perception of the forefathers influence his sentiment, his mind and heart, his conscience. Consequently I name the will thought of in this sense natural will (Wesenwiue),contrasting it with the type of rational will (Kiirwille)in which the thinking has gained predominance and come to be the directing agent. The rational will is to be differentiated from intellectual will. Intellectual will gets along well with subconscious motives which lie deep in man's nature and at the base of his natural will, whereas rational will eliminates such disturbing elements and is as clearly conscious as possible.” Loomis, Fundamental Concepts of Sociology,as cited, p. 15.

26 The assumed fundamental norm that the will of the international commiinity or society should be obeyed.

27 The same objection applies of course to Lauterpacht's formula, voluntas civitatis maximae est servanda.

28 Pacta sunt servanda;the will of the community shall be obeyed; the will of society shall be obeyed; voluntas civitatis maximae est servanda;the constitution shall be obeyed; quod prindpi placuit legis vigorem habet; etc