1 See Horst, Teltschik, 329 Tage, Innenansichten der Einigung 34, 64, 98, 372 (1991)Google Scholar (diary notes of the adviser to the Chancellor).

2 See Stefan, Oeter, German Unification and State Succession , 51 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht [ZAÖRV] 349, 352, 381 (1991)Google Scholar.

3 May 18, 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil II [BGB1. II] S.537, 700, translated in 29 ILM 1108 (1990).

4 See Teltschik, supra note 1, at 8: “Just how much the success [of the unification process] depended on [Mikhail Gorbachev] personally,” he wrote in August 1991, “has only become clear to some now after the putsch, which was supposed to silence all those who made the criticism over and again that German unification was established too quickly. The door to German unity only stood open for a brief, lucky moment.” All translations from the German herein, unless otherwise noted, are by Dr. Donna Goessler (Bonn-Meckenheim).

5 On November 28, 1989, Chancellor Kohl announced his ten-point program in the German parliament, which envisaged a confederate structure between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR. This set the course in the direction of unity, which at first aimed at the fusion under international law of two states that would continue to exist under the roof of a federation.

6 Namely, Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thüringen.

7 See Preamble, para. 2, 1990 BGB1. II S.889, translated in 30 ILM 457 (1991).

8 See Charles, Rousseau, Bibliographical note on André Goncalves Pereira, La Succession d’Etats en Matière de Traités, 73 Revue Générale de Droit International Public [RGDIP] 559 (1969)Google Scholar.

9 Matthias, Herdegen, International Treaties of the GDR , in 9 Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland §214.B. L3 (1997)Google Scholar (emphasizing the significance of the right to self-determination in the establishment of German unity and its precedential effect regarding state succession with respect to treaties).

10 Seejochen, A. Frowein, Germany Reunited , 51 Zaörv 333, 346 (1991)Google Scholar. For details, see Dieter, Papenfub, Die Behandlung der Völkerrechtlichen Verträge der DDR im Zuge der Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands—ein Beitrag zur Frage der Staatennachfolge in Verträge (1997)Google Scholar.

11 See Hans, D. Treviranus, Die Konvention der Vereinten Nationen über Staatensukzession bei Verträgen , 39 ZaöRV 259 (1979)Google Scholar. For the convention, Aug. 23, 1978, see UN Doc. A/CONF.80/31 (1978), 17 ILM 1488 (1978).

12 See Eberhard, Menzel & Knut, Ipsen, Völkerrecht: E. Studienbuch 186 (1979)Google Scholar; see also Michael, Silagi, Staatsuntergang und Staatennachfolge mit Besonderer Berücksichtigung des Endes der DDR (1996)Google Scholar.

13 Jochen, A. Frowein, Der Eingliederungsvertrag im Völkerrecht und im Staatsrecht , 30 Zaörv 1, 1 (1970)Google Scholar, distinguishes between the incorporation treaty “through which a state or other person under public law is incorporated into another” and a union treaty, which leads “to the creation of a new state through the merger of two previously sovereign states.” He adds that “[w]hat is special about. . . incorporation treaties is that upon completion one of the contracting parties loses its legal independence and merges into the other.” See also Oliver Dörr, Die Inkorporation als Tatbestand der Staatensukzession (1995).

14 See [1974] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 1 at 209, 253, 259, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.1 (Part 1).

15 Resolution relating to incompatible treaty obligations and rights arising from a uniting of states, UN Doc. A/CONF.80/32 (1978), 17 ILM 1517 (1978).

16 See Treviranus, supra note 11, at 275: “Apart from the principle of moving treaty boundaries (Article 15),” he states, “customary law generally recognizes only the extreme continuity cases—(boundary treaties and other localized treaties running with the land); the noncontinuation of highly personal treaties, in particular, bilateral treaties of a political nature, is on the other side of the spectrum.”

17 On this, see DO–RR, supra note 13, and Silagi, supra note 12.

18 See Papenfub, supra note 10, at 26 n.97 (with further references).

19 See D. P. O’Connell, The Law of State Succession 3 (1956) (“The body of law which has been built up for the solution of the problems arising from transfer of territory has for its object the minimizing of the effects of this change.”).

20 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, has codified this principle of customary international law; Article 73 of the same Convention, however, states expressly that the Convention does not prejudge questions arising in regard to a succession of states.

21 The main representatives of this so-called negative school are Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre 271 (Walter Jellinek ed., 1914); Arrigo, Cavaglieri, La Dottrina della successione di Stato a Stato e il suo valore giuridico , 13 Archivto Giuridico (3d ser.) 297 (1910)Google Scholar; and his Règies Générates de Droit de la Paix, 26 Recueil des Cours 311, 378 (1929 I); Arthur, Keith, The Theory of State Succession, with Special Reference to English and Colonial Law 5, 17 (1907)Google Scholar.

22 See Paul, Guggenheim, Beiträge zur Völkerrechtlichen Lehre vom Staatenwechsel (Staatensukzession) (1925)Google Scholar; 1 Dieter, Blumenwitz, Staatennachfolge und die Einigung Deutschlands 22 (1992)Google Scholar (with further references).

23 The principle of treaties that continue to apply and are related to territory and the term derived therefrom of “succession réelle” was first elaborated by the popular public international law writer, Emer de, Vattel, in Le Droit des gens, ou, Principes de la loi naturelle (1758)Google Scholar. See also the Carnegie edition of 1916, with an introduction by Albert de Lapradelle.

24 1 Lassa, Oppenheim, International Law 158, §82 (Hersch, Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)Google Scholar.

25 See Tono Eitel, Deutsche Einigungsbemuhüngen und das Souveränitätsproblem, Speech at the Europa-Institut of the University of Saarland at 14 (Apr. 30, 1990) (who is doubtful in respect of supply contracts, leaning toward their continuation in particular when the contracting party merging into the larger state remains distinguishable for a transitional period). For another view, see Erik Castrén, Succession in International Law (1950); and his Aspects récents de la Succession d’Etats, 78 Recueil des Cours 379, 435 (1951 I) [hereinafter Castrén, Aspects] (stating, in respect of the commercial treaties, that “cette question doit être réglée par des négotiations”).

26 Oppenheim, supra note 24, at 159.

27 See Castrén, Aspects, supra note 25, at 432 (traités dits d’ordre territorial); Ivan, A. Shearer, La Succession d’Etats et les traités non localisés , 68 rgdip 5 (1964)Google Scholar; and his Recent Problems of State Succession in Relation to New States, 139 Recueil des Cours 95 (1972 II) (traités localisés); Ralf, Wittkowski, Die Staatensukzession in Völkerrechtliche Verträge unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Herstellung der staatlichen Einheit Deutschlands 142 (1992)Google Scholar; see also Jochen, A. Frowein, Josef, Isensee, Christian, Tomuschat & Albrecht, Randelzhofer, Deutschlands aktueUe Verfassungslage: Berichte und Diskussion aufder Sondertagung der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer in Berlin am 27. April 1990 , 49 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (1990)Google Scholar [hereinafter Verfassungslage]; Frowein, id. at 37 (“GDR treaties remain applicable where so-called territorially restricted, localized treaties are concerned”).

28 See 2 D. P. O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal and International Law 28 (1967) (with references to state practice). For another view, see Castrén, Aspects, supra note 25, at 431; Hubert, Beemelmans, Die Staatennachfolge in völkerrechtliche Verträge —Bemerkungen zur neuen Staatenpraxis, 40 Osteuroparecht 339, 342 (1994)Google Scholar (who at 343 & n. 11 does not recognize the graphic terms “political” or “personal” treaties as a clear demarcation line for different legal consequences).

29 See Frowein, Verfassungslage, supra note 27, at 37.

30 See, e.g., The Treaty of Union of Scotland And England, 1707, at 81 (George S. Pryde ed., 1950); O’Connell, supra note 28, at 29; [1974] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, supra note 14, at 255.

31 See 1 Österreichisches Handbuch Des Völkerrechts, sec. 2249 (Hanspeter Neuhold, Waldemar Hummer & Christoph Schreuer eds., 1983) [hereinafter Handbuch]; and, in particular, Adolf, Merkl, Der Anschluß Österreichs an das Deutsche Reich—eine Geschichtslegende , 17 Juristische Blatter 439 (1955)Google Scholar; and his War Österreich von 1938 bis 1945 Bestandteil des Deutschen Reiches? 82 Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts 480 (1957).

32 See Handbuch, supra note 31, sec. 715.

33 Id., sec. 2249 (with further references).

34 Arnold Mcnair, The Law of Treaties 600 (1961).

35 Fritz, Münch, Zum Saarvertrag vom 27. Oktober 1956 , 18 Zaörv 1 (1957–58)Google Scholar.

36 1956 BGB1. II S.1587.

37 Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, Jan. 27, 1973, 12 ILM 48, 53 (1973).

38 Agreement on the Establishment of the Republic of Yemen, Apr. 22, 1990, 30 ILM 820, 822 (1991); see also Raymond, Goy, La Reunification du Yémen , 1990 Annuaire Français de Droit International [A.F.D.I.] 249, 261 Google Scholar (“le traité . . . parle d”union totale portant fusion des deux Etats’ “) (emphasis added).

39 Gregorio Garzón Clariana (Conseiller juridique principal au Service juridique de la Commission Européenne), Speech in the EU Working Group on public international law, Paris (Apr. 22, 1994). After the unification of the two Yemens, the Republic of Yemen did not in principle query the handling of the GDR’s international treaties, so that with the Republic of Yemen’s consent, the expiry of the GDR treaties with the Yemen Arab Republic and the People’s Republic of South Yemen or People’s Republic of Yemen could be made public.

40 See Wittkowski, supra note 27, at 63, 70 (referring to the annexation cases of Algeria in 1830, Texas and Hawaii in 1898, Hannover and Nassau in 1866–1867, Madagascar in 1896, the Boer Republic in 1900, the state of Congo in 1907, and Korea in 1910, and the coming into being of Yugoslavia in 1919).

41 In spite of its long struggle and considerable internal political resistance, Vietnam finally relented. It did so because it was dependent on receiving new credits and cooperating with creditor countries and also because it wanted to negotiate favorable debt-rescheduling conditions. It has since successfully concluded rescheduling agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany (Rescheduling Agreement of August 15, 1994), as well as with most Western creditors—even the United States—covering the debts incurred by the former Republic of South Vietnam.

42 See Silagi, supra note 12, at 78, who regards the notification of continuing UN membership and the accession dates notified after unification as significant signs of incorporation.

43 Eitel, supra note 25, at 15. To similar effect, see O’Connell, supra note 28, at 24: “It must be recognized that international law is an adjunct of diplomacy. Its rules develop so that diplomacy can be facilitated, and diplomatic obstacles removed.”

44 Castrén, Aspects, supra note 25, at 388, underlines the significance of political considerations: “Il peut être dans l’intérêt de l’Etat successeur de ne pas bouleverser les conditions et les rapports juridiques existants plus qu’il n’est nécessaire, et il est également sage et opportun de tenir compte, dans une certaine mesure, des intérêts d’autres Etats.” He further identifies “l’attitude favorable des Etats” as “devant être attribuée à des raisons d’opportunité et non à une obligation juridique.” Id. at 437.

45 See Denkschrift zum Einigungsvertrag, Bundestag-Drucksache No. 11/7760, 1990, at 356 [hereinafter Denkschrift]. However, the new version of Article 72(2) of the Basic Law refers to the more accurate “equal living conditions.”

46 See also Fritz, Sturm, L’Impact du Traité d’unification sur le droit privé de l’Allemagne unie , 118 Journal du Droit International 7, 26 (1991)Google Scholar.

47 The Preamble to the Basic Law and Articles 23 and 146 were amended in connection with unification to clarify under constitutional law that the existing boundaries are final. German unification also meant the end of the division of Europe. On July 21, 1990, the lower house of the German parliament and the Chamber of Deputies of the German Democratic Republic issued similarly worded declarations on the German-Polish boundary that were the foundation for the conclusion of the Final Settlement Treaty, infra note 61, and the Treaty Confirming their Mutual Frontier, Nov. 14, 1990, Ger.-Pol., 1991 BGB1. II S.1328.

48 See Denkschrift, supra note 45, at 362; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 20, Art. 29. It was assumed that there was a customary principle in international law that was simply being referred to.

49 Unification Treaty, supra note 7, Art. 11.

50 For the concerns expressed, each with different reasons, see, e.g., Frowein, Isensee & Randelzhofer, Verfassungslage, supra note 27, at 26, 47 & 110, respectively. Eckart Klein, id. at 133, expressed strong doubts, as “we basically do not have any relevant precedents in history.” In this context, one notes that the precedent of Vietnam has obviously not been dealt with in the literature since too little is known about the details of its unification.

51 The Netherlands was the only country to reject the automatic extension of the treaties by the operation of international law and declared its consent to be necessary. Only two treaties were adjusted, however, according to the protocol of January 25, 1994, Tractatenblad van Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, No. 81, 1994.

52 For details, see Council Regulation 2684/90 of 17 September 1990, 1990 O.J. (L 263) 1, as well as the German Transitional Ordinance of September 28, 1990, BGB1. I S.2117 and December 18, 1990, BGB1. I S.2915.

53 EC Bull., Apr. 1990, at 7. The European Parliament reinforced this view in its order of May 17, 1990; the Commission did the same in the suggestions made to the Council on August 21, 1990, for transitional measures for the incorporation of the territory of the GDR in the Community. See Bundesrat-Drucksache No. 580/1990.

54 See Communication de la Commission en vue de la réunion spéciale du Conseil européen de Dublin le 28 avril 1990, La Communauté et l’unification allemande, Bull. CE, Supp. No. 4/90, at 50.

55 For example, European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968.

56 See Denkschrift, supra note 45, at 355, 362. See also the recent decision and confirmation by the Federal Constitutional Court of June 10, 1997, S. v. Berlin Court of Appeal and District Court of Berlin-Tiergarten, 1998 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 50, summarized in 92 AJIL 74 (1998), concerning diplomatic immunity of former diplomats in the GDR and state succession.

57 In the German- and English-language aide-mémoires it is said:

The unification of the two German states raises the question of the successor state continuing the treaties entered into by the German Democratic Republic. In line with valid international law, the German Democratic Republic is committed to the contractual obligations it has assumed and it seeks to ensure that the level of co-operation reached will not be hampered by succession to such treaties. In that regard, it is guided by the principle of the continuation in force of treaties, as set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties of 23 August 1978, a principle which in the view of the German Democratic Republic reflects existing customary law. The German Democratic Republic would request the partner state to transmit its legal position on the question of the succession of states and to set forth its interests as regards the continuation by the successor state of the treaties entered into with the German Democratic Republic.

58 See Ulrich, Fastenrath, Die Begelungen für die Staatennachfolge bei der Vereinigung der beiden deutschen Staaten , 25 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 67, 72 (1992)Google Scholar.

59 Unification Treaty, supra note 7, Art. 12.

60 Supra note 20.

61 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, FRG–GDR–Fr.-USSR–UK–U.S., BGB1. II S.1317, 29 ILM 1186 (1990), S. TREATY Doc. No. 101–20 (1990). For the Foreign Ministers’ letter, see id. At the two-plus-four meeting at the senior level, September 4–7,1990, in Berlin, the Federal Government asserted its view that the issues named in the letter did not belong in the Treaty since a decision on them should be reserved for united Germany.

62 The Soviet reply, however, contains an additional passage not covered by the initial German letter:

The Soviet Union takes note of the agreement . . . reached between the governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany that the bilateral treaties or conventions between the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the German Democratic Republic will not be unilaterally terminated or revised, which means terminated or revised without prior consultations.

63 Treaty on the Development of Comprehensive Cooperation in the Areas of the Economy, Industry, Science and Technology, Nov. 9, 1990, FRG–USSR, BGB1. II S.799.

64 The term “consultations” was consciously and carefully chosen. But see Fastenrath, supra note 58, at 72 (who accords all the contracting parties a right to “negotiations” on all these options and who, furthermore, in considering the adoption of the treaties pursuant to Article 12(2) of the Unification Treaty, does not allow united Germany the “final decision on the fate of these treaties”). See also Frowein, Verfassungslage, supra note 27, at 29, 37 (“In respect of treaties which relate to the economic performance of the GDR, there at least exists a duty to negotiate to continue or gradually relieve [the parties] of such duties.”).

65 As a result of this notification, depositories of multilateral agreements, such as the United Nations and the International Labour Organization, made reference in the footnotes of their official publications to the changed legal situation after the establishment of German unity on October 3,1990. Thus, it became unnecessary to give notice of the expiry of the GDR’s membership in international organizations. See, e.g., Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status as at 31 December 1993, UN Doc. ST/LEG/ SER.E/12, at 6, 9 n.13, and 819, 824 nn.3, 4.

66 Denkschrift, supra note 45, at 362.

67 Namely, Agreement on the Creation of an International System and Organization for Cosmic Telecommunications (Intersputnik), Nov. 15, 1971, 1972 Gesetzblatt DDR I S.115, and the trilateral agreement between the GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union on Joint Petroleum Exploration on the Continental Shelf in the Baltic Sea (PETROBALTIC), Nov. 11, 1975, amended July 12, 1990 (unpublished).

68 This cable stated:

[U] pon the accession of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany with effect from 3 October 1990, all international treaties previously concluded by the Ministry for National Defense of the GDR are terminated. Upon accession by the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany the GDR ceases to exist as a subject of international law. A “fundamental change of circumstances” occurs under Article 62(1) (a) and (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The German Democratic Republic’s consent to be bound by these treaties is thus withdrawn.

69 See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 20, Art. 62(3): “If, under [paragraphs 1 and 2], a party may invoke a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.”

70 Thereafter, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Sabine Bergman-Pohl, declared the GDR’s resignation from the CMEA and its suborganizations with effect from October 3, 1990. Similarly, its membership in the CMEA was declared terminated in a note from the GDR to all of the member countries. Blumenwitz, supra note 22, at 135, points out that the formal resignation by the GDR pursuant to Article 11(3) of the CMEA statute was not necessary since the GDR’s membership, being a highly personal right, could not be transferred to the Federal Republic through state succession.

71 Karl, Doehring, Die Anwendung der Regeln der völkerrechtlichen Sukzession nach der Wiedervereinigung der beiden deutschen Staaten , in Nation und Demokratie 11, 16 (Rudolf, Wildenmann ed., 1991)Google Scholar.

72 The GDR’s foreign trade enterprises had concluded long-term commodity agreements with the Yugoslav constituent republics. These were guaranteed by both governments. See, e.g., Agreement on the Securing of Long-term Supplies of Aluminum from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the German Democratic Republic, July 29, 1970.

73 Wittkowski, supra note 27, at 36, states: “General treaty rules . . . are displaced by the special succession rules or general treaty law governs the fate of international treaties parallel to and separate from succession law.”

74 See Ulrich, Drobnig, Das Schicksal der Staatsverträge der DDR nach dem Einigungsvertrag , 1991 Deutsch-Deutsche Rechtszeitschrift 76, 78 Google Scholar.

75 In Vetfassungslage, supra note 27, at 36, Georg Ress had already drawn attention to the political significance of this preliminary theoretical question and suggested that it is better, in cases of doubt, not to continue political treaties, but to use the trust stemming from them to negotiate. The legal position was not such that one should have proceeded from the reverse—that all treaties continued to exist—and then have had to negotiate on the termination of each individual GDR treaty.

76 See on this “hybrid approach” Richard, J. Graving, Status of the New York Arbitration Convention: Some Gaps in Coverage But New Acceptances Confirm Its Vitality , 10 ICSID Rev. 1, 42 (1995)Google Scholar.

77 Even the EC Commission, which originally assumed that all GDR treaties would continue to exist, had to recognize this result. See Garzón Clariana, supra note 39. For a different view, see Pieter, Jan Kuyper, The Community and State Succession in Respect of Treaties , in Institutional Dynamics of European Integration: 2 Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers 619, 633 (Deirdre, Curtin & Ton, Heukels eds., 1994)Google Scholar: “The unilateral assertion on the part of Germany or the Community that treaties were incompatible and that two treaty regimes within one state could subsist at best for a very brief period usually sufficed.”

78 O’Connell, supra note 28, at 3. See Castrén, Aspects, supra note 25, at 450, to similar effect.

79 Oeter, supra note 2, at 360.

80 See Christian, Tomuschat, A United Germany within theEuropean Community , 27 C.M.L. Rev. 415, 421 (1990)Google Scholar; Drobnig, supra note 74, at 78.

81 See Heinz-Peter, Mansel, Staatsverträge und autonomes internationales Privat- und Verfahrensrecht nach der Wiedervereinigung , 1990 Juristische Rundschau 441, 444 Google Scholar.

82 In each case the date of the relevant note is cited in the official publication in the BGBL According to Fastenrath, supra note 58, at 72 n.24: “The note verbale contains a unilateral declaration; there are no objections to this procedure if the note verbale only evidences the consensual result of the consultations, which is what can be assumed.”

83 This applied in particular to consular treaties and conventions on nationality and mutual legal assistance, which were based on the existence of a separate East German nationality as defined in the GDR Nationality Act of February 20, 1967, Gesetzblatt DDR I 3. East German nationality ceased to exist, of course, at the same time as the GDR, as thereafter there was only one German nationality.

84 See text at note 27 supra.

85 See Vermogensgesetz: Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen, Kommentar, Annex II 6 (Austria, Aug. 21, 1987), Annex II 7 (Denmark, Dec. 3, 1987), Annex II 4 (Finland, Oct. 3, 1984), Annex II 5 (Sweden, Oct. 24, 1986) (Gerhard Fieberg, Harald Reichenbach, Burkhard Messerschmidt & Heike Neuhaus eds., loose-leaf 1991-). See also the decision of the Austrian Constitutional Court, 1993 Zeitschrift für Vermögens-und Investitionsrecht 360; Burkhart, Heß, Der Ausschluß österreichischer Berechtigter vom Vermögensgesetz , id. at 331 Google Scholar; and the recent decision of the Bundesgerichtshof, 1997 id. at 155.

86 See the Ordinance of April 3, 1991, BGB1. II S.614, in the version of the Amendment Ordinance of December 18, 1992, BGB1. II S.1231.

87 State practice on this varies: many of the parties asserted the need to involve their parliaments in the expiry of the GDR treaties since they had participated in their coming into force and the instruments had been officially published. See, e.g., Pierre Michel Eisemann & Catherine Kessedjian, France, in National Treaty Law and Practice 1, 15 (Monroe Leigh & Merritt Blakeslee eds., 1995), on the French practice of publishing the names of canceled treaties with reference to decree No. 53–192, Mar. 14, 1953, as revised by decree No. 86–707, Apr. 11, 1986.

88 See Jiri, Malenovsky, La Partition de la Tchecoslovaquie , 1993 A.F.D.I. 328 Google Scholar.