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Environment and Statecraft: Strategies of Environmental Treaty-Making. By Scott Barrett. Pp. xvii, 427. Index. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. $39.95, £27.50.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Jeffrey L. Dunoff
Jeffrey L. Dunoff*
Affiliation:
Temple University Beasley School of Law
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Type
Recent Books on International Law
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 98 , Issue 1 , January 2004 , pp. 224 - 229
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2004 

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References

1 Snidal, Duncan, The Game Theory of International Politics, 8 World Pol. 25 (1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also John, K. Setear, Law in the Service of Politics: Moving Neo-liberal Institutionalism from Metaphor to Theory by Using the International Treaty Process to Define “Iteration,” 37 Va.J. Int’l L. 641 (1997).Google Scholar

2 Snidal, supra note 1, at 34-35.

3 Consider, for example, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. While over one hundred states signed the convention, no person has ever been (or likely ever will be) charged in a domestic or international court with the crime of apartheid; a fair conclusion is that the central point of this treaty was not to change state behavior.

4 See, e.g., Young, Oran, The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: fit, Interplay, and Scale (2002).CrossRefGoogle Scholar This multiplicity is found in other issue areas as well. See, e.g., Laurence, R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 1 (2004).Google Scholar

5 See, e.g., Raustiala, Kal & David, G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 Int’l Org. (forthcoming 2004).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 I am grateful to Kyle Danish for raising this point. See also Setear, supra note 1, at 654–75.

7 For an overview of recent scholarship, see Raustiala, Kal & Anne-Marie, Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in The Handbook of International Relations 538 (Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas, & Beth, A. Simmons eds., 2002).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 See, e.g., Harold Hongju, Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 Yale L.J. 2599 (1997).Google Scholar

9 Kingsbury, Benedict, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 345 (1998).Google Scholar