1 Report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV/1 to Commission IV, Doc. 913 (June 12), 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 381, at 393.

2 Sir Arnold D. McNair, The Development of International Justice, p. 3: “But without question the most important, from the point of view of both the danger it averted and the influence it exerted upon the future, is the Alabama Claims arbitration between the United States and Great Britain, which took place in Geneva in 1872.. .. The feature of this arbitration which captured the public imagination and was significant for the future was that two states were prepared to submit to a tribunal. .. disputes which were regarded as affecting their honor and vital interests and as being of such a character that, I think I can say, had never been submitted to arbitration before and had often led to war. “See also Percy E. Corbett, Law in Diplomacy 152–156 (1959).

3 The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (ed. by James Brown Scott, 1915), p. xvii: “Acceptance, in principle, of the use of good offices, mediation, and voluntary arbitration, in cases where they are available with the purpose of preventing armed conflicts between nations.’’

4 Ibid. 41 ff. Art. 1 of the 1899 Convention reads: “With a view to obviating, as far as possible, recourse to force in the relations between States, the signatory Powers agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international differences.” See also Arts. 2, 8, and 15.

5 See Art. 9: “In differences of an international nature involving neither honor nor vital interests. .. “; and Art. 16: “In questions of a legal nature, and especially in the interpretation or application of international conventions, arbitration is recognized by the signatory Powers as the most effective, and at the same time the most equitable, means of settling disputes which diplomacy has failed to settle.” Ibid. 45, 55.

6 For arbitration in the period between the First Hague Peace Conference and World War I, see Corbett, op. cit. 136–186.

7 See 2 Oppenheim, International Law 14 (7th ed. by H. Lauterpacht, 1952); and 2 Hyde, International Law 1570 (2nd ed., 1945).

8 Scott, op. cit. 31.

9 Max Habicht, Post-War Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes six (1931). For the period 1929–1941 a similar number of treaties is listed in Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1928–1948, pp. 1180 ff. (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1949.V. 3).

10 For text, see Habicht, op. cit. 929.

11 General Assembly, 3rd Sess., Official records, Pt. 2, Resolutions, pp. 10–11 (Doe. A/900).

12 54 League of Nations Treaty Series 291.

13 94 ibid. 59.

14 Art. 13, par. 4, and Art. 14 of the Covenant.

15 Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920–1942, p. 779 (1943). For a brief analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence, see Wilfred Jenks, C., “The Compulsory Jurisdiction of International Courts and Tribunals,” Preliminary Report, 24^e Commission, 47 Annuaire, Institut de Droit International 119–132 (1957, I)Google Scholar (referred to hereinafter as Jenks, Preliminary Report).

16 Jenks, Preliminary Report 121.

17 It may be noted in passing that this theme was received in the systems of major treatises on international law. Suffice it to refer to Oppenheim, op. cit. note 7 above. Part I is entitled “Settlement of State Differences,” Chapter I, “Amicable Settlement of State Differences,” Chapter II, “Compulsive Settlement of State Differences.” In Hyde, op. cit., Part VI is entitled “Differences between States. Modes of Redress other than “War,” and Vol. 3, Part VII, “Differences between States. War.”

18 Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly covering the period from July 16, 1946, to July 15, 1947. General Assembly, 2nd Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 2, pp. 51, 61 (Doc. A/366). In the debate the Soviet Union contended that the dispute did not constitute a threat to peace and security and that presumably for this reason it fell outside the competence of the Council. The United Kingdom submitted that it might be hard to define what constituted such a threat. The Council, by placing the item on its agenda and issuing the recommendation, presumably considered itself competent and the dispute as one constituting an actual or potential threat to the peace. See also statements by Sir Hartley Shawcross before the Court on Feb. 28 and March 1, 1948. 3 Corfu Channel Case, Pleadings 51–59, at 53 (1948). is [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4 and 244.

20 Systematic Survey of Treaties. .. pp. 1160 ff. The full title of this instrument is: Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands (Brussels Pact). The accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic to this Pact was accomplished through Protocol No. I, Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty, Paris, October 24, 1954. Disarmament and Security, A Collection of Documents 1919–1955. Subcommittee on Disarmament, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (Committee Print, 1956), p. 504. The divisibility of disputes into their legal and political components has been suggested on several occasions by the U.N. Secretary General. Thus, in his Annual Report on the Work of the Organization 1954–1955, he said: “I t is apparent that there are a number of controversies between Governments which continue to be sources of tension but which are suitable, in whole or in part, for judicial settlement through the Court.” General Assembly, 10th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 1, p. xiii (Doc. A/2911); in his Report for 1956–1957 he stated: “Even in the present state of international society there are many disputes which would be closer to settlement if the legal issues involved had been the subject of judicial determination.” Ibid., 12th Sess., Supp. No. 1 A, p. 5 (Doc. A/3594/Add.1); and in his Report for 1958–1959 he declared: “I t should also be recognized that there are many international disputes which involve legal questions along with the political elements and that submission of such questions to the Court for judicial determination would clear the ground for processes of peaceful negotiation in the political organs of the United Nations. Neglect of the legal elements in international conflicts, and of the means by which they may be clarified, thus stands in the way of progress in the political field and, in the long run, may tend to weaken the weight of law in international affairs.” Ibid., 14th Sess., Supp. No. 1 A, p. 3 (Doc. A/4132/ Add.1).

21 48 Annuaire, Institut de Droit International 381 (1959, II). Reproduced in 54 A.J.I.L. 136 (1960).

22 Arts. 3 and 27 of the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Scott, op. cit. 43, 61. Cf. also Charles De Visscher, Théories et Réalités en Droit International Public 460 (3rd ed., 1960) (hereinafter cited as De Visscher, Théories).

23 Cf. Art. 36, par. 2, of the Statute of the I.C.J., with the text of Art. 36 of the Statute of the P.C.I.J.

24 The distinction between justiciable disputes (in the phraseology of the Locarno Treaties, disputes in which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights) which are in fact regarded as justiciable, and disputes which, although regarded as justiciable in law, are not regarded as justiciable in fact, was made by the British Government in Reservation V of its Declaration o£ April 18, 1957, accepting the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory pursuant to Art. 36, par. 2, of the Statute of the Court. 1957–1958 I.C.J. Yearbook 211. This Declaration was somewhat modified by the Declaration of Nov. 26, 1958. 1959–1960 Ibid. 254. The motivations for such a distinction may be found in the British Observations on the Programme of Work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference:

“ 4.. .. Arbitration treaties impliedly, if not explicitly, impose upon the parties the obligation loyally to accept the decision of the tribunal. An arbitration treaty which goes beyond what the public opinion of a country can be counted on to support when the interests of that country are in question and when a decision unfavourable to those interests is pronounced is a treaty which is useless. It is merely calculated to deceive the so generally felt that there are some questions—justiciable in their nature—which no country could safely submit to arbitration that it has been usual to make reservations limiting the extent of the obligation to arbitrate. These limitations may vary in form, but their existence indicates the consciousness on the part of Governments that there is a point beyond which they cannot count on their peoples giving effect to the obligations of the treaty.. .. 12.. .. Disputes legal in their nature may arise between two States with regard to matters falling exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of one of them. No State can agree to the submission to an international tribunal of matters falling exclusively within the range of its national sovereignty. Similarly, there are some political questions even of a justiciable nature as to which a country feels that for the reasons indicated in paragraph 4 the stage has not yet been reached when it can agree unreservedly in advance to submit them to an arbitration tribunal.” League of Nations Official Journal, May, 1928, pp. 695–697.

The logic of this reasoning appears to establish public opinion of the moment as the criterion of the justiciability of a dispute and to lead to the sort of self-judging reservation made by the United States in the so-called Connally Amendment and by the United Kingdom in the Declaration referred to above, excluding from the compulsory jurisdiction disputes “relating to any question which, in the opinion of the Government of the United Kingdom, affects the national security of the United Kingdom or of any of its dependent territories.” This exclusion was maintained in the Declaration of Nov. 26, 1958.

25 Shabtai Rosenne, The International Court of Justice 118 (1957).

26 Instruments like the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of Feb. 3, 1946 (Doc. A/43), according to which an Advisory Opinion given by the Court “shall be accepted as decisive by the parties” (Art. VIII, Sec. 30), are left out of account here.

27 See Art. 9 of the 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes in Scott, op. cit. 45.

28 The question of a non liquet is not material in the present context.

29 Good offices and mediation, says Art. 6 of the 1899 Hague Convention, “have exclusively the character of advice and never have binding force.” Scott, op. cit. 44.

30 De Visscher, Théories 433.

31 Ibid. 431.

32 For example, cf. United Nations Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1928–1948, pp. 130 ff.

33 See De Visscher, Théories 442, and Rosenne, op. cit. 118.

34 This distinction goes back to Arts. 15 and 37 of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which define arbitration as follows: “International Arbitration has for i t s object the settlement of disputes between States by judges of their own choice and on the basis of respect for law.” Scott, op. cit. 55. See also Corbett, Law in Diplomacy 136 ff. On the fate of the draft on arbitral procedure prepared by the International Law Commission, see 1958 I.L.C. Yearbook (II) 1–15, Doc. A/CN.4/Ser. A/1958/Add. 1, and De Visscher, Théories 438 f. This draft, as originally conceived by Georges Scelle, Special Rapporteur, aimed at virtually eliminating completely the discretionary element from the arbitral procedure which De Visscher argues is inherent in it and which the majority of Members of the United Nations were determined to preserve. Reversing gears, the Rapporteur submitted a draft from which, as he put it, “every trace of obligation has been eliminated.” (Italics in the original.) 1958 I.L.C. Yearbook (II) 3, par. 6.

35 This information is culled from the Yearbooks of the Court. In the case instituted on Nov. 4, 1960, separately by Liberia and Ethiopia against the Union of South Africa on the basis of Art. 7 of the Mandate for South West Africa of Dec. 17, 1920, and Art. 37 of the Statute, the Court, by order of May 20, 1961, after finding that the submissions of the Applications and Memorials by the applicant governments were mutatis mutandis identical and that, accordingly, the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia were in the same interest, joined the proceedings instituted against the Union of South Africa, [1961] I.C.J. Rep. 13. On May 30, 1961, the Republic of Cameroun filed an Application instituting proceedings against the United Kingdom, General List No. 48; 1960–1961 Yearbook 91. This case is included in the total of 34.

36 The Asylum Case (Colombia-Peru), the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France- United Kingdom) and the Case concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium-Netherlands), 1960–1961 Yearbook 32. In one case, the Case concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on Dec. 23, 1906 (Honduras v. Nicaragua), the parties had made an Agreement governing the procedure for submitting the dispute to the Court. 1957–1958 Yearbook 228.

37 [1947–1948] I.C.J. Rep. 15 at 27 ff. and [1949] ibid. 6 ff. See also Rosenne (The International Court of Justice 292), who refers to this case as an instance of jurisdiction “conferred upon the Court by an informal agreement between the parties, reached by successive acts .”

38 See Nos. 22, 23, 25, 28, 40, 44 of the Court’s General List, 1960–1961 Yearbook 62 ff. Replying to the Soviet statement that, in filing an application without Soviet consent, the United States “acted in disaccord with the Statute of the International Court of Justice,” the Agent for the United States, in a note of Nov. 25, 1958, addressed to the Registrar of the Court, declared: “It is now well settled that any government qualified to appear before this Court may file its application without prior special agreement.” 1958–1959 Yearbook 91. The United States appears thus to have relied implicitly upon the forum prorogatum doctrine. See Rosenne, op. cit., 284–302.

39 See Nos. 26 and 27 of the Court’s General List, 1960–1961 Yearbook 64.

40 Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955 (Preliminary Objections) (Israel v. Bulgaria), [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 127. For a discussion of this case see Lucius C. Caflisch, in 54 A.J.I.L. 855–868 (1960).

41 1959–1960 Yearbook 85, 93.

42 Cf. [1960] I.C.J. Rep. 146.

43 Order of the Court of Aug. 31, 1960, [1960] I.C.J. Rep. 186 at 187. It may be noted that the Lebanese Government transmitted to the Registrar the documents establishing these arrangements. Ibid.

44 Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), Order of April 10, 1961, [1961] I.C.J. Rep. 9; Case concerning the Protection of French Nationals and Protected Persons in Egypt (France v. Egypt), 1959–1960 Yearbook 52; and “Electricité de Beyrouth” Company Case (France v. Lebanon), ibid. 65.

45 Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955 (United States v. Bulgaria), Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), and Compagnie du Port, des Quais et des Entrepôts de Beyrouth and Société Radio-Orient (France v. Lebanon).

46 In the Case concerning Eights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. United States), the United States filed a preliminary objection on June 21, 1951, and withdrew it on Oct. 22, 1951. 1960–1961 Yearbook 53.

47 The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), 1960–1961 Yearbook 44; Ambatielos Case (Greece v. United Kingdom), ibid. 55; Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), ibid. 58; Case Concerning Eight of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), ibid. 68; Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Judgment of May 26, 1961, ibid. 79, 88.

48 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), ibid. 56; Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom and United States), ibid. 60; Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), ibid. 65; Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States), ibid. 70; and Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), ibid. 71.

49 [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 26, and [1959] ibid. 6, at 30.

50 [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 19, at 28–29.

51 Corfu Channel Case (Merits) (United Kingdom v. Albania), [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4; Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] ibid. 116; Asylum Case (Colombia/ Peru), [1950] ibid. 266; Case Concerning Eights of Nationals of the United States in Morocco (France v. United States), [1952] ibid. 176; Haya de la Torre Case (Colombia v. Peru), [1951] ibid. 71; Ambatielos Case (Greece v. United Kingdom), [1953] ibid. 10; Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France/United Kingdom), [1953] ibid. 47; Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), [1960] ibid. 6; Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v. Sweden), [1958] ibid. 55; Case Concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium/Netherlands), [1959] ibid. 209; Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on Dec. 23, 1906 (Honduras v. Nicaragua), [1960] ibid. 192.

52 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of Nov. 20, 1950, in the Asylum Case (Colombia/Peru), [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 395.

53 The Corfu Channel Case (Assessment of the Amount of Compensation) (United Kingdom v. Albania), [1949] ibid. 244.

55 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Order of July 5, 1951, [1951] ibid. 89.

56 Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States), Order of Oct. 24, 1957, [1957] ibid. 105.

56 In this case the Court dispensed with oral hearings altogether and the one public meeting was devoted to the reading of the opinion. See Leo, Gross, “Participation of Individuals in Advisory Proceedings before the I.C.J.: Question of Equality of Parties,” 52 A.J.I.L. 16 ff. (1958)Google Scholar.

57 It may be sufficient to refer to Sir Herseh Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (1958); De Visseher, Théories et Réalités en Droit International Public (3rd ed., 1960); Rosenne, , The International Court of Justice (1957)Google Scholar; Schwarzenberger, International Law, Vol. 1 (3rd ed., 1957).

58 Report of the International Law Commission covering the Work of its Eighth Session, April 23–July 4, 1956. General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 9, pp. 13 f t, 19 f., and 24 f. (Doc. A/3159).

59 [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 276.

60 P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10 (1927), p. 28.

61 [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 277.

62 Cf. De Visscher, Théories 480; Lauterpacht, op. cit. 197.

63 [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 266, at 288.

64 Ibid. at 274. The distinction between auto-interpretation, which is not authoritative, and auto-decision, which is claimed to be authoritative though wholly unilateral, is indicated in the present writer’s essay, “States as Organs of International Law and the Problem of Autointerpretation,” in Law and Politics in the World Community 59–89 (ed. by G. A. Lipsky, 1953).

65 [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 229. See Schwarzenberger, op. cit. 488 ff.

66 De Visscher, Théories 318, 475 ff., and the opinions there quoted, notably the Advisory Opinion of the Court of March 3, 1950, in the case of the Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 8. See also Lauterpacht, op. cit. 290: “.. . The Advisory Opinion of the Court on the Interpretation of the Peace Treaties (Second Phase) affords an instructive example of a much needed warning of the limitations of the principle of effectiveness.” But see also p. 290, note 13.

67 [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 128, at 143.

68 Ibid. 137.

69 Ibid, at 140 and 144. See also Lauterpacht, op. cit. 280.

70 Lauterpacht, op. cit. 179. See also De Visscher (Théories 478), who refers to this case as illustration of the Court’s courage in breaking new ground when faced with a novel situation.

71 [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 182.

72 Schwarzenberger, op. cit. 595.

73 Théories 478. But he goes on to say that in this case the Court applied the two principles of interpretation: the object and function of the treaty and the full effectiveness of its provisions, the convergence of which nearly always suffices to sway the interpreter.

74 [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 182.

75 That this is so is corroborated by the following statement in the Report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV/2 as approved by the Committee: “A s regards the question of international juridical personality, the Committee has considered it superfluous to make this the subject of a text. In effect, it will be determined implicitly from the provisions of the Charter taken as a whole.” Doc. 933, June 12, 1945; 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 703, at 710 (emphasis supplied).

76 Cf. Kunz, , “The Nottebohm Judgment (Second Phase),” 54 A.J.I.L. 536–571 (1960)Google Scholar, and the literature there cited.

77 [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 16.

78 P.C.I.J., Publications, Series B, No. 4 (1923).

79 [1955] I.C.J. Rep. at 20.

80 On these points the Court said: “It is for Liechtenstein, as it is for every sovereign State, to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality, and to confer that nationality by naturalization granted by its own organs in accordance with that legislation.. . .

“But the issue which the Court must decide is not one which pertains to the legal system of Liechtenstein. It does not depend on the law or on the decision of Liechtenstein whether that State is entitled to exercise its protection, in the case under consideration. To exercise protection, to apply to the Court, is to place oneself on the plane of international law. It is international law which determines whether a State is entitled to exercise protection and to seise the Court.

“The naturalization of Nottebohm was an act performed by Liechtenstein in the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction. The question to be decided is whether that act has the international effect here under consideration.” Ibid, at 20 ff.

81 Ibid. 26.

82 The preceding passage is as follows: “That naturalization was not based on any real prior connection with Liechtenstein, nor did it in any way alter the way of life of the person upon whom it was conferred in exceptional circumstances of speed and accommodation. In both respects, it was lacking in the genuineness requisite to an act of such importance, if it is to be entitled to be respected by a State in the position of Guatemala.” Ibid,., and at 23.

83 Ibid. 25.

84 Sehwarzenberger, op. cit. 370: “The element of a genuine connection between a sovereign State and a naturalized individual is the common denominator of all those cases.” See also ibid. 132.

85 De Visscher, Théories 399.

86 [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 132.

87 [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4 at 22.

88 Ibid, at 35.

89 Ibid.

90 Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of March 3, 1950, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 8–10.

91 Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion of July 13, 1954, [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 47, at 59.

92 Ibid. 51.

93 Ibid. at 62.

94 Ibid, at 57.

95 Ibid.

96 See Gross, , “Participation of Individuals in Advisory Proceedings before the International Court of Justice: Question of Equality between the parties,” 52 A.J.I.L. 16–40, at 26 ff. (1958)Google Scholar.

97 [1960] I.C.J. Rep. 150, at 170.

98 Ibid, at 166, 171.

99 [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 15 at 24. See Lauterpacht (op. cit. 186), who regards this Opinion and the Judgment in the Fisheries Case as “the two principal instances of judicial legislation in face of an admitted absence of agreed law.’’

100 Ibid, at 29. The Court also laid down several other rules.

101 See ibid, at 31, the Dissenting Opinion of Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold MeNair, Bead, Hsu Mo.

102 That governments responded to this challenge can be seen from the discussion in the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee on Reservations to Multilateral Conventions and India’s ratification with a condition of the Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization. General Assembly, 14th Sess., Official Reeords, 6th Committee, pp. 69–159. The Court’s opinion had also a remarkable impact in the International Law Commission. In his Report on the Law of Treaties, the Rapporteur, Pro feasor H. Lauterpacht, after noting that, even prior to the Court’s Advisory Opinion in the matter of Reservations to the Genocide Convention, no general agreement on the so-called “unanimity view” existed, and that some governments, including the United Kingdom, “who in the past have conspicuously advocated that principle, may be ready to admit that it is too rigid,” stated: “In view of the fact that the principle of unanimous consent has ceased to be regarded as supplying a satisfactory solution of the problems which have arisen and are likely to arise in this connexion, the Commission no longer feels justified in limiting itself to the formulation, by way of codification, of a legal rule on the subject based on that principle. Nor does it consider itself justified in making the principle of unanimous consent the basis of the future law on the subject.” Doc. A/CN.4/63, pp. 107 ff. See also Second Report on the Law of Treaties by H. Lauterpacht, Doc. A/CN.4/87, pp. 28 ff.

108 Among the constant preoccupations of international tribunals De Visscher notes the considerations of order and stability which determine the judge not to sanction, without compelling reasons, interpretations which would bring about confusion and uncertainty. Théories 474 and 480.

104 General Assembly, 2nd Sess., Official Records, Resolutions, Sept. 16–Nov. 29, 1947, p. 103 (Doc. A/519). The vote on this resolution was 46 in favor, 6 against, and 2 abstentions. At that time the membership of the United Nations stood at 59. It would be interesting to know what would be the vote if the resolution or a similar one were put to the vote in the present General Assembly comprising 104 Members.

105 Annual Beport of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization July 1, 1954–June 15, 1955. General Assembly, 10th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 1, p. xiii (Doe. A/2911).

106 Ibid. See also the Annual Reports of the Secretary General for 1952–1953, General Assembly, 8th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 1, pp. xi-xii (Doc. A/2404); for 1956– 1957, ibid., 12th Sess., Supp. 1 A, pp. 4–5 (Doc. A/3594/Add. 1); and for 1958–1959, ibid., 14th Sess., Supp. 1 A, pp. 3–4 (Doc. A/4132/Add. 1). And see Basdevant (“ La Place et le Rô1e de la Justice Internationale .. .,” 5 Les Affaires Etrangères 331–351 at 346 ff. (1959)), who stresses the restraining influence of Advisory Opinions.

107 De Visscher, Théories 445 ff.

108 But see the various efforts of the United States referred to above, p. 43, to bring such disputes before the Court.

109 In a sense the surrender of the larger, if illusory, object for a more modest, if realistic, one, makes matters more difficult rather than easier. For, as Jenks pointed out, “the movement for a larger measure of compulsory jurisdiction can no longer draw strength from the emotional and political forces which supported it when it could be presented as an alternative to war and a guarantee of peace.” Preliminary Report 179.

110 Jules, Basdevant, “La Place et le Rô1e de la Justice Internationale dans les Relations entre Etats et à l’égard des Organisations Internationales,” 5 Les Affaires Etrangères 331–351, at 338, 351 (Presses Universitaires de France, 1959)Google Scholar. His statement on p. 349 may bear quotation in full:

“Non seulement les Etats se présentent et sont traités comme des égaux devant la justice Internationale mais ceux qui comparaissent devant celle-ci pour représenter un Etat ou une organisation internationale parlent tous le même langage, le langage du droit, pour convaincre les juges dont ils savent que ceux-ci statueront selon le droit et par une décision obligatoire. C’est tout autre chose que parler dans un débat à l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies ou au Conseil de sécurité où, bien souvent, les représentants des Etats parlent beaucoup moins pour convaincre ceux à qui ils s’adressent directement que pour satisfaire leurs mandants, leur presse, leur opinion publique, ou encore pour le retentissement qu’ils espèrent obtenir dans 1’opinion publique de tel ou tel pays. A 1’opposé de cela, tous ceux qui parlent devant la Cour, s’efforçant de parler le langage du droit, tout en soutenant des thèses opposés, retrouvent ou découvrent devant le juge quelque chose qui leur est commun. Ainsi le fait d’aller devant le juge international fait apparaitre ou mieux sentir ce qu’il y a de commun entre les peuples. Cela contribue à créer ou à entretenir un esprit de compréhension, de mutuelle considération, de mutuel respect, esprit qui, lui-même, sera générateur de 1’esprit de mutuelle concession.

“Parcela, le recours à la justice internationale, au delà et par-dessus la solution de tel différend qui lui est déféré, apporte sa contribution à la formation d ‘une psychologie commune susceptible de fournir le meilleur appui au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales.’’