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Iraq: No Easy Response to “The Greatest Threat” - The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global Security. By Richard Butler. New York: Public Affairs, 2000. Pp. xxiv, 262. Index. $26.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 March 2017

David Malone
David Malone*
Affiliation:
International Peace Academy
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Book Reviews and Notes
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 95 , Issue 1 , January 2001 , pp. 235 - 245
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2001

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References

* The views expressed in this review are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of State.

1 SC Res. 687 (Apr. 3, 1991).

2 SC Res. 661 (Aug. 6, 1990).

3 SC Res. 949 (Oct. 15, 1994).

4 Crossette, Barbara, France, in Break with the U.S., Urges End to Iraq Embargo, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1999, at A6.Google Scholar

5 The complete text of the secretary of state’s speech, delivered at Georgetown University, is available online at <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970326.html>.

6 See Malone, David M., Goodbye UNSCOM: A Sad Tale in U.S.-UN Relations, 30 Security Dialogue. 393 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a more detailed account of these developments.

7 SC Res. 986 (Apr. 14, 1995).

8 See David Cortright & George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990S, at 223-24 (2000) (where no possibility of give and take exists—including die possibility of partial reward for partial compliance—sanctions are bound to prove ineffective).

9 See id. at 118.

10 SC Res. 1284 (Dec. 17, 1999).

11 Ritter’s revelations (and speculations) are detailed in Scott Ritter, Endgame: Solving The Iraq Problem—Once and for All (1999). An insightful review by Brian Urquhart, How Not to Fight a Dictator, N.Y. Rev. Books, May 6, 1999, at 25, places Ritter’s material in context.

At the time that Ritter made his original allegations, Butler defended UNSCOM’s record with panache and apparent conviction, and denied claims that the United States had engaged in its own intelligence monitoring under Iraqi cover. Ritter claimed, however, that the U.S. listening device that Butler had ordered him to install in Baghdad had been under Washington’s complete control from July to December 1998: “What Butler did was allow the U.S. to take over.” Cameron Stewart, Butler: I Never Served U.S. Interests, Australian, Jan. 11, 1999, at 8.

On the issue of his alleged cooperation with the United States’ intelligence operation, Butler is arguably less than forthcoming in the book:

Is it possible that some member state could have somehow taken advantage of UNSCOM personnel or facilities for its own intelligence-gathering purposes? I can’t know for certain. It is conceivable that a supplier country could have hidden some intelligence-gathering capability into equipment it had supplied us. If that happened, however, it was without my knowledge or approval.” (P. 182)

Or as Richard Nixon might have said, that would have been wrong. At the very least, Butler seems to have been grievously misled by some U.S. operatives who, in so doing, greatly damaged the United Nations’ reputation, as well as Butler’s.

12 Hersh, Seymour M., Saddam’s Best Friend, New Yorker, Apr. 5, 1999, at 32.Google Scholar It was left to The Wall Street Journal Europe to question the extent to which successive crises in relations with Iraq, as well as the year-end bombing campaign, were designed to detract attention from President Clinton’s travails in the Monica Lewinsky case:

When convenient, the reports of UNSCOM inspectors were ignored by the U.S. At other times, the reports appeared to be geared to die Clinton Administration’s political needs, which compromised Mr. Butler. The events that led up to the Desert Fox bombings looked suspiciously as if they had been orchestrated to delay an impeachment vote in the U.S. Congress.

Goodbye, UNSCOM (editorial), Wall St. J. Eur. Jan. 13, 1999.

13 SC Res. 688 (Apr. 5, 1991).

14 Memorandum of Understanding Between Iraq and the United Nations, Apr. 18, 1991, UN Doc. S/22513 (1991), 30 ILM 858 (1991).

15 See generally Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law 196-206 (2001) (discussing these actions and the various legal justifications given by the coalition governments).

16 Article 25 of the Charter states: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”

17 Extensive leakage of goods (in both directions) across Iraq’s borders with Iran, Jordan, and Turkey has been documented, but die application of the provisions of Resolution 687 continues to be accepted, at least in principle, by the vast majority of member states.

18 For a discussion of the “reverse veto,” see Sydney D. Bailey & Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council 66 (3d ed. 1998) and Chesterman, supra note 15, at 189-95.

19 Confidential interview with the author, December 2000.

20 For the French position on Iraq, including its main proposal of August 15, 1999, see the Web site of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs at <http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/actual/dossiers/iraq2/index.gb.html>.

21 In February 1998, at a time when Washington was intensifying the drumbeat for military confrontation with Iraq, the U.S. administration—after a disastrous town hall meeting involving several senior administration figures, including Secretary of State Albright, at Ohio State University on February 18, 1998—concluded that the American public would not strongly support military action against Baghdad at the time. The result was a U-turn in U.S. policy that helped pave the way for Kofi Annan’s visit to Baghdad a few days later.

22 See, e.g., Plett, Barbara, Iraqi Sanctions Solution Nearer, BBC News Online (Nov. 20, 2000) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east/newsid_1032000/1032410.stm>.Google Scholar Cf. Beeston, Richard, Sanctions on Iraq ‘Could Go in Six Months,’ Times (London) , Nov. 20, 2000 Google Scholar, Overseas News.

23 See, e.g., D’Amato, Anthony, Israel’s Air Strike Against the Osiraq Reactor: A Retrospective, 10 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L. J. 259 (1996)Google Scholar.

24 The issuance of guidelines was disclosed to the media at the time by the United Kingdom’s permanent representative to the United Nations, John Weston, see [John] Kampfner & Khalaf, Roula, UN Chief in Baghdad Mission, Fin. Times (London), Feb. 18, 1998, at 1 Google Scholar, and has since been confirmed by him in a review of Buder’s book, see Weston, John, Hidden Arms Still Within the Gates, Fin. Times (London), May 27, 2000, Books, at 5 Google Scholar. Both articles are obtainable from the Financial Times’ Web site, <http://www.ft.com>.

25 Traub, James, Kofi Annan’s Next Test, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1998, §6 (Magazine), at 44 Google Scholar.

26 SC Res. 687, para. 9(b) (Apr. 3, 1991).

27 See supra text accompanying notes 15-16; supra note 18 and accompanying text.

28 See Malone, supra note 6.