¹ Walter Lippmann regards him as “perhaps the ablest living diplomat in the world.” See Gupta, Karunakar, Indian Foreign Policy, Preface, p. ix (Calcutta: The World Press, 1956)Google Scholar. Lord Birdwood, who had an intimate knowledge of men and affairs of India, wrote: “I had long regarded him (Panikkar) as a key man in international affairs.” See his article, “The Foreign Policy of India and Pakistan,” 6 Eastern World 10 (London, 1952).

² Brecher, Michael, India’s Foreign Policy 15 (New York: Institute of Pacific Affairs, 1957)Google Scholar.

³ See the Communiqué issued on Dec. 30, 1949, by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Dec. 31, 1949, p. 1.

⁴ See Panikkar, K. M., In Two Chinas 67 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955)Google Scholar.

⁵ Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Dec. 31, 1949, p. 1.

⁶ Before the outbreak of war in Korea in June, 1950, the People ‘s Republic of China had been recognized by 27 countries of the world. 16 of them, Afghanistan, Burma, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, India, Israel, The Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia, were members of the United Nations Organization. 11 non-members were: Albania, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Finland, Eastern Germany, Hungary, North Korea, Mongolia, Rumania, Switzerland and Vict Minh. See Wright, Quincy, “The Chinese Recognition Problem,” 49 A.J.I.L. 322 (1955)Google Scholar.

⁷ See the following : Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, Jan. 2, 1950, p. 4 ; Assam Tribune, Jan. 2, 1950, p. 3; Hindu, Madras, Jan. 2, 1950, p. 6; Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Dec. 31, 1949, p. 1; Leader, Allahabad, Jan. 4, 1950, p. 4; National Herald, Lucknow, Dec. 31, 1949, p. 4; Times of India, Bombay, Dec. 31, 1949, p. 8.

In addition to these English dailies many native-language newspapers and periodicals also expressed their approval, in certain cases even enthusiasm, for the decision. It may be pointed out that the above-mentioned newspapers represent almost every important section of public opinion in India.

⁸ Broadly there were three kinds of reactions : the first, the countries led by the Soviet Union were obviously happy; the second, led by the United Kingdom, approved of the decision; and the last, led by the United States, considered India as one of the “precipitate recognitionists.” See New York Times, Dec. 3, 1949, p. 14.

⁹ See Press Trust of India Report, Times of India, Bombay, Dec. 3, 1949, p. 9.

¹⁰ See Prime Minister Nehru’s speech addressing the opening session of the World Pacifist Conference at Wardha the same day when recognition was accorded to China. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Jan. 1, 1950, p. 1.

¹¹ Quoted by Herach Lauterpacht in. his article, “Recognition of Governments,” The Times (London), Jan. 6, 1950, p. 5.

¹² India, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 3, Pt. 2, March 17, 1950, p. 1699.

¹³ Anne O. MeCormick described him as “one of the biggest figures in the General Assembly of the United Nations.” See New York Times, Feb. 5, 1951, p. 22.

¹⁴ 1 Oppenheim, International Law 127.

¹⁵ U.N. General Assembly, 5th Sess., Official Records, 277th Plenary Meeting (Sept. 19, 1950), p. 9.

¹⁶ Panikkar, op. cit. 68. For the status of Formosa see O’Connell, D. P., “The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem,” 50 A.J.I.L. 405-416 (1956)Google Scholar. Even after the Japanese Peace Treaty, its status is doubtful because the treaty has been signed by neither the People’s Republic of China nor the exiled Nationalist Government in Formosa. See Dillard, Hardy C., “The United States and China: The Problem of Recognition,” 44 Yale Law Rev. 182 (1955)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ See Nehru’s speech, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Jan. 1, 1950, p. 1. For the repetition of these views see Cousins, Norman, Talks with Nehru 53 (London: Gollancz, 1951)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ See Nehru’s speech, India: Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 3, Pt. 2, p. 1699.

¹⁹ See his article, “Recognition of Governments,” The Times (London), Jan. 6, 1950, p. 5.

²⁰ Quincy Wright, loc. cit. 321.

²¹ India: Parliamentary Debates: House of the People, Vol. 6 (1954), Pt. 2, Col. 7500.

²² Michael Brecher, op. cit. 2.

²³ “I had a deep feeling of sympathy for the Chinese people, a desire to see them united, strong and powerful, able to stand up against the nations which had opposed them for a hundred years, psychological appreciation of the desire to wipe out the humiliations which followed the Western domination of their country and to proclaim the message of Asia Resurgent.” See Panikkar, op. cit. 72. Also see “India and the Balance of Power,” by SirBajpai, G. S., 1 Indian Year Book of International Affairs 3 (Madras, 1952)Google Scholar.

²⁴ See Robert Trumbull’s despatch, “Nehru’s policies based on his fears for India,” New York Times, Jan. 28, 1951, See. IV, p. 5.

²⁵ National Herald, Lucknow. See the report of the Special Correspondent from New Delhi, Dec. 3, 1949, p. 8.

²⁶ See the communiqué issued by the Government of India, Dec. 30, 1949, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Dec. 31, 1949, p. 1.

²⁷ National Herald, Lucknow, Dec. 31, 1949. See the Press Trust of India Report at p. 1. By no means should it be inferred that there were no skeptical opinions with regard to the future attitude of the new Chinese regime. For example, Assam Tribune editorially wrote on Jan. 2, 1950, on p. 3, that “probably China’s intentions in South East Asia are as mala fide as Russians in Europe,” but at the same time pleaded that this “suspicion should not stand in the way of a country’s recognition policy.”

²⁸ Letter of Nov. 7, 1792. See 1 Moore, Digest of International Law 120 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906).

²⁹ The Times (London), Jan. 7, 1950, editorial at p. 7.

³⁰ The author is not oblivious of the aberrations of the British and American state practice of recognition. But on the whole, the principle of de faetoism has been adhered to. It is difficult to agree with Schwarzenberger (see his letter to The Times (London), Jan. 9, 1950, p. 5) that the state practice of the two countries—U. S. and U.K.—is against this principle. He cites H. A. Smith’s authority on the British practice (see Great Britain and the Law of Nations 5 (London, 1932)). Surprisingly, he ignores the view expressed by Smith earlier on the same page, where the latter says : “ In a very large number of cases recognition is practically a matter of routine. ...” What does it mean, if not the acceptance and the practice of the principle of de factoism? For the American practice see Neuman, William L. Jr., Recognition of Governments in the Americas 1-6 (Washington: Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1947)Google Scholar; Goebel, Julius, The Recognition Policy of the United States 111 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1915)Google Scholar.

³¹ See 18 U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin 673 (1948).

³² The United States recognized “the de facto authority” on the same day and followed it up with de jure recognition in January, 1949. Ibid., and U. S. Dept. of State Wireless Bulletin, No. 25, Jan. 29, 1949. Without distinguishing de facto and de jure recognition, the Soviet Union announced on May 17, 1948, that it “decided to recognize officially the State of Israel and its Provisional Government.” Letter from Mr. Molotov to Mr. Shertok quoted by Philip Marshall Brown, 42 A.J.I.L. 620 (1948). The United Kingdom accorded “de facto recognition to the Government of Israel” on Jan. 29, 1949, and de jure recognition on April 27, 1950. Ibid. 622, and 7 Keesing’g Contemporary Archives 1948-50, p. 10678.

³³ See India: Constituent Assembly: Legislative Debates, Vol. 6 (Aug. 9-13, 1948), Pt. 1, p. 380.

³⁴ Ibid. p. 381.

³⁵ On the following important occasions, the problem of Israel’s recognition was raised, in addition to being a part of general discussion on the foreign policy of the country many times: (a) on Aug. 20, 1948, see India: Constituent Assembly: Legislative Debates, Vol. 6, Pt. 1 (Aug. 9-13, 1948), pp. 380-381; (b) on March 9, 1949, see ibid., Vol. 2, Pt. 1 (Feb. 18-March 10, 1949), pp. 1400-1401; (c) on Dec. 6, 1949, see ibid., Vol. 4, Pt. 1 (Nov. 28-Dec. 24, 1949), pp. 233-234; (d) on Feb. 27, 1950, see India: Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 1, Pt. 1 (Feb. 1950), p. 495.

Even in the case of the People’s Republic of China there “was not much discussion of India’s policy of recognition because the Government of India had acted rather promptly, giving no occasion to raise the issue.

³⁶ Most notable of them was Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, a leading English daily of the country. It published a long editorial on Dec. 10, 1949 (p. 4), and an article by Prof. M. L. Choudhry, which according to it was a “realistic point of view,” on Dec. 18, 1949 (see Magazine Section at p. 9).

³⁷ Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, Dec. 10, 1949, editorial, p. 4.

³⁸ For the reasons responsible for British delay, see the speech of Mr. Kenneth Younger, the Minister of State in the House of Commons on April 27, 1950, 7 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives 10678. Moreover, in international law, a clear demarcation of boundaries has, in the past, not been considered a prerequisite of statehood. An example in point is the recognition of many states whose frontiers were not clearly demarcated after the first World War. See Ti-Chiang Chen, The International Law of Recognition 56 (1951).

³⁹ See the explanation of the official spokesman of the External Affairs Ministr; Government of India, on Sept. 17, 1950, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Sept. 18, 1950 p. 1.

⁴⁰ See India: Constituent Assembly: Legislative Debates, Vol. 6, Pt. 1 (Aug. 9-13 1948), p. 318.

⁴¹ Ibid., Vol. 4, Pt. 1 (Feb. 18-March 10, 1949), p. 1400.

⁴² Ibid. (Nov. 28-Dec. 24, 1949), p. 233.

⁴³ India: Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 1, Pt. 1 (Feb. 27, 1950), p. 495.

⁴⁴ For example, see the New York Times of Jan. 28, p. 6; Nov. 14, p. 2; Dec. 5, 1949, p. 2.

⁴⁵ See the statement of the spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Sept. 18, 1950, p. 1.

⁴⁶ This belief delayed Israeli recognition and even later it prevented India from entering into diplomatic relations with Israel. See Nehru’s clarification in Washington, New York Times, Dec. 20, 1956, p. 4.

⁴⁷ See ibid., Dec. 15, 1949, p. 2.

⁴⁸ See the communiqué issued by the Government of India, Hindustan Times, N Delhi, Sept. 18, 1950, p. 1.

⁴⁹ Ibid. See the report of the Special Correspondent.

⁵⁰ See the following: Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Sept. 19, 1950, editorial, p. National Herald, Lucknow, Sept. 19, 1950, editorial, p. 4; Statesman, Calcutta, Sept. 1950, editorial, p. 6; Times of India, Bombay, Sept. 20, 1950, p. 6.

⁵¹ See for example the views of Acharya J. B. Kriplani, India: Lok Sabha Debal 1956, Vol. 9, Pt. 1, Col. 501.

⁵² See 26 A.J.I.L. 927 (1932).

⁵³ 33 ibid. 689 (1939).

⁵⁴ See p. 404 above.

⁵⁵ See p. 404 above.

⁵⁶ See pp. 407-408 above.

⁵⁷ See Chen, op. cit. 101.

⁵⁸ For U. S., see 18 Dept. of State Bulletin 673 (1948) ; for U.K., see Foreign Office, Press Release, Jan. 29, 1949.

⁵⁹ See Government of India’s announcement of Sept. 17, 1950, Hindustan Times, Sept. 18, 1950, p. 1.

⁶⁰ See Chen, op. cit. 101.

⁶¹ See Molotov’s letter quoted in 42 A.J.I.L. 620 (1948).

⁶² See, for example, the view of the Government of the United Kingdom expressed in 1948. “It should be made clear that recognition of an entity as a State in no way requires the entry into diplomatic, or any other particular relations, with the entity so recognised. Whether a State enters into diplomatic or other relations with another State is, and must remain, a matter for purely political decision.” Quoted in Briggs, Herbert W., The Law of Nations 102-103 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 2nd ed., 1952)Google Scholar.

⁶³ See the speech of Mr. Menon, U.N. General Assembly, 1st Sess., Official Records, 2nd Pt., 1946, Plenary Meeting, Dec. 12, 1946, p. 1220. This resolution contained a few other provisions also, including a directive to the Members of the United Nations to recall their diplomatic representatives.

⁶⁴ See U.N. General Assembly, 5th Sess., Official Records, 1950-51, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 30th Meeting, p. 192, and ibid., 1950-51, Plenary Meetings, pp. 380-381.

⁶⁵ See India News, published by the Public Relations Department, India House, London, Oct. 14, 1950, p. 4. At an unofficial level, trade was going on even before this Pact.

⁶⁶ See Jaffe, , Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations 115 (Cambridge, Mass., 1933)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. However, it is not difficult to discover the exceptions to this generally accepted rule. For example, the Government of the United Kingdom “considered the conclusion of a trade agreement as an act of recognition.” See Chen, op. cit. 194.

⁶⁷ “It has been decided to open a Consulate of India at Barcelona. The Spanish Government’s approval is awaited.” See Report of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1951-1952, p. 8.

⁶⁸ It has not been possible to ascertain the reasons for it, although it is probable that criticism in Parliament did exercise some influence.

⁶⁹ “Almost” because there was no vote against Spain, although Belgium and Mexico abstained from voting.

⁷⁰ See Statesman, Calcutta, May 26, 1956, Report of the Special Correspondent on p. 1.

⁷¹ See Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 26, 1956, p. 1.

⁷² See Chen, op. cit. 196.

⁷³ See 1 Hackworth, Digest 166. Most other writers agree with this view.

⁷⁴ See India, Loksabha Debates, 1956, Vol. 9, Pt. 2, Col. 594.

⁷⁵ There are a few exceptions to this rule, the most outstanding being the case of Israel in relation to India.

⁷⁶ See India, Loksabha Debates, 1956, Vol. 9, Pt. 2, Col. 594.

⁷⁷ See Statesman, Calcutta, May 26, 1956, p. 1.

⁷⁸ See National Herald, Lueknow, May 27, 1956, editorial, “India and Spain,” p. 4.

⁷⁹ See New York Times, Aug. 20, 1955, p. 6.

⁸⁰ “Though relations between Spain and Portugal have been far from happy, Portuguese propaganda there has been portraying Nehru Government as anti-Catholic and anti-Christian.” See Times of India, Bombay, May 26, 1956, p. 1.

⁸¹ It may be mentioned that whatever the reasons, this view proved to be wrong by subsequent events. The Government of India did not appoint a separate Ambassador for Spain. Mrs. V. L. Pandit (a non-Christian), India’s High Commissioner in London, was concurrently accredited in Spain.

⁸² See Hackworth, op. cit. 297-298.

⁸³ See 1 Oppenheim, International Law 146.

⁸⁴ For the full text of the Declaration see Journal Officiel de la République Française, pp. 1606-1607 (March 25, 1945). It is reproduced in Cole, Allan B., Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions, A Documentary History, 1945-1955, pp. 5-6 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1956)Google Scholar.

⁸⁵ “The agreement with the Vietnam Government was much more difficult because of the greater strength of the entrenched Vietnam organizations and its unwillingness to yield on major issues of French territorial or political control.” See Michael, Franz H. and Taylor, George E., The Far East in the Modern World 588 (New York : Henry Holt & Co., 1956)Google Scholar.

⁸⁶ The views of the leaders of the Government of India were made clear at the beginning of the conflict in Indo-China, when they were not even in the government. Cf. the resolution of the Working Committee of the National Congress of India passed in December, 1945. See N. V. Rajkumar, op. cit. 90-91.

⁸⁷ See The First Year (Independence Day Souvenir, issued by the Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 1948), p. 53.

⁸⁸ ”. . . the Dutch were faced with the fait accompli of a newly established independent republic in their former colony. “See Franz H. Michael and George E. Taylor, op. cit. 575.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ See 2 International Organization 80-82 (World Peace Foundation, Boston, Mass., 1948).

⁹¹ See Fifield, Russell H., The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, 1945-1955, p. 274 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958)Google Scholar.

⁹² See the address of the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, Jan. 14, 1950, in Pravda, Jan. 31, 1950; reproduced in Allan B. Cole, op. cit. 95-96.

⁹³ See the note of Foreign Minister Chou En-lai to Hoang Minh Giam, dated Jan. 18, 1950 ; reproduced ibid. 121.

⁹⁴ See the order of A. Vyshinsky, dated Jan. 30, 1950, quoted ibid. 122.

⁹⁵ See the editorial in the New York Times, Feb. 1, 1950, p. 28.

⁹⁶ See par. 4 of the announcement in 22 Dept. of State Bulletin 291-292 (1950).

⁹⁷ See The Times (London), Feb. 8, 1950.

⁹⁸ see Allan Cole, op. cit. 89.

⁹⁹ See the statement of Dr. B. V. Keskar, the then Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Government of India, in the Times of India, Bombay, Jan. 3, 1950, p. 7.

¹⁰⁰ See the report of C. L. Sulzberger from New Delhi in the New York Times, April 29, 1950, p. 3. He describes Sir G. S. Bajpai as “India’s small, wise, soft-spoken diplomatic expert” and “righthand man of Pt. Nehru in such matters.” He also characterizes the above statement as India’s “fundamental policy.”

¹⁰¹ After about a year it was stated that “only limited progress was made ... in winning popular support for Bao Dai regime.” See Russell H. Fifleld, op. cit. 40.

¹⁰² For a full text of the Elysée Agreements, see Accords Franco-Vietnamiens 45-58 ; also reproduced in Allan Cole, op. cit. 72-79.

¹⁰³ Ibid., par. 1, under Diplomatic Status of the Agreements.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., par. 5.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pars. 3 and 4.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., par. 8.

¹⁰⁷ See par. 2, under Military Status of the Agreements.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., par. 4.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., par. 7.

¹¹⁰ Even Western Powers who had extended recognition were in agreement with India ‘s view, at least to a certain extent. “Being sensitive to the charge that this was a ‘puppet’ State, the Government in Washington, particularly, urged that more autonomous power be progressively transferred to the regime of which Bao Dai had become Head of State.” Allan Cole, op. cit. xxv.

¹¹¹ This is admitted even by those who are critical of certain aspects of the foreign policy of the Government of India. For example, Werner Levi remarks that in Vietnam India “has refused to take sides.” See his book, Fundamentals of World Organization 66 (Minneapolis, 1950).

¹¹² See a report from Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in the New York Times, Feb. 4, 1950, p. 3.

¹¹³ See his article, “India ‘s Foreign Policy—I. The Socialist View,” 7 India Quarterly 104 (New Delhi, 1951).

¹¹⁴ See par. 7 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the Problem of Restoring Peace in Indo-China, July 21, 1954; reproduced in Allan Cole, op. cit. 160-161. It may be mentioned that Bao Dai refused to be a party to it.

¹¹⁵ See the announcement of Mr. A. K. Chanda, the then Deputy Minister in the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, in the Rajya Sabha, in the Statesman, Calcutta, Dec. 16, 1954, p. 7.

¹¹⁶ See Grant, J. A. C., “The Vietnam Constitution of 1956,” 52 American Political Science Review 437 (1958)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹⁷ See Kahin, George M. (ed.), Governments and Politics in South East Asia 352 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1959)Google Scholar.

¹¹⁸ See India: A Reference Annual, 1955, p. 641 (New Delhi, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India).

¹¹⁹ There are two schools of thought on the problem. One school holds that consular relations do not amount to recognition. “A sending state shall not be presumed to have recognized the authority in actual control of a territory as entitled to such control because it has appointed a person or has permitted a person previously appointed to exercise consular functions within such territory, nor because such person has applied to that authority for permission to exercise consular functions.” See Art. 6(a), Research in International Law, Harvard Law School, Drafts of Conventions Prepared for the Codification of International Law (1932), 26 A.J.I.L. Supp. 238 (1932). There are others who lay emphasis on the issuance of exequatur in this context. They say that if the exequatur has been requested or granted, it implies recognition. See the discussion in Lauterpacht, op. cit. 383-387.

¹²⁰ See Chen, op. cit. 198.

¹²¹ For examples, see Lauterpacht, op. cit. 385. For the general policy of the U. S. Government, see 1 Moore, op. cit. 13.

¹²² For example, Prime Minister Nehru visited Hanoi and Saigon, respectively, on Oct. 17 and 30, 1954 (New York Times, Oct. 18, 1954, pp. 1 and 5): For Saigon, see National Herald, Lucknow, Oct. 31, 1954, p. 1. Dr. Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, paid an official visit to India Feb. 5-13, 1958 (see Foreign Policy of India: Text of Documents, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1958, p. 311). Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Vietnam, visited India Nov. 4-9, 1957 (see ibid. 303).

¹²³ For a full text of the principles, see ibid. 311.

¹²⁴ Ibid. 97.

¹²⁵ For example, the visit of the Prime Minister of East Germany in 1959.

¹²⁶ See Williams, John Fischer, “Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recognition in International Law,” 47 Harvard Law Rev. 776, 794 (1934)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹²⁷ See “Non-recognition as a Sanction of International Law,” 1933 A.S.I.L. Proceedings 53.

¹²⁸ Incidentally, opposition parties and independent influential individuals in India have, by and large, agreed with Prime Minister Nehru on the foreign policy of the country.

¹²⁹ The case of the state of Israel may be cited as an example.

¹³⁰ India has so far not recognized the following states : North Vietnam, South Vietnam, North Korea, South Korea, and East Germany. With West Germany she already had some kind of relationship through the Allies, of which she was a part during the second World War.