Element contents
Series: Elements in Epistemology
The A Priori without Magic
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 September 2022
Summary
The distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori is an old and influential one. But both the distinction itself and the crucial notion of a priori knowledge face powerful philosophical challenges. Many philosophers worry that accepting the a priori is tantamount to accepting epistemic magic. In contrast, this Element argues that the a priori can be formulated clearly, made respectable, and used to do important epistemological work. The author's conception of the a priori and its role falls short of what some historical proponents of the notion may have hoped for, but it allows us to accept and use the notion without abandoning either naturalism or empiricism, broadly understood. This Element argues that we can accept and use the a priori without magic.
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- Series: Elements in EpistemologyOnline ISBN: 9781009030472Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 13 October 2022
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