The chapter reports that the leniency programme in Hong Kong was promulgated at the same time that the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance went into full effect in 2015. This leniency programme has been successfully used once. The Hong Kong Competition Commission (HKCC) reached a leniency agreement in 2020, despite the strong focus of the HKCC on tackling cartels. Six out of the seven cases the HKCC has brought to the Hong Kong Competition Tribunal are cartel related. These enforcement successes are attributable to market studies of the HKCC itself. However, this situation should not be misinterpreted. With the arrival of Brent Snyder as the Chief Executive Officer of the HKCC, the leniency programme was revised. Lenient treatment remained limited to immunity, but also became available once an investigation has started. Two new schemes were introduced: leniency for individuals and leniency plus. A leniency applicant has also been given immunity from damages claims. Further, reduction was made possible through the introduction of a cooperation policy. These recent changes should contribute to enforcement and supplement the successfully concluded ex officio investigations.

This chapter on India suggests that the Indian Competition Act of 2002 already had the possibility to offer lenient treatment to a firm that reports the existence of a cartel. However, the details for offering lenient treatment were only elaborated for the first time in 2009, in the Lesser Penalty Regulation. A revision followed in 2017. This resulted in a mere thirteen decisions of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) supported by the leniency programme. This low number may be explained by the discretion the CCI has to judge leniency applications and the uncertainty leniency applicants face in relation to damages claims. The chapter recommends addressing these issues, but also increasing the incentives to apply for leniency by introducing individualised sanctions to directors or immunising successful leniency applicants from debarment from procurement projects. Another recommendation is to avoid creating other pitfalls when the Competition Act is being amended.

The chapter assesses the Taiwanese leniency programme. Taiwan incorporated a leniency programme into the Taiwan Fair Trade Act in 2011. Since it became operational in 2012, the leniency programme has been used fifteen times. Out of these fifteen leniency applications, three applications have led to a decision. Noticing that financial rewards are not really assisting the leniency applications, the chapter investigates whether the low number of decisions could be attributed to the design of the leniency programme. This is done based upon the checklist of effective leniency programmes created by the International Competition Network. The main conclusion drawn is that the leniency programme may only be moderately effective. The chapter further argues that lawyers have identified the following elements as exacerbating the bad conceptualisation of the leniency programme: uncertainty about the calculation of the fines, access to the leniency dossier by third parties, and uncertainty on how the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission deals with cartel cases in general. Another concern that the chapter ascertains is the lack of awareness in Taiwan about the disputable character of cartels.

Competition law increasingly needs to deal with contribution claims. Claims for antitrust damages are selectively brought forward against companies with vast financial assets or established in claimant-friendly jurisdictions. There is thus an emerging need for allocating liability internally among antitrust infringers. However, the ability to claim contribution in competition law cannot be taken for granted. In Texas Industries, the US Supreme Court was clear that such claims are not currently available in US antitrust law. The aim of the book is to explain how the issue of contribution is resolved in EU competition law.

Malaysia’s competition law came into force in January 2012. Detailed guidelines on the leniency programme were published in October 2014. Despite the leniency programme being designed based on best practices found in more mature competition regimes and the International Competition Network, the leniency programme has been underutilised in the cartel cases investigated in Malaysia. The underutilisation of the leniency programme could be due to the enforcement agency having too many discretionary powers. Another reason could be the lack of immunisation from civil proceedings. De facto government oversight and spillovers from deterioration in the country’s state of governance in the past could also have affected the public’s perception of quasi-independent commissions. This is reflected in the perceptions of the business community of courts and corruption in the country.