This chapter concerns Locke’s understanding of the morality of exchange and the division of labour. I first consider whether the power to appropriate property is a right which we have as a natural right, a right which is not ‘distributed’ to individuals under social contractarian reasoning. Drawing upon the views of Otsuka and Gardner, I conclude that it is such a natural right. I then dispute the claims of Otsuka and Sreenivasan that a Lockean ‘enough and as good condition’ on appropriation, if taken seriously, leads to the conclusion that each individual has a claim right to an equal share of the earth’s resources. Once we focus on (1) the stringency of Locke’s spoilation proviso, and (2) Locke’s views on the value of labour, one can develop a theory of just contractual exchange which it seems fair to attribute to Locke, which shows that the distribution of titles to land, even in conditions of scarcity, is irrelevant to the question of economic or distributive justice in holdings. The real action lies in a just division of the fruits of a division of labour, which does not allow first acquirers of titles in land to exploit the landless.