Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now
- PART ONE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXTENSIONS
- PART TWO NEW THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS
- PART THREE REAL-WORLD APPLICATIONS
- 33 The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences
- 34 Like Goes with Like: The Role of Representativeness in Erroneous and Pseudo-Scientific Beliefs
- 35 When Less Is More: Counterfactual Thinking and Satisfaction among Olympic Medalists
- 36 Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives
- 37 Assessing Uncertainty in Physical Constants
- 38 Do Analysts Overreact?
- 39 The Calibration of Expert Judgment: Heuristics and Biases Beyond the Laboratory
- 40 Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment
- 41 Heuristics and Biases in Application
- 42 Theory-Driven Reasoning about Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics
- References
- Index
33 - The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences
from PART THREE - REAL-WORLD APPLICATIONS
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now
- PART ONE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXTENSIONS
- PART TWO NEW THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS
- PART THREE REAL-WORLD APPLICATIONS
- 33 The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences
- 34 Like Goes with Like: The Role of Representativeness in Erroneous and Pseudo-Scientific Beliefs
- 35 When Less Is More: Counterfactual Thinking and Satisfaction among Olympic Medalists
- 36 Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives
- 37 Assessing Uncertainty in Physical Constants
- 38 Do Analysts Overreact?
- 39 The Calibration of Expert Judgment: Heuristics and Biases Beyond the Laboratory
- 40 Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment
- 41 Heuristics and Biases in Application
- 42 Theory-Driven Reasoning about Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics
- References
- Index
Summary
In describing an outstanding performance by a basketball player, reporters and spectators commonly use expressions such as “Larry Bird has the hot hand” or “Andrew Toney is a streak shooter.” These phrases express a belief that the performance of a player during a particular period is significantly better than expected on the basis of the player's overall record. The belief in “the hot hand” and in “streak shooting” is shared by basketball players, coaches, and fans, and it appears to affect the selection of plays and the choice of players. In this chapter, we investigate the origin and the validity of these beliefs.
People's intuitive conceptions of randomness depart systematically from the laws of chance. It appears that people expect the essential characteristics of a chance process to be represented not only globally in the entire sequence, but also locally, in each of its parts. For instance, people expect even short sequences of heads and tails to reflect the fairness of a coin and contain roughly 50% heads and 50% tails. This conception of chance has been described as a “belief in the law of small numbers” according to which the law of large numbers applies to small samples as well (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). A locally representative sequence, however, deviates systematically from chance expectation: It contains too many alternations and not enough long runs.
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- Heuristics and BiasesThe Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, pp. 601 - 616Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2002
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